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PREFACE
Two years ago, during the weekly finance seminar at Ross, I was having lunch
with a well-known scholar in the field of asset pricing. When I asked him whether it
would be possible to introduce a stochastic discount factor based on a “habit model”
with forward-looking reference levels, he immediately replied that such a model would
be really hard to solve.
For the following year I was trying to wrap my head around the problem of intro-
ducing preferences with expectation-based reference levels into asset pricing models.
Unfortunately, Gul had already done that back in 1991 when he introduced disap-
pointment aversion preferences. Disappointment aversion relies on the simple and
intuitive fact that people feel really sad whenever things turn out worse than ex-
pected. Although the theoretical framework for expectation-based utility functions
was established more than twenty years ago, disappointment aversion preferences have
been largely overlooked in favor of Kahneman’s and Tversky’s (1979) loss aversion
model.
Disappointment aversion preferences combine well established behavioral patterns
for decision making under uncertainty, such as reference-based utility and asymmet-
ric marginal utility, with a number of economically tractable properties. For in-
stance, unlike most behavioral models, disappointment aversion preferences do not
violate first-order stochastic dominance, transitivity of preferences or aggregation of
investors, and can therefore help us shed additional light on the link between financial
markets and aggregate economic activity, while maintaining investor rationality.
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Great Expectations, Greater Disappointment: Disappointment Aversion Preferences
in General Equilibrium Asset Pricing Models
by
Stefanos Delikouras
Chair: Associate Professor Robert Dittmar
For a long time, most financial economists have largely ignored experimental evidence
on decision making under risk, mainly because introducing behavioral elements into
asset pricing models while preserving investor rationality is a very challenging task.
This thesis focuses on a relatively novel set of preferences that exhibit attitudes toward
risk termed disappointment aversion preferences. These preferences are able to cap-
ture well documented patterns for risky choices, such as asymmetric marginal utility
over gains and losses, without violating first-order stochastic dominance, transitivity
of preferences or aggregation of investors. In my dissertation, I employ disappoint-
ment aversion preferences in an attempt to resolve two of the most prominent puzzles
in asset pricing: the equity premium puzzle in the cross-section of expected stock
returns, and the credit spread puzzle in corporate bond markets.
The first chapter of my dissertation explains the cross-section of expected stock
returns for the U.S. economy using an empirically tractable solution for the disap-
pointment aversion discount factor. The consumption-based asset pricing framework
introduced in the first chapter does not rely on additional risk processes, backwards-
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looking state variables, or extremely persistent macroeconomic shocks to generate
large equity risk premia. In contrast, estimation results highlight the importance of
disappointment events, defined as periods during which consumption growth drops
below its forward-looking certainty equivalent. Finally, the disappointment aversion
model is able to generate smaller in- and out-of-sample pricing errors than popular
factor-based models using aggregate consumption growth as the only independent
variable.
Structural models of default are unable to generate measurable Baa-Aaa credit
spreads, when these models are calibrated to realistic values for default rates and
losses given default. Motivated by recent results in behavioral economics, the second
chapter proposes a consumption-based asset pricing model with disappointment aver-
sion preferences in an attempt to resolve the credit spread puzzle. Simulation results
suggest that as long as losses given default and default boundaries are countercyclical,
then the disappointment model can resolve the Baa-Aaa credit spread puzzle using
preference parameters that are consistent with experimental findings. Further, the
disappointment aversion discount factor can almost perfectly match key moments for
stock market returns, the price-dividend ratio, and the risk-free rate.
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CHAPTER I
Disappointment Events in Consumption Growth,
and the Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns
“Blessed is he who expects nothing, for he shall never be disappointed.”
Alexander Pope (1688− 1744)
1.1 Abstract
This paper explains the cross-section of expected stock returns for the U.S. econ-
omy using an empirically tractable solution for the disappointment aversion discount
factor. The consumption-based asset pricing framework introduced in this paper does
not rely on additional risk processes, backwards-looking state variables, or extremely
persistent macroeconomic shocks to generate large equity risk premia. In contrast,
estimation results highlight the importance of disappointment events, defined as pe-
riods during which consumption growth drops below its forward-looking certainty
equivalent. Finally, the disappointment aversion model is able to generate smaller in-
and out-of-sample pricing errors than popular factor-based models using aggregate
consumption growth as the only independent variable.
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1.2 Introduction
This paper examines whether recent experimental results on choices under un-
certainty can help explain the cross-section of expected stock returns. Towards this
goal, I focus on a relatively novel set of preferences that exhibit attitudes toward risk
termed disappointment aversion preferences. Introducing behavioral models into a
general equilibrium framework has always been a challenging task due to the fact
that these models tend to violate fundamental preference axioms. Disappointment
aversion preferences on the other hand are able to capture well documented patterns
for risky choices, such as asymmetric marginal utility over gains and losses, without
violating first-order stochastic dominance, transitivity of preferences or aggregation
of investors. The disappointment framework can therefore help us shed additional
light on the link between expected stock returns and aggregate economic activity,
while maintaining investor rationality.
Although several consumption-based asset pricing models have proposed frame-
works that generate risk premia consistent with empirical observations, these frame-
works rely on unobserved or hard-to-measure quantities. In contrast, the empirical
results obtained here depend only on the standard measure of growth in per capita
consumption of nondurables and services. The disappointment aversion model defines
bad states of the economy endogenously, and generates risk premia by amplifying con-
temporaneous covariances between equity returns and consumption growth through
first-order risk aversion. Estimation results suggest that the disappointment aversion
framework captures book-to-market, size, earnings-to-price, and market-wide risk pre-
mia, while maintaining low first and second moments for the risk-free rate. Further
the disappointment aversion framework generates smaller in- and out-of-sample pric-
ing errors than popular factor-based pricing models, such as the four-factor Fama-
French-Carhart (Fama and French 1993 & 1996, Carhart 1997) model, using aggregate
consumption growth as the only independent variable.
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The disappointment model is centered around a single parameter, the disappoint-
ment aversion parameter, and a single explanatory variable, disappointment events in
consumption growth, defined as periods during which consumption growth falls below
its forward-looking certainty equivalent. If consumption growth is i.i.d., then disap-
pointment events happen whenever annual consumption growth is less than 0.84%.
In contrast, if consumption growth is an AR(1) process, then the disappointment
threshold is time-varying. In the postwar sample, disappointment years happen with
a 16% probability. These disappointment events tend to pre-date NBER recessions.
For instance, if year t is a disappointment year, then the probability that year t + 1
will have more than three NBER recession months rises from 15% to 88%. Moreover,
stock market crises, such as the one in 1987 or the 1998 LTCM bailout, which do
not spill over to the real economy are not particularly important for the pricing of
equity claims, because these periods are not associated with disappointment events
in consumption growth.
Finally, this paper is one of the first to estimate disappointment aversion param-
eters using stock market data. Parameter estimates are higher than those estimated
in clinical experiments. Nevertheless, the interaction between disappointment and
second-order risk aversion results in lower estimates for the coefficient of relative risk
aversion relative to preferences with second-order risk aversion alone. Under CRRA
or Epstein-Zin (Epstein and Zin 1989) preferences with i.i.d. consumption growth,
the annual point estimate for the relative risk aversion coefficient in my sample is
55 (140 for quarterly data). By incorporating disappointment aversion, point esti-
mates for the coefficients of relative risk aversion fall between 10 and 16, depending
on the persistence of consumption growth, the sample frequency, and the sample
period. Moreover, even though risk aversion estimates for second-order risk aver-
sion preferences are very sensitive to sample frequency, preference parameters for the
disappointment aversion model remain constant across frequencies.
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Disappointment aversion preferences were first introduced by Gul (1991) in order
to resolve the Allais paradox (Allais 1953)1. These preferences belong to a broader
class of preferences which are usually referred to as first-order risk aversion prefer-
ences. One way to describe first-order risk aversion preferences is by non-differentiable
utility functions with asymmetric slopes around a reference point for gains and losses.
On the other hand, preferences that are characterized by smooth, continuously dif-
ferentiable utility functions are usually referred to as second-order risk aversion pref-
erences.
Routledge and Zin (2010) and Bonomo et al. (2011) employ a generalized version
of disappointment aversion preferences in order to explain the stock market premium
for the U.S. economy. Furthermore, Bonomo et al. (2011) also find that the disap-
pointment aversion framework can closely replicate predictability patterns found in
stock market data and price-dividend ratios. However, neither paper addresses the
cross-section of equity returns. In contrast, Ostrovnaya et al. (2006) use disappoint-
ment aversion preferences to explain the cross-section of stock returns, and focus on
monthly returns for book-to-market, size and industry portfolios. Even though they
emphasize the importance of consumption growth as a state variable, the authors also
rely on aggregate stock market returns as a proxy for returns on aggregate wealth.
Ostrovnaya et al. (2006) conclude that the addition of consumption growth to the dis-
appointment aversion discount factor enhances the ability of the stock market index
to explain the cross-section of stock returns.
This paper employs the same disappointment aversion framework as Routledge
and Zin (2010) and Ostrovnaya et al. (2006), but further augments their contribution
by solving for the value function solely in terms of consumption growth. A closed-form
solution for the value function, and hence the pricing kernel, in terms of consumption
growth is significant for three reasons. First, characterizing the pricing kernel in
1The Allais paradox is related to the empirical finding that people tend to violate the indepen-
dence axiom for choices under uncertainty.
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terms of consumption growth alone, rather than consumption growth and market
returns, forces the model to confront asset pricing moments using macroeconomic data
alone. Consequently, the model does not fit equity returns to reasonable preference
parameters simply by increasing the volatility and correlation of the pricing kernel
through the use of market returns. Second, contrary to the calibration approach
undertaken by Routledge and Zin (2010) or Bonomo et al. (2011), I estimate rather
than calibrate the disappointment model allowing consumption and stock return data
to decide on the statistical and economic significance of disappointment aversion.
Finally, due to the closed-form solution for the stochastic discount factor and the use
of real data, I am able to actually identify disappointment events in the post-war
sample.
Although, Ang et al. (2006) theoretically motivate their discussion on the down-
side risk CAPM based on disappointment aversion preferences, they do not provide
a framework that directly links the disappointment aversion utility function to their
asymmetric CAPM. Lettau et al. (2013) also employ the downside CAPM to ex-
plain the cross-sectional dispersion for an impressively broad set of assets: equities,
currencies, commodities, corporate bonds. Despite the analytical tractability of the
downside CAPM, by estimating the disappointment model via GMM on consumption-
Euler equations, I do not have to explicitly transform the disappointment aversion
pricing kernel into a linear factor model, thus preserving the economic content of
preference parameters. Finally, even though I only consider a single class of assets
(equities), I conduct a number of statistical tests (out-of-sample, different frequen-
cies, different reference levels) which highlight the model’s successes as well as its
shortcomings.
The use of disappointment aversion preferences is motivated by strong experimen-
tal and field evidence from aspects of economic life that are not directly related to
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portfolio choices2. There are many asset pricing models that can efficiently explain
stylized facts in equity markets, yet these models usually have questionable out-of-
sample performance. The strategy of this paper is to impose more discipline on
investor preferences, and provide solid micro-foundations for a universal discount fac-
tor by taking into account recent experimental results for choices under uncertainty.
These results emphasize the importance of expectation-based reference-dependent
utility. This paper also adds to the relatively limited strand of literature that in-
corporates elements of behavioral economics into a consumption-based asset pricing
model without violating key assumptions of the traditional general equilibrium frame-
work.
1.3 Recursive utility with disappointment aversion prefer-
ences
1.3.1 Disappointment aversion and the portfolio-consumption problem
Consider a discrete-time, single-good, closed, endowment economy. Disappoint-
ment aversion preferences are homothetic. Therefore, if all individuals have identical
preferences, then a representative investor exists, and equilibrium prices are indepen-
dent of the wealth distribution3. Implicit in the representative agent framework lies
the assumption of complete markets. There is no productive activity, yet at each
point in time the endowment of the economy is generated exogenously by n “tree”-
assets as in Lucas (1978). There is also a market where equity claims on these assets
can be traded. In addition to rational expectations, I will also assume that there are
no restrictions on individual asset holdings, no transaction costs, and that all agents
can borrow and lend at the same risk-free rate.
At each point in time, the infinitely-lived, representative investor chooses con-
2See Section 1.5 for a complete set of references.
3Chapter 1 in Duffie (2000), and Chapter 5 in Huang and Litzenberger (1989).
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µt(Vt+1; Vt+1 < δµt)
−α = Et
[ V −αt+1 (1 + θ1{Vt+1 < δµt})
1− θ(δ−α − 1)1{δ > 1}+ θδ−αEt[1{Vt+1 < δµt}]
]
, (1.2)
subject to the usual budget and transversality constraints.
Lifetime utility Vt is strictly increasing in wealth, globally concave
5, and homo-
geneous of degree one. Dolmas (1996) shows that homothetic preferences are a nec-
essary condition for balanced growth of the economy6. This is an appealing charac-
teristic of disappointment aversion relative to other types of first-order risk aversion
preferences: disappointment preferences can successfully explain the cross-section of
expected returns without violating key economic implications for the macroecon-
omy. Another important issue with reference-based utility in a dynamic framework




µt in equation (1.2) is the disappointment aversion certainty equivalent which
generalizes the concept of expected value. Et is the conditional expectation operator.
The denominator in (1.2) is a normalization constant such that µt(µt) = µt. 1{} is
the disappointment indicator function that overweighs bad states of the world (dis-
appointment events). In a dynamic setting, the reference point for disappointment is
4In Barberis et al. (2001) and Easley and Yang (2012), investors draw utility from consumption
as well as from investing in risky assets. Here, investors draw utility from consumption alone.
5Contrary to Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, the objective function in (1.1) is
globally concave, and the second-order conditions for maximization are satisfied.
6Along balanced growth paths for the economy, the consumption-wealth ratio Ct/Wt is a sta-
tionary process.
7Andries (2011), p. 12 and pp. 50-55.
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. According to (1.2), disappointment events happen whenever lifetime
utility Vt+1 is less than some multiple δ of its certainty equivalent µt
8.
δ > 0 is the generalized disappointment aversion (GDA) multiplier introduced in
Routlegde and Zin (2010). The parameter δ is associated with the threshold below
which disappointment events occur. In Gul (1991) δ is 1, and disappointment events
happen whenever utility falls below its certainty equivalent: Vt+1 < µt(Vt+1). On the
other hand, according to the GDA framework, disappointment events may happen
below or above the certainty equivalent, Vt+1 < δµt(Vt+1), depending on whether the
GDA parameter δ is lower or greater than one respectively9. I set δ = 1 as in Gul
(1991) in order to solve Vt analytically.
α ≥ −1 is the Pratt (1964) coefficient of second-order risk aversion which affects
the smooth concavity of the objective function. θ ≥ 0 is the disappointment aversion
parameter which characterizes the degree of asymmetry in marginal utility over above
and below the reference level. If θ is positive10, then a an additional one-dollar-loss in
consumption below the reference point hurts approximately 1 + θ times more than a
an additional one-dollar-loss in consumption above the reference point. When θ = 0
investors have symmetric preferences, and the effects of first-order risk aversion vanish.
β ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of time preference. In the deterministic steady-state of the
economy, an additional $1 of consumption tomorrow is worth $β today. ρ ≤ 1 char-
acterizes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) for consumption between
two consecutive periods since EIS = 1
1−ρ . The EIS also measures the responsiveness
of consumption growth to the real interest rate. The sign of ρ and the magnitude of
the EIS have important implications for asset pricing models. In Bansal and Yaron
8I explicitly write Vt+1 < δµt as a parameter in the certainty equivalent function to keep track
of the disappointment threshold.
9For δ > 1 in (1.2), θ(δα − 1) < 1 is a sufficient condition for decreasing marginal utility.
10If θ is negative, then investor preferences are characterized by convex utility functions, losses
hurt less than gains give joy, and investors are usually referred to as ”elation seekers”.
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(2004), ρ is positive, and the EIS is greater than 1. However, in a time-additive con-
text, Hall (1988) finds that ρ is negative, and that the EIS is a very small number.
Here, I set ρ = 0 (EIS=1) in order to analytically solve the value function Vt in terms
of consumption growth.
Since the focus of this paper is the cross-sectional dimension of stock returns
and not the time-series, setting ρ equal to zero does not significantly affect empirical
results while keeping the number of free parameters to a minimum. Fixing ρ to
zero essentially implies that current consumption expenditures and future lifetime
utility are compliments (log-aggregator for consumption at different points of time),
that consumption is always a fixed fraction of wealth, and that consumption growth
moves one for one with the interest rate. Log-time preferences have been heavily
exploited in the literature precisely because they lead to closed-form solutions for
lifetime utility Vt. Piazzesi and Schneider (2006), Hansen et al. (2007), Hansen and
Heaton (2008) are a few examples in which the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is equal to one. This paper is the first to show that an EIS equal to one allows for
closed form solutions even in the case of disappointment aversion preferences.
The expression for the disappointment aversion intertemporal marginal rate of














[ 1 + θ1{Vt+1 < δµt}
1− θ(δ−α − 1)1{δ > 1}+ θδ−αEt[1{Vt+1 < δµt}]
]
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
disappointment (first-order risk) correction
Mt,t+1 essentially corrects expected values by taking into account investor preferences
over the timing and riskiness of stochastic payoffs. The first term in (1.3) corrects
for the timing of uncertain payoffs (resolution of uncertainty) which happen at a fu-
11See also Hansen et al. (2007), and Routledge and Zin (2010).
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ture date. The second term adjusts future payoffs for investors’ dislike towards risk
(second-order risk aversion). When investors’ preferences are time-additive, adjust-
ments for time and risk are identical (α = ρ)12, and the second term vanishes. The
third term in equation (1.3) corrects future payoffs for investors’ aversion towards
disappointment events, defined as periods during which lifetime utility Vt+1 drops
below some multiple δ of its certainty equivalent µt.
According to the expression in (1.3), if household preferences are not separable
across time (Kreps and Porteus 1978), then the stochastic discount factor is a func-
tion of consumption growth as well as of lifetime utility (investor’s value function).
Epstein and Zin (1989) were the first to show that these lifetime utility terms can
be replaced by returns on aggregate wealth. However, because aggregate wealth is
hard to measure, various approaches have been suggested for measuring its returns.
Campbell (1996) log-linearizes the budget constraint and expresses returns on wealth
as a function of consumption growth. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) infer returns
on wealth by exploiting the co-integration of macroeconomic variables such as in-
vestment, consumption and production. Ostrovnaya et al. (2006) use stock market
returns as a proxy for returns on wealth. Finally, Weil (1989) assumes a discrete
state space for consumption growth, and solves a system of non-linear equations that
yield wealth returns for each state of the world. Contrary to all the above, this paper
analytically characterizes investors’ lifetime utility in terms of consumption growth
by building upon the methodology used in Hansen and Heaton (2008), and exploiting
the fact that the EIS is set equal to one.




α + βEt[Vt+1], β ∈ (0, 1), α ≥ −1.
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1.3.2 Log-linear disappointment aversion preferences
For ρ = 0 and δ = 1 in equations (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3), the disappointment













1 + θ 1{Vt+1 < µt(Vt+1)}




Suppose now that all the randomness in the economy can be summarized by con-
sumption growth which follows an AR(1) process13 with constant volatility
∆ct+1 = µc(1− φc) + φc∆ct +
√
1− φ2cσcεt+1. (1.5)
µc = E[∆ct+1] ∈ R, σ2c = Var(∆ct+1) ∈ R>0, φc = ρ(∆ct+1,∆ct) ∈ (−1, 1) are the
unconditional mean, variance, and first-order autocorrelation coefficient for consump-
tion growth14. Shocks to consumption growth εt+1 are i.i.d. N(0, 1) variables. The
R2 for the AR(1) model is 21.96% for annual data and 10.79% for quarterly data.
Mehra and Prescott (1985) as well as Routledge and Zin (2010) also employ an AR(1)
model for consumption growth.
The goal now is to obtain an empirically tractable version of the disappointment
aversion stochastic discount factor in (1.4). This is done by expressing lifetime utility
Vt in terms of the observable consumption growth process ∆ct.
Proposition 1: For ρ = 0, δ = 1 and consumption growth dynamics in (1.5),
the log utility-consumption ratio, vt − ct is affine in consumption growth: vt − ct =
µv + φv∆ct ∀t, where
13Lowercase letters denote logs of variables: ct = logCt, vt = logVt.
14Following Hansen and Heaton (2008), the AR(1) framework in (1.5) can be extended to allow
for consumption growth to be a function of multiple state variables which in turn can be described
by VAR processes. Also for φc=0, the AR(1) models nests the i.i.d. case. Appendix A.2 analyzes a
linear version of the disappointment model in which I analytically express lifetime utility in terms of
changes in consumption (∆Ct+1 = Ct+1 −Ct) rather than consumption growth (∆ct+1 = logCt+1Ct ).
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• µv = β1−β
{




, µv ∈ R,
• φv = βφc1−βφc , φv ∈ R,


















) ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
disappointment
.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.1
µv is the constant term in the log utility-consumption ratio which depends on the
drift term for consumption growth µc(1−φc) appropriately corrected for risk and dis-
appointment, d1(φv+1)
√
1− φ2cσc. φv is the sensitivity of the log utility-consumption
ratio to consumption growth, and depends on consumption growth persistence (φc).
Finally, d1 is the disappointment threshold for consumption growth shocks εt+1. Ac-
cording to (1.6), the disappointment threshold d1 consists of two terms: the first term
depends only on the risk aversion coefficient α, whereas the second term depends on
both risk and disappointment aversion parameters, α and θ. For positive θ, if the
coefficient of risk aversion is also positive (α > 0), then the disappointment threshold
is definitely negative d1 < 0
15. On the other hand, for −1 ≤ α < 0 we may have
d1 ≥ 0.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 1 is that disappointment events can
now be expressed in terms of consumption growth ∆ct+1 rather than lifetime utility
15For this result to hold we also need β ∈ (0, 1) and φc ∈ (−1, 1) so that φv + 1 > 0. Empirical
results suggest that these conditions hold.
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Vt+1:
∆ct+1 < µc(1− φc) + φc∆ct + d1
√
1− φ2cσc︸ ︷︷ ︸
certainty equivalent for ∆ct+1
(1.7)
The right-hand side in (1.7) is the certainty equivalent for next period’s consumption
growth which takes into account investors’ aversion towards risk and disappointment.
(1 − φc)µc + φc∆ct is the expected value for next period’s consumption growth16,
whereas d1
√
1− φ2cσc captures the disappointment and risk correction terms. Since
consumption growth is assumed an AR(1) process, simple algebra shows that dis-
appointment events happen whenever shocks to consumption εt+1 are less than the
disappointment threshold d1
17. Note that analytical solutions for the disappoint-
ment aversion stochastic discount factor are not limited to the AR(1) specification,
but include any linear model for consumption growth with homoscedastic, normally
distributed shocks.
Equation (1.7) implies that disappointment events occur whenever next period’s
consumption growth is lower than some quantity which depends on current consump-
tion growth. At a first glance this result may be reminiscent of a habit model, like the





, which is also the certainty equivalent for consumption growth,
is forward-looking. Proposition 1 exploits the log-linear structure of the value func-





terms of the autoregressive consumption growth process, and consequently, in terms
of current consumption growth. Nevertheless, this dependence does not imply a habit
mechanism. Note also that in the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) con-
sumption never drops below its habit, otherwise marginal utility becomes infinity. On
16In this paper, expectations about future consumption growth are based on the AR(1) frame-
work. It would be interesting to consider alternative expectation measures such as analyst forecasts.
17Estimation results suggest that d1 ≈ −0.80. Disappointment events happen whenever shocks
to consumption growth are less that −0.80.
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the other hand, for disappointment aversion preferences it is precisely periods during
which consumption growth falls below its certainty equivalent that are important for
asset prices.





























1{∆ct+1 < µc(1− φc) + φc∆ct + d1
√
1− φ2cσc + α(φv + 1)(1− φ2c)σ2c}
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
disappointment (first-order risk) correction
,
Mt,t+1 in (1.8) corrects expected future payoffs for timing, risk and disappointment
18,
much like the discount factor in (1.4). The crucial difference between the two ex-
pressions is that in equation (1.8) unobservable lifetime utility Vt+1 is expressed in
terms of the observable consumption growth ∆ct+1. The empirically relevant terms
in (1.8) which affect expected excess stock returns are future consumption growth
terms (∆ct+1), and the disappointment aversion indicator function.
The disappointment model yields an analytical solution for the risk-free rate as




, the expected value of the remaining terms
in (1.8) should equal one, since the risk and disappointment correction terms induce a new probability
measure on the space of asset returns and consumption growth.
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well. According to (1.8), the one-period, log risk-free rate is equal to
rf,t+1 = −logβ + 1 · µc(1− φc) + 1 · φc∆ct︸ ︷︷ ︸



















disappointment aversion︸ ︷︷ ︸
precautionary savings motive
.
If agents are impatient with low β, then they would require a high interest rate as





in (1.9) are multiplied by unity, because the EIS is assumed
equal to one, and consumption growth moves one-for-one with interest rates. The last
two terms in (1.9) reflect the precautionary motive for investors to save. This motive
depends on both risk and disappointment aversion. Notice that second-order risk
aversion terms depend on consumption growth variance (σ2c ), while disappointment




For the empirical analysis I use annual and quarterly data. Personal consumption
expenditures (PCE), and PCE index data are from the BEA. Per capita consumption
expenditures are defined as services plus non-durables. Each component of aggregate
19The expression in (1.9) underestimates the unconditional volatility of the risk-free rate since
V̂ol(rf,t+1) = 2.428% > φ̂cV̂ol(∆ct) = 0.572% (Table 1.7.1). In contrast, an important drawback
for most consumption-based asset pricing models is an extremely volatile risk-free rate. For example,
in the time-additive CRRA case with AR(1) consumption growth, the expression for the log risk-free
rate reads rf,t+1 = −logβ + (α + 1)µc(1 − φc) + (α + 1)φc∆ct − 12 (α + 1)
2(1 − φ2c)σ2c . Given that
the risk aversion parameter α in the CRRA model needs to be around 60 to match the stock market
premium, CRRA models severely overestimate risk-free rate volatility since 60 · 0.45 · V̂ol(∆ct) =
34.320% >> V̂ol(rf,t+1) = 2.428%.
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consumption expenditures is deflated by its corresponding PCE price index (base
year is 2004). Population data are from the U.S. Census Bureau. Recession dates are
from the NBER. Asset returns, factor returns, and interest rates are from Kenneth
French’s (whom I kindly thank) website. Stock returns and interest rates have been
adjusted for inflation by subtracting the growth rate of the PCE price index20. For
quarterly data, I follow the “beginning-of-period” convention as in Campbell (2003)
and Yogo (2006) because beginning-of-quarter consumption growth is better aligned
with stock returns.
Annual consumption data are from 12/31/1948 to 12/31/2011, whereas quarterly
consumption data are from 1948.Q1 to 2011.Q4. Annual asset returns are cum-
dividend, equal-weighted returns from 12/31/1949 to 12/31/2011 with the exception
of earnings-to-price portfolios which start on 12/31/1952. Quarterly returns are from
1948.Q2 up to 2011.Q4. Following Liu et al. (2009), I focus on equal-weighted portfo-
lios which exhibit more pronounced cross-sectional dispersion, and do not overweigh
large firms. Following Yogo (2006), I start the sample in the late 40’s in order to
allow sufficient time for Second World War shocks to die out. The use of post-war
data is motivated by the possibility of a structural break in the U.S. economy af-
ter the Second World War, as well as by the fact that consumption and population
measurements during the first half of the 20th century may not be accurate21.
1.4.2 Estimation methodology
My analysis is focused on portfolios double sorted on size and book-to-market
(BM). Ever since Fama and French (1993 & 1996) documented that these two vari-
ables capture most of the cross-sectional variation in equity returns, much of the
20Rreal,t+1 = exp(logRnom,t+1 − log PCEt+1PCEt ), R are gross returns.
21This study focuses on 25 portfolios double sorted on book-to-market and size. Estimation
results for 10 BM portfolios, 10 size portfolios, 10 BM and 10 size portfolios combined, value-
weighted portfolios, nominal consumption growth and nominal stock returns, as well as results for
the 1930-2011 period are available upon request.
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asset pricing literature in the past two decades has focused on explaining the size
and value factors. Parameters to be estimated are the rate of time preference β, the
second-order risk aversion parameter α, and the disappointment aversion parame-
ter θ. The key insight for disappointment aversion preferences is that the reference
point for disappointment d1 is endogenous. According to equation (1.6), d1 will be
identified once preference parameters and consumption growth moments have been
estimated. Consumption growth moments (mean µc, autocorrelation φc, volatility σc)
are estimated in advance, and are considered inputs for the GMM estimation22.
Estimation is conducted using the generalized method of moments (GMM, Hansen
and Singleton 1982) in which the unconditional consumption-Euler equations serve
as moment restrictions







































Ri,t are one-period, real, cum-dividend, gross returns for portfolio i, and Rf,t is the one
period risk-free rate. It is important to emphasize that, contrary to the majority of
cross-sectional results in the literature, moment conditions include the Euler equation
for the risk-free rate in order to examine whether the disappointment model can
explain the cross-section of expected stock returns while generating realistic first and
22In untabulated results, I also consider the case where consumption moments are part of the
GMM objective function, and results still go through.
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second moments for the risk-free rate23.
We can also use the unconditional consumption-Euler equations in (1.10), and the












M̃t,t+1 is from (1.11),
ˆ̂E[Ri,t] are model-implied expected returns, and Ê[Ri,t] are
sample expected returns. Mean absolute prediction error (m.a.p.e.) is a metric which
shows how well the model fits expected returns.
Parameters are estimated by minimizing the sample analogue of the GMM objec-
tive function (ĝ(β, α, θ)) with respect to the unknown preference parameters
min
{β, α, θ}
ĝ(β, α, θ)′ W ĝ(β, α, θ). (1.13)
Moment conditions are weighted by the identity matrix (first-stage GMM). According
to Cochrane (2001) and Liu et al. (2009), first-stage GMM preserves the economic
structure of the GMM objective function. Furthermore, according to Ferson and
Foerster (1994), second-stage GMM estimates are distorted in finite samples. Hayashi
(2000, p. 229) and references therein also provide a discussion on small sample GMM
estimators, and suggest the use of first-stage GMM in finite samples. Although first-
stage GMM estimates are consistent (Cochrane 2001, p. 203), standard errors need
to be adjusted for the fact that first-stage GMM does not use the minimum variance
weighting matrix (Cochrane 2001, p. 205).
23The risk-free rate is assumed conditionally risk-free. Unconditionally, the risk-free rate becomes
a random variable.
24Cov(X,Y ) = E[XY ]− E[X]E[Y ].
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Estimation of the disappointment model is challenging because the discount factor
in (1.8) is not continuous. However, Newey and McFadden (1994) and Andrews
(1994) have shown that continuity and differentiability of the GMM objective function
can be replaced by the less stringent conditions of continuity with probability one
(Theorem 2.6 p. 2132 in Newey and McFadden 1994) and stochastic differentiability
(Theorems 7.2 p. 2186, and 7.3 p. 2188, in Newey and McFadden 1994). As shown in
Appendix A.3, both of these conditions are satisfied by the disappointment aversion
stochastic discount factor provided that log-consumption growth and log-stock returns
are continuous random variables (no mass points) with bounded first and second
moments, and a well defined moment generating function. In this case, discontinuities
are zero probability events.
For comparison purposes, I estimate five additional models: the market discount
factor (Lintner 1965), the four factor Fama-French-Carhart (FF) model (Fama and
French 1996, Carhart 1997) model, the time-additive CRRA discount factor defined





the Epstein-Zin (EZ) pricing kernel with AR(1) consumption growth and log-time





















25The EIS in Epstein-Zin preferences is not necessarily one as it is assumed here. However,
throughout the paper I will refer to the non-separable model with second-order risk aversion and
log-time preferences as the Epstein-Zin model. The discount factor in (1.15) is derived along the
lines of Proposition 1 with the additional assumption that the coefficient of disappointment aversion
θ is zero (no first-order risk aversion effects).
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1 + θ 1{∆Ct+1 < µC + d1ΣC}
1 + θ Et[1{∆Ct+1 < µC + d1ΣC}]
. (1.16)
The market and Fama-French-Carhart specifications are considered benchmark
models among practitioners and academics. According to Cochrane (2001, p. 442),
the Fama-French-Carhart (FF) model can be regarded as an arbitrage pricing the-
ory model (APT) ”rather than a macroeconomic factor model.” However, due to its
popularity, I include it in the set of asset pricing models. The time-additive CRRA
discount factor in (1.14) requires extremely large values for the second-order risk aver-
sion and rate of time preference parameters in order to match equity returns. The
Epstein-Zin framework does not account for disappointment aversion, yet it relies on
second-order risk aversion and consumption growth persistence in order to generate
realistic equity premia. The linear disappointment model in (1.15) with i.i.d. changes
in consumption highlights the explanatory power of disappointment aversion alone,
without considering second-order risk aversion or persistence in consumption growth.
Consumption models in (1.14) - (1.16) are essentially nested by the benchmark model
in (1.8).
1.4.3 Estimation results for annual stock returns
Table 1.7.2 shows estimation results for the the 25 Fama-French portfolios and
the disappointment aversion discount factor. According to the J-test and p-value
statistics (20.087 and 0.636 respectively), the null hypothesis that all moment condi-
tions are jointly zero cannot be rejected at conventional confidence levels. The rate
26The linear version of the disappointment aversion discount factor is discussed in Appendix
A.2, and derived in Appendix A.4.2. µC and ΣC are the unconditional mean and standard devia-
tion respectively for consumption in first differences (∆Ct+1) which, in turn, is assumed to be an
i.i.d. process with normal shocks. d1 is the disappointment threshold for the linear disappointment
aversion discount factor, and is defined in Appendix A.4.2 (equation A.17).
27An undesirable aspect of the linear disappointment models is the non-zero, but infinitesimally
small, probability of negative consumption.
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of time preference β is equal to 0.977 (t-statistic 2.868), whereas the disappointment
aversion coefficient θ is 4.606 (t-statistic 3.883). The estimated value for θ implies
that an extra dollar of consumption during disappointment years is approximately 5.5
times more valuable in terms of marginal utility than an extra dollar of consumption
during normal times. The second-order risk aversion coefficient is 9.929, yet the low
t-statistic (t-stat. 0.574) suggests that α cannot be accurately estimated by GMM.
Kahneman and Tversky (1992) estimate the loss aversion coefficient to be 1.25,
and the second-order risk aversion parameter α to be -0.88. Barberis et al. (2001)
also use a loss aversion parameter of 1.25, yet they set the second-order risk aversion
parameter equal to zero (log-preferences over risk) and prescribe preferences over con-
sumption as well as individual asset returns, whereas here investors have preferences
over consumption alone. In order to explain the market-wide equity premium, Rout-
ledge and Zin (2010) set θ equal to 9 with α equal to -1 (second-order risk neutrality),
whereas in Bonomo et al. (2011) θ is 2.33 and α is 1.5 because the authors assume
a very persistent process for resumption growth variance, whereas here consumption
growth variance is constant.
Choi et al. (2007) conduct clinical experiments on portfolio choice under uncer-
tainty, and find disappointment aversion coefficients that range from 0 to 1.876, with
a mean of 0.39. They also estimate second-order risk aversion parameters that range
from -0.952 to 2.871, with a mean of 1.448. Using experimental data on real effort
provision, Gill and Prowse (2012) estimate disappointment aversion coefficients rang-
ing from 1.260 to 2.070. Ostrovnaya et al. (2006) estimate disappointment aversion
parameters from stock market data using market wide stock market returns as the
explanatory variable, instead of consumption growth. Their estimates for θ range
from 1.825 to 2.783. However, the authors rely on aggregate stock market returns as
an explanatory variable, which are much more volatile than consumption growth.
The main reason as to why parameter estimates may deviate from those obtained
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in clinical experiments is probably limited stock market participation. It has been
well documented (Mankiw and Zeldes 1991, Jorgensen 2002) that only a fraction of
households participate in the stock market. If aggregate consumption is less volatile
than stock-market participants’ consumption, then parameter estimates using aggre-
gate consumption will be upwards biased.
According to Table 1.7.2, the disappointment threshold d1 is -0.780, which means
that disappointment events happen whenever annual consumption growth is less than
1.031% + 0.463∆ct− 0.780 · 1.120%. These events happen with a 15.873% probability
in the post-war sample28. This is in sharp contrast to the disaster literature (Barro
2006) which indicates that disasters happen with probability 1.7% per year, and to
the results in Ostrovnaya et al. (2006) which identify only 4 disappointment months
for a period from 1960 to 2005. Barro (2006) calibrates the disaster process, an ad-
ditional risk process, to OECD log-output data, whereas here disappointment events
arise endogenously from investor preferences over consumption. In Ostrovnaya et al.
(2006), disappointment events happen rarely because reference levels for disappoint-
ment, in terms of the generalized disappointment aversion coefficient δ, are low. In
their model, the aggregate investor penalizes extreme events since δ < 1, whereas
here δ is 1.
Table 1.7.2 also shows GMM estimation results for the extended set of discount
factors. The constant term in the market model is positive (4.377), whereas the
coefficient on the market factor is negative (-3.132). Both parameters are statistically
significant (t-statistics 3.661 and -2.991 respectively), yet the null hypothesis that all
moment conditions are jointly satisfied can be rejected (p-value 0.009). Statistically
significant estimates for the Fama-French-Carhart model include the constant term
(3.659, t-stat. 2.627), the market parameter (-2.268, t-stat. 1.931), and the HML
coefficient (-3.956, t-stat. -3.058). The null hypothesis for the Fama-French-Carhart
28Disappointment years for the log-linear disappointment aversion discount factor happened in
1953, 1956, 1959, 1973, 1980, 1990, 1999, 2007, 2008, 2010.
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model is also rejected (p-value 0.023). According to Hayashi (2000, p. 229), the low
J-statistics across all asset pricing models in Table 1.7.2 can be attributed to the fact
that first-stage GMM tests of overidentifying restrictions tend to reject the null more
often than they should.
Results for time-separable preferences (CRRA model) reaffirm the equity premium
puzzle in Mehra and Prescott (1985) since the second-order risk aversion parameter
is extremely high (55.17129, t-stat. 2.561). With time-separable CRRA preferences, a
large coefficient of risk aversion is the only way to map consumption growth risk into
equity premia. Moreover, the rate of time preference β is significantly larger than one
(2.17230, t-stat. 3.334) so that the unconditional mean for the risk-free rate remains
low despite the large risk aversion coefficient. Nevertheless, a risk aversion parameter
equal to 55 implies an extremely volatile risk-free rate. Finally, the null hypothesis
for this model is rejected at conventional confidence levels (p-value 0.002).
Contrary to the CRRA case, the estimated rate of time preference for the Epstein-
Zin model is lower than one (0.983, t-stat. 9.395). Also, the second-order risk aversion
parameter (35.55031, t-stat. 3.336) is smaller than for CRRA utility because, with
Epstein-Zin preferences, consumption growth risk is amplified by consumption growth
persistence. However, in untabulated results for i.i.d., instead of AR(1), consumption
growth, the risk aversion estimate for Epstein-Zin preferences is 55.171 (t-stat. 2.537),
exactly identical to the time-additive CRRA case.
The Epstein-Zin discount factor can explain the cross-section of returns with low
values for the second-order risk aversion parameter α provided that consumption
growth is extremely persistent. A number of recent asset pricing results rely on highly
persistent shocks to expected consumption growth. In Bansal and Yaron (2004),
29Cochrane (2001) argues that time-additive CRRA preferences can explain the unconditional
equity premium provided that the risk aversion parameter is larger than 50.
30Liu et al. (2009) and Yogo (2004) also estimate β larger than one for time-additive CRRA
preferences.
31In Routldege and Zin (2010), the risk aversion parameter α for the Epstein-Zin model is cali-
brated to 31.542.
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shocks to expected consumption growth have a half-life of approximately 3 years32,
whereas, according to BEA data from Table 1.7.1, shocks to consumption growth
have a half-life of less than a year. Of course, consumption growth persistence and
expected consumption growth persistence are two different quantities. Nevertheless,
the persistent shocks in expected consumption growth assumed by the Bansal-Yaron
model are hard to detect empirically (Beeler and Campbell 2012). Furthermore,
a number of authors (Campbell and Cochrane 1999, Cochrane 2001) suggest that
consumption growth is most likely an i.i.d. process.
When preferences are time-separable, expected excess log-returns are a function
of covariances between stock returns and consumption growth. According to the
expression in (1.14), these covariances are amplified by the second-order risk aversion
coefficient α33:
E[ri,t+1 − rf,t+1]CRRA ≈ (α + 1)Cov
(
∆ct+1, ri,t+1 − rf,t+1
)
. (1.17)
When preferences are non-separable (Epstein-Zin model), then expected excess log-
returns are still generated by covariances between stock returns and consumption
growth. However, according to the expression in (1.15), the second-order risk aversion
coefficient α, which amplifies covariances, is divided by 1−βφc, the term that captures
consumption growth persistence





∆ct+1, ri,t+1 − rf,t+1
)
. (1.18)
If consumption growth persistence φc or the rate of time preferences β are high
enough so that 1 − βφc ≈ 0, then covariances of consumption growth with stock
returns can generate plausible equity risk premia, even if the coefficient of risk aversion
32The half-life of consumption growth shocks when consumption growth follows an AR(1) process
is equal to log(0.5)/log(φAR(1)) in which φAR(1) is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient.
33ri,t = logRi,t
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α is low. For φc = 0 however, risk aversion estimates for the Epstein-Zin model
are the same as in the time-separable case. If additionally we allow the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution to be greater than one, instead of unitary EIS as is
assumed here, then the effects of consumption growth persistence will be even more
pronounced. Beeler and Campbell (2012) highlight the interaction between expected
consumption growth persistence and an EIS higher than one as the main driving force
behind equity risk premia in the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004). In
the long-run risk model, equity premia are almost zero if the EIS is lower than one
or if consumption growth is i.i.d.34, unless one assumes extremely high values for the
coefficient of risk aversion α.
Turning to the linear disappointment model in (1.16), the disappointment thresh-
old d1 is -0.913, higher than the threshold for the log-linear case (-0.780 in Table
1.7.2). Similarly, disappointment events for the linear model happen with probabil-
ity 11.111%, and are less frequent relative to the log-linear case35. The rate of time
preference for the linear disappointment aversion model is 0.987 (t-stat. 340.996)36,
and the disappointment aversion coefficient θ is 9.33137 (t-stat. 1.070). The GMM
cannot accurately estimate the disappointment aversion for the linear model probably
because the GMM function remains constant for a range of θ values. Nevertheless,
with a p-value of 0.074 the null hypothesis for the linear disappointment model cannot
be rejected at a 5% confidence level.
Table 1.7.2 also shows mean absolute prediction errors (m.a.p.e.) across all models,
and Figure 1.8.1 shows fitted and sample expected returns according to the expression
in (1.12). Prediction errors for the disappointment aversion discount factors (log-
34Table 4, p. 23 in Bonomo et al. (2011).
35Disappointment years for the linear disappointment aversion discount factor happened in 1957,
1973, 1979, 1980, 1990, 2007, 2008.
36The high t-statistic is due to the fact that the linear disappointment model exactly pins down
the rate of time preference β from the moment condition E[Rf,t+1β] = 1.
37For their version of the linear model, Routledge and Zin (2010) set the disappointment aversion
parameter equal to 9.
25
linear m.a.p.e. 0.99%, linear m.a.p.e. 0.99%) are smaller than for the rest of the
models. The market model is the least accurate model since average prediction error is
2.38% and fitted returns in Figure 1.8.1 (graph b) are almost parallel to the horizontal
axis. The Fama-French-Carhart model does a better job than the market model (FF
m.a.p.e. 1.12%), and its accuracy is superior to consumption models (CRRA m.a.p.e.
1.51%, EZ m.a.p.e. 1.35%). However, in-sample prediction errors for the Fama-
French-Carhart specification are slightly lager than the errors for the disappointment
aversion models. In accordance to m.a.p.e. results, fitted expected returns for the
disappointment models (plots a & f in Figure 1.8.1) are aligned in an orderly fashion
along the 45◦ line.
Relative to the time-additive CRRA and Epstein-Zin models in (1.14) and (1.15),
the log-linear disappointment aversion discount factor in (1.8) has an additional free
parameter, the disappointment aversion coefficient θ. We would therefore expect
the disappointment aversion discount factor to fit the data better than traditional
consumption models. However, results in Table 1.7.2 and Figure 1.8.1 suggest that the
linear disappointment discount factor performs better than the CRRA and Epstein-
Zin discount factors while maintaining the same number of free parameters.
The empirical performance of disappointment aversion preferences can be ex-
plained by three important characteristics. The first one is common to all consump-
tion models, and is related to consumption smoothing. During bad times, when
consumption growth is low, the discount factor is high. According to equation (1.12),
assets that covary positively with the stochastic discount factor Mt,t+1, that is as-
sets that perform well in states of the world for which consumption growth is low,
essentially provide insurance to investors. These assets command low, even negative,
expected returns. On the other hand, assets which do well when consumption growth
is high, but perform poorly when consumption growth is low (negative covariance
with the stochastic discount factor), command high expected returns so as to entice
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the aggregate investor to include these assets in her portfolio.
Second, disappointment averse investors are reluctant to take small bets due to
non differentiable preferences with asymmetric marginal utility over gains and losses.
Aggregate consumption growth exhibits extremely low time-series variability, which in
turn implies very low covariances between assets returns and consumption growth38.
If investors’ preferences are described by continuously differentiable functions, then
these functions need to be extremely concave in order to generate the observed equity
premia. In contrast, with disappointment aversion preferences, whenever disappoint-
ment events occur, there is an upwards jump in marginal utility. Even though these
jumps in marginal utility are smoothed out by the expectation operator, first-order
risk aversion terms amplify shocks to consumption growth, and generate realistic risk
premia with preference parameters which are smaller in magnitude than those in
second-order risk aversion models.
The third characteristic is related to the reference point for disappointment events.
According to the expression in (1.7), reference levels for disappointment and gains are
endogenously defined, and depend on preference parameters α and θ. Furthermore, in
a dynamic setting the expectation-based reference point for disappointment aversion
preferences is forward-looking which matches perfectly the forward-looking nature
of asset prices. On the other hand, most first-order risk aversion models assume
reference points which are exogenously specified. Relative to other first-order risk
aversion models, the disappointment framework seems to provide a more accurate
description of what investors consider gains and losses.
The sceptical reader might argue that by introducing a non-differentiable utility
function, one can reduce the required magnitude of the risk aversion coefficient be-
cause second-order risk aversion and disappointment aversion are perfect substitutes.
While this might be partially true, the discussion in the introductory and literature
38Table 1.7.1.
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review parts of this paper, and references therein, emphasize important theoretical
differences between the two concepts. First-order risk aversion can resolve a num-
ber of stylized facts about decisions under uncertainty which cannot be explained by
smooth utility functions. If second-order risk aversion and disappointment aversion
were perfect substitutes, then prediction errors in Table 1.7.2 for the two types of
consumption models should be identical. Moreover, expected returns for traditional
consumption models (graphs d and e in Figure 1.8.1) should perfectly match those
for disappointment aversion preferences (graphs a and f).
1.4.4 Disappointment events and NBER recessions
Figure 1.8.2 plots consumption growth, disappointment years, and NBER reces-
sion dates. Disappointment events are estimated from the Euler equations for the
25 Fama-French portfolios plus the risk-free rate, and are highlighted with ellipses.
When consumption growth is i.i.d, the disappointment threshold is constant across
time (the flat line in Figure 1.8.2) and equal to 0.84%39. When consumption growth is
AR(1), the disappointment threshold is time-varying (the dashed line in Figure 1.8.2).
Overall, disappointment events are connected to real economic activity. The stock
market crisis of 1987 or the LTCM bailout in 1998 are not considered disappointment
events since the financial meltdowns did not spill over to aggregate consumption.
Disappointment events emphasize an important aspect of consumption asset pricing
models: financial assets are priced according to the co-movement of these assets with
aggregate consumption and the real economy. Financial crises are therefore priced
into asset returns only to the extent that these crises spill over to the real sector.
This is exactly what happened during the recent 2007-2009 recession.
39For i.i.d. consumption growth, disappointment events are characterized by the threshold µc +
d1σc ≈ 0.84%. µc is the unconditional expected consumption growth (1.922% from Table 1.7.1), σc
is the unconditional standard deviation for consumption growth (1.264% from Table 1.7.1), and d1
is the disappointment threshold (-0.854 in untabulated results for i.i.d. consumption growth and the
set of the 25 Fama-French portfolios plus the risk-free rate).
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According to Figure 1.8.2, disappointment events tend to pre-date NBER recession
years. In order to test how often disappointment events are followed by recessions,
I run logistic regressions in which the dependent variable is an indicator function
depending on whether there are at least three NBER recession months in year t
Y = 1{at least three months in year t are NBER recession months}.
The explanatory variable is also an indicator function depending on whether year
t− 1 was a disappointment year
X = 1{year t− 1 was a disappointment year}.
Disappointment years are estimated for the set of 25 BM-size portfolios and the
disappointment discount factor in (1.8) with AR(1) consumption growth (the ellipses
in Figure 1.8.2). Panel A in Table 1.7.3 presents results for the logistic regression. If
year t− 1 is a disappointment year, then the probability that there will be more than
three NBER recession months during year t increases from (1 + e1.727)−1 = 15.09%40
to (1 + e1.727−3.806)−1 = 88.88%. Furthermore, since the p-value for the log-likelihood
test is almost zero, we can reject the null hypothesis that the two logistic regression
models, with and without disappointment events as an explanatory variable, have the
same overall fit.
In order to emphasize the fact that disappointment events precede NBER reces-
sions, I repeat the above exercise, but now the explanatory variable is an indicator
function depending on whether year t is also a disappointment year.
X = 1{year t is also a disappointment year}.
4015.09% is the probability that at least three months in year t are NBER recession months given
that year t− 1 was not a disappointment year.
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Results in Panel B suggest that disappointment events do not overlap with NBER
recessions since regression coefficients are statistically insignificant (0.251, t-stat.
0.330). Moreover, the high p-value (0.743) indicates that including contemporaneous
disappointment events to the logistic model does not improve the overall fit relative
to the model with the constant term alone. The above results establish that the
set of disappointment events is different than the set of NBER recessions, and that
disappointment events tend to pre-date NBER recessions.
1.4.5 Out-of-sample performance
Consumption-based stochastic discount factors are usually structural models that
rely on deep economic parameters such as the rate of time preference, first or second-
order risk aversion parameters, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the elas-
ticity of substitution across different consumption goods, the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply and so on. Estimates for these parameters should remain roughly the same
across time41 and across assets. In this section, the set of asset pricing models is sub-
mitted to a series of out-of-sample performance tests. Besides providing additional
information for the disappointment model, out-of-sample tests can also help address
the critique in Lewellen et al. (2010) on the structural nature of book-to-market
portfolios.
Using estimation results for the 25 Fama-French portfolios in Table 1.7.2, I calcu-
late prediction errors according to the expression in (1.12) when the estimated asset
pricing models are applied to 10 equal-weighted earnings-to-price (EP) portfolios.
Earnings-to-price portfolios have also been used by Fama and French (1993) as test-
ing assets. The stock market portfolio is also included as an out-of-sample testing
asset for consumption models only, since the Fama-French and market models already
include market returns as an asset pricing factor. For the market portfolio tests, I
41The possibility of exogenous time variation in preference parameters is generally unappealing
to most economists.
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also set preference parameters in the log-linear disappointment aversion model equal
to the clinical estimates from Choi et al. (2007): the disappointment aversion param-
eter θ is 1.876, and the second-order risk aversion coefficient α is 2.871. Choi et al.
(2007) perform their clinical experiments in an atemporal setting, and do not provide
any guidance on the choice of β which I set equal to 0.99. Finally, for the Choi et
al. (2007) parametrization, I assume an extremely persistent process for consumption
growth in which the autocorrelation coefficient φc is equal to 0.968.
Panel A in Table 1.7.4 shows out-of-sample results for the set of discount factors
considered in this study and the 10 EP portfolios. Disappointment aversion mod-
els seem to outperform all other models in terms of prediction errors (linear m.a.p.e.
0.40%, log-linear m.a.p.e. 0.80%). According to graph a in Figure 1.8.3, predicted and
sample returns for the disappointment aversion model are almost perfectly aligned
across the diagonal. In terms of the market-wide equity premium (Panel B), dis-
appointment models outperform standard consumption models, and can almost per-
fectly replicate stock market expected returns (linear m.a.p.e. 0.24%), even though
preference parameters have been estimated from the set of 25 Fama-French portfo-
lios. Prediction errors for the Choi et al. (2007) model are also very low (0.15%),
but this is mainly due to consumption growth autocorrelation, which is set equal
to 0.968. Fitted expected returns for the Choi et al. (2007) parametrization with
extremely persistent consumption growth prove that, according to the expression in
(1.18), if consumption growth persistence φc or the rate of time preference β are large
enough, clinical estimates for risk and disappointment aversion parameters can fully
rationalize the equity premium.
In addition to cross-sectional out-of-sample tests, I also study the out-of-sample
accuracy of the asset pricing models across the time-series dimension. First, I esti-
mate model parameters for the extended set of discount factors using stock returns
from 1949 to 1978. Then, I use the estimated parameters to generate model-implied
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expected returns according to (1.12) for the second half of the sample. For these tests,
I set consumption growth moments (autocorrelation, mean, standard deviation) equal
to the full sample estimates from Table 1.7.1.
Table 1.7.5 shows GMM results for the 1949-1978 sample. Parameter estimates
for the market and Fama-French-Carhart specifications are statistically significant,
and are comparable to the full-sample results from Table 1.7.2, with the exception of
the momentum coefficient (-6.607 vs. 0.268 for the full sample in Table 1.7.2). The
risk aversion estimate for the CRRA model during the 1949-1978 period is 61.229
(t-stat. 2.179), slightly larger than for the full sample. The rate of time preference
for the Epstein-Zin model is higher than one (1.104, t-stat. 5.508), and the second-
order risk aversion estimate is 30.014 (t-stat. 2.706), which is lower than the one
obtained for the full sample in Table 1.7.2. Finally, estimates for the disappointment
aversion parameter θ in the log-linear and linear disappointment models are 3.990
(t-stat. 2.768) and 6.810 (t-stat. 1.980) respectively. None of the models is rejected
since all p-values are large. Nevertheless, standard errors are not reliable, and test
statistics should be interpreted with caution since there are only 30 observations in
the sample.
Table 1.7.5 also shows out-of-sample mean absolute prediction errors for the four
models during the 1979-2011 period. The Fama-French-Carhart model cannot price
expected returns out of sample since the mean absolute prediction error for 1979-2011
period is 13.59%. The market, CRRA, and linear disappointment aversion models do
not do well either, since average out-of-sample errors are equal to 4.10%, 3.22%, and
2.67% respectively. In contrast, the log-linear disappointment aversion and Epstein-
Zin models outperform all other specifications with average prediction errors of 2.17%
and 1.99% respectively. Figure 1.8.4 and Figure 1.8.5 show expected stock returns
for the first and second half of the sample. According to Figure 1.8.4, the Fama-
French-Carhart specification clearly performs better than all other specifications in
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terms of in-sample accuracy. However, plot c in Figure 1.8.5 shows that the Fama-
French-Carhart model cannot explain out-of-sample expected returns.
Figure 1.8.6 and Figure 1.8.7 show expected stock returns for 10 book-to-market
portfolios during the first and second half of the sample respectively. Estimation re-
sults can be found in Table 1.7.6. In terms of point estimates, results in Table 1.7.6
are quite similar to the ones obtained for the 25 portfolios in Table 1.7.2. Figure
1.8.6 highlights the impressive in-sample performance of the Fama-Frech discount
factor (FF in-sample m.a.p.e. 0.21%). However, out-of-sample prediction errors for
the second half are extremely large (FF out-of-sample m.a.p.e. 10.70%). According
to Figure 1.8.6 and Figure 1.8.7, consumption models exhibit more consistent perfor-
mance across samples than the Fama-French model, and this is probably due to the
structural nature of these models.
Large out-of-sample errors for the Fama-French-Carhart model do not imply that
we should automatically dismiss this model, but rather that its unconditional version
fails to capture time variation in risk premia. Following Ferson and Harvey (1991),
and Jagannathan and Wang (1996), there is a large literature on time-varying betas
which seem to improve the performance of factor-based asset pricing models. On
the other hand, the disappointment model delivers out-of-sample performance with
constant preferences parameters, since time-variation in risk aversion, and therefore
in expected risk premia, is hardwired into disappointment aversion terms. The im-
pressive out-of-sample performance for the disappointment model should also be at-
tributed to better consumption measurements towards the end of the sample, and the
realization of particularly important disappointment events in 1990 and 2007-2008.
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1.4.6 Estimation results for first-order risk aversion preferences with al-
ternative reference points for gains and losses
The empirical evidence in this paper emphasize the importance of endogenous
reference points for gains and losses in explaining the cross-section of expected stock
returns. In this section, I estimate three additional consumption models which are
very similar to the disappointment aversion stochastic discount factor in (1.8). How-
ever, unlike the disappointment aversion framework, reference points for gains and
losses are no longer equal to the certainty equivalent for consumption growth.
The first-order risk aversion discount factor specification to be tested is
Mt,t+1 = exp
[
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1 + θEt
[
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] .︸ ︷︷ ︸
first-order risk correction
(1.19)
in which d̄ is the exogenous reference point for gains and losses. It is straightforward
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∆ct+1 < d̄+ α(φv + 1)(1− φ2c)σ2c
])
+ log(1 + θ1{∆ct+1 < d̄})
]}
= 1,
provided that i) consumption growth is log-normal, ii) its dynamics are given by the
expression in (1.5), and iii) φv =
βφc
1−βφc . Note that utility functions corresponding
to the discount factor in (1.19) are hard, or even impossible, to aggregate because
preferences are no longer homothetic.
Disappointment events are defined in equation (1.7) as years during which con-
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sumption growth drops below its certainty equivalent. Similarly, we can define loss
events as periods during which consumption growth drops below the threshold d̄. I
consider four different values for d̄: i) the log risk-free rate rf,t+1, ii) current period’s
consumption growth ∆ct, iii) zero consumption growth, and iv) d̄ is a free parameter
to be estimated. The above parameter values are intuitively appealing, and have been
previously used in the literature42.
Table 1.7.7 shows results for the discount factor in (1.19). When d̄ is equal to the
log risk-free rate, the probability of a loss event is 33.333%, the rate of time preference
is 0.917 (t-stat. 5.143), the second-order risk aversion estimates is quite high (α =
46.784, t-stat. 3.015), and the disappointment aversion parameter is negative (θ = -
0.827, t-stat. -3.073). When d̄ is equal to current consumption growth, the probability
of a loss event is 53.568%, the rate of time preference is larger than one (1.215, t-
stat. 6.590), the second-order risk aversion estimate (54.227, t-stat. 13.369) is almost
equal to the time-separable CRRA case from Table 1.7.2, and the first-order risk
aversion parameter is negative (-0.916, t-stat. -7.794). We can therefore conclude
that whenever the reference point d̄ is equal to either the log risk-free rate or current
consumption growth, then loss events happen so often that: i) they become irrelevant
for asset pricing, ii) the first-order risk aversion parameter is negative, and iii) the
second-order risk aversion parameter is similar in magnitude to the time-additive
CRRA estimates from Table 1.7.2.
Results are more economically sensible when the reference point for consumption
growth is zero (the status quo). This reference point can also be interpreted as the
outcome of a reference mechanism for consumption in levels: Ct+1 < Ct. In this case,
loss events happen rarely with probability 6.349% because the loss threshold is quite
low. The rate of time preference is lower than one (0.919, t-stat. 11.963), the first-
order risk aversion estimate is quite low (1.511, t-stat. 0.428), and the second-order
42Barberis et al. (2001) and Piccioni (2011) use the risk-free rate as a reference point, whereas
in Bernatzi and Thaler (1995) the reference point is zero.
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risk aversion parameter is equal to 19.297 (t-stat. 0.793).
Finally, estimates for the free threshold model are very similar to the benchmark
disappointment aversion model from Table 1.7.2. The rate of time preference is
lower than one (0.903, t-stat. 4.444), while the first and second-order risk aversion
parameters are equal to 4.113 (t-stat. 2.018) and 13.043 (t-stat. 0.875) respectively.
The estimated reference point for consumption growth, ˆ̄d = 0.47%, is greater than
zero but lower than the i.i.d. disappointment reference level of 0.84% in Figure 1.8.2.
Empirical results for the disappointment aversion and free threshold models suggest
that loss events in consumption-based asset pricing models are triggered by positive
thresholds rather than zero or negative consumption growth.
None of the models in Table 1.7.7 is rejected. However, mean absolute prediction
errors across different models indicate that the relatively high p-values for first-order
risk aversion models are mainly driven by large covariance estimates, rather than zero
means for the error terms. Similarly, mean absolute prediction errors for first-order
risk aversion models are larger than those for the disappointment model in Table
1.7.2. For d̄ = rf,t+1 m.a.p.e. is 2.02%, for d̄ = ∆ct m.a.p.e. is 1.84%, for d̄ = 0
m.a.p.e. is 1.54%, and for the free threshold model with ˆ̄d = 0.47% m.a.p.e. is 1.23%.
Figure 1.8.8 shows fitted expected returns for first-order risk aversion models plus
the disappointment aversion discount factor from (1.8). According to Figure 1.8.8,
the free threshold and disappointment aversion discount factors outperform the rest
of the models in terms of fitted expected returns. The above results highlight the
fact that asymmetric marginal utility alone does not improve the performance of
consumption-based asset pricing models. First-order risk aversion preferences must
be combined with an accurate description of investors’ perception of losses in order
to achieve accurate asset pricing moments.
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1.4.7 Estimation results for quarterly stock returns
Discrete-time models do not provide any guidelines as to how often investors
should evaluate their wealth, and adjust their consumption. If an optimal consump-
tion rebalancing frequency exists, then it will undoubtedly affect the empirical per-
formance of consumption-based asset pricing models. This section studies the per-
formance of asset pricing models at the quarterly frequency in order to shed more
light on the relevant frequency of consumption adjustments by disappointment averse
individuals.
Table 1.7.8 shows GMM results for the 25 Fama-French portfolios and the set of
discount factors. The intercept for the market discount factor is economically and
statistically significant (4.317, t-stat. 4.342), while the loading on market returns (-
3.253, t-stat. -3.392) is similar to the one estimated from annual data. For the Fama-
French-Carhart model, all terms are statistically significant. According to Table 1.7.8,
the equity premium puzzle is more pronounced for quarterly data since second-order
risk aversion parameters for the time-additive CRRA and Epstein-Zin discount factors
are extremely large: 138.538 (t-stat. 3.368) and 147.910 (t-stat. 1.406) respectively43.
Notice also that the rate of time preference β for CRRA utility is higher than one
(1.483, t-stat. 13.030).
Why are second-order risk aversion estimates for the CRRA and Epstein-Zin mod-
els so large? Gabaix and Laibson (2002) propose a continuous-time model in which at
each point in time only a fraction of investors adjust consumption for a period of D
time-units. The authors show that adjustment delays cause covariances of aggregate
consumption with asset returns to be very low. According to Gabaix and Laibson
(2002), second-order risk aversion parameters should be divided by 6D (“6D bias”)
with D being the adjustment period44. If we believe the 6D bias, and investors adjust
43Aı̈t-Sahalia et al. (2004) and Yogo (2006) obtain even larger estimates for the second-order risk
aversion parameter using quarterly data.
44Breeden et al. (1989) suggest dividing the second-order risk aversion estimate by 2 in order to
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their consumption every 4 quarters, then quarterly estimates for risk aversion parame-
ters should be equal to 138/(6·4) ≈ 5.75 for CRRA preferences, and 148/(6·4) ≈ 6.16
for the Epstein-Zin model. However, Piazzesi (2002) shows that adjustment delays
in consumption are not enough to generate plausible equity premia, and that the
Gabaix-Laibson model has a number of undesirable implications.
Unlike second-order risk aversion models, preference parameters for the disap-
pointment aversion discount factor remain roughly equal to their annual counterparts.
The disappointment aversion coefficient θ in the linear model is 7.932 (t-stat. 1.412),
whereas for the log-linear disappointment aversion model θ is 5.274 (t-stat. 2.861)
and α is 14.376 (t-stat. 0.352). The disappointment threshold d1 is -0.858 for the
linear model, and -0.774 for the log-linear case, while the probabilities of disappoint-
ment events are 15.294% and 16.862% respectively. Disappointment thresholds and
disappointment event probabilities for quarterly data are similar to those obtained
for annual data in Table 1.7.2 because preference parameters for the two samples
are almost identical. The fact that disappointment aversion parameters remain con-
stant across frequencies, while risk aversion triples in magnitude, emphasizes that
first and second-order risk aversion models are not perfect substitutes, and that the
two specifications have both quantitative and qualitative differences.
According to Table 1.7.8, the CRRA model achieves the lowest mean absolute
prediction error (0.40%) among consumption models, probably because the AR(1)
specification in non-separable preferences does not fit quarterly consumption growth
well (Table 1.7.1). The Fama-French-Carhart specification generates the lowest pre-
diction error among all models (0.24%). Figure 1.8.9 shows predicted and sample
expected returns at the quarterly frequency. Although there is a weak alignment pat-
tern between predicted and sample expected returns for the disappointment discount
factors (graphs a & f), the latter models tend to overestimate expected returns for
correct for the summation bias in consumption measures.
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low book-to-market portfolios (portfolios 1, 6, 11, and 16).
An important issue that emerges from quarterly data is the disappointing per-
formance of the disappointment models. Bernatzi and Thaler (1995) combine loss
aversion with narrow framing45 under the term “myopic loss aversion”. They pro-
vide evidence that stock market equity premia can be explained by a model in which
loss averse investors evaluate portfolio performance and rebalance consumption infre-
quently:
The longer the investor intends to hold the asset, the more attractive the risky asset
will appear, so long the investment is not evaluated frequently. Bernatzi and Thaler
(1995), p. 75.
My results also suggest that the disappointment aversion discount factor performs
much better at low frequencies. Disappointment aversion preferences do not seem
to work well for high frequencies simply because individuals do not adjust their con-
sumption often enough. The fact that disappointment models fail at the quarterly
frequency may also be related to the results in Dillenberger (2004) and Artstein-
Avidan and Dillenberger (2011) where the authors show that disappointment averse
individuals prefer one-shot over gradual resolution of uncertainty. According to these
results, investors prefer to evaluate their portfolios once a year (one-shot resolution
of uncertainty) rather than gradually accumulate information about portfolio perfor-
mance every quarter, and adjust their consumption accordingly.
Aı̈t-Sahalia et al. (2004) provide an alternative explanation for the failure of con-
sumption models at higher frequencies which is related to consumption measurement.
They claim that consumption pricing models should focus on consumption of luxury
goods because these goods are more responsive to changes in wealth, and constitute
a better measure for stock market participants’ consumption. Yogo (2006) success-
fully explains quarterly expected returns for 25 Fama-French portfolios using durables
45The fact that investors tend to evaluate new risks in isolation instead of pooling new risks
together with old ones is usually referred to as “narrow framing”.
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consumption, even though estimated coefficients for second-order risk aversion are ex-
tremely large (around 200). It might well be the case that consumption of nondurables
and services, which is used here, is unresponsive to wealth performance on a quarterly
basis, while other measures of consumption that include luxury or durable goods co-
vary better with equity returns. Note also that this study uses seasonally adjusted
consumption data from the BEA. Ferson and Harvey (1992) show that the implied
smoothing in seasonally adjusted quarterly data will affect the empirical performance
of consumption-based models.
Overall, results for quarterly data raise two very important questions which are
left for future research: i) What determines optimal consumption rebalancing in-
tervals when investors are disappointment averse? ii) Why are quarterly estimates
for disappointment aversion parameters almost equal to annual estimates, whereas
second-order risk aversion coefficients for time-additive and Epstein-Zin preferences
triple in magnitude?
1.5 Related literature
Before concluding the discussion about disappointment aversion preferences, I
will briefly relate the disappointment framework to previous results on first-order risk
aversion, and to the current state of consumption-based asset pricing literature.
1.5.1 First-order risk aversion preferences
Starting with the seminal paper by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), there has been
an abundance of experimental evidence in favor of first-order risk aversion preferences
(Duncan 2010, Pope and Schweitzer 2011). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were
also among the first to introduce the concept of loss aversion which describes first-
order risk aversion behavior by means of piece-wise utility functions with exogenous
reference points for gains and losses. However, piece-wise utility functions are not
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the only way to obtain first-order risk aversion preferences. Epstein and Zin (1990)
show that first-order risk aversion behavior also occurs when investors use concave
functions to rescale cumulative distribution functions of random payoffs. These types
of preferences are usually referred to as rank-dependent preferences (Epstein and Zin
1990).
Even though loss aversion is probably the most widely known approach for model-
ing first-order risk aversion preferences, there are a number of important issues which
until recently have been overlooked by the literature. First, loss aversion preferences
may lead to violations of the continuity and transitivity axioms for choices under
uncertainty (Gul 1991). Second, the original loss aversion framework does not pro-
vide theoretical arguments as to what reference points for gains and losses should be
or how these reference points should be dynamically updated. Towards the end of
their paper, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) essentially discuss time-varying reference
points. However, they do not provide further guidelines on how to construct endoge-
nous reference points within the loss aversion framework. Third, contrary to the well
behaved aggregation properties of the disappointment model, Ingersoll (2011) shows
that loss aversion preferences cannot be aggregated under the standard assumptions
of general equilibrium models.
Segal and Spivak (1990), who were among the first to introduce the term first-
order risk aversion, discuss the full insurance problem46 which can be rationalized
by first-order risk aversion preferences, but cannot be explained by smooth utility
functions. Rabin (2000) argues that smooth utility functions imply an approximately
risk-neutral behavior “not just for negligible stakes, but for quite sizeable and eco-
nomically important stakes”47. He also explains why second-order risk aversion pref-
erences have unappealing implications for large scale risks, a result known as the
46The full insurance puzzle is related to the fact that it is never optimal to purchase full insurance
when insurance policies are not actuarially fairly priced, but in practice people do so (Mossin 1968).
47Rabin (2000), p. 1281.
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calibration theorem48. First-order risk aversion models are not immune to calibration
theorems. Safra and Segal (2008) extend Rabin’s (2000) critique on expected utility
to non-expected utility models, like the disappointment aversion model, in which they
assume the presence of background risk (Theorem 2, p. 1151 in Safra and Segal 2008
)49.
Recent empirical results indicate that endogenous reference points are a very im-
portant aspect of first-order risk aversion preferences. Choi et al. (2007) identify
disappointment aversion behavior during clinical experiments on portfolio decisions
under uncertainty. Post et al. (2008) suggest that players’ choices in the TV show
“Deal or No Deal” can be explained by reference-based preferences in which reference
points are affected by previous outcomes experienced during the game. Using a ques-
tionnaire experiment with stock prices, Arkes et al. (2008) identify an asymmetric
adaptation process for reference points which is a function of past decision outcomes
(gains vs. losses).
Doran (2010) and Crawford and Meng (2011) find evidence that taxi drivers set
daily income goals (reference points) which are affected by expectations (slow day vs.
a good day), and these goals change during the course of the day (dynamic updating).
Choice-acclimating reference-dependent preferences have also been well documented
in the context of effort provision by Abeler et al. (2011), while Gill and Prowse (2012)
identify disappointment aversion preferences in real effort competition. They argue
that
Disappointment at doing worse than expected can be a powerful emotion. This emotion
may be particularly intense when the disappointed agent exerted effort in competing
for a prize [...] Furthermore, a rational agent who anticipates possible disappointment
48Appendix A.1 also provides a brief discussion about key differences between first and second-
order risk aversion preferences.
49Nevertheless, Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2011) show that if this background risk is a dis-
crete random variable and investors have rank-dependent preferences, then Safra and Segal’s (2008)
critique cannot be applied.
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will optimize taking into account the expected disappointment arising from her choice.
Gill and Prowse (2012), p. 469.
Finally, Artstein-Avidan and Dillenberger (2011) show that their dynamic disappoint-
ment aversion framework can explain why individuals tend to pay overpriced fees in
order to insure electric appliances.
First-order risk aversion preferences have already been used in prior attempts to
resolve asset pricing puzzles. Epstein and Zin (1990), Bernatzi and Thaler (1995),
Barberis et al. (2001), Andries (2011), Piccioni (2011), Easley and Yang (2012) are
papers which use loss aversion models or some form of asymmetric marginal utility
over gains and losses in order to explain the equity premium puzzle. However, none
of these papers focuses on the importance of reference points for gains and losses.
Epstein and Zin (2001) integrate models of first-order risk aversion into a recursive
intertemporal asset-pricing framework and find that “risk preferences that exhibit
first-order risk aversion accounts for significantly more of the mean and autocorrela-
tion properties of the data than models that exhibit only second-order risk aversion”
(Epstein and Zin 2001, p. 537). Campanale et al. (2010) introduce disappointment
aversion preferences in a production economy to match the unconditional market-wide
equity premium.
Ang et al. (2005) compare loss and disappointment aversion models, and empha-
size the tractability of disappointment aversion preferences relative to loss aversion.
The authors also argue that if expected excess returns are positive, then smooth utility
functions will necessarily generate positive holdings of risky assets, while first-order
risk aversion preferences can admit corner solutions: zero holdings of risky assets in
spite of positive expected excess returns (non-participation effect). In a similar way,
Khanapure (2012) uses disappointment aversion preferences to rationalize the fact
that investors drastically cut their portfolio allocations on stocks after retirement, a
puzzling behavior that cannot be explained by smooth (CRRA) preferences.
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Finally, the theoretical framework in this paper assumes identical preferences
across individuals which can then be aggregated due to linear homogeneity of dis-
appointment aversion. Nevertheless, Chapman and Polkovnichenko (2009) show that
in models with first-order risk aversion preferences the equity premium and the risk-
free rate are sensitive to preference heterogeneity, an important implication which is
ignored by the representative agent model.
1.5.2 Consumption-based asset pricing
Throughout this paper, I maintain that BEA consumption accurately depicts eco-
nomic conditions. A number of papers have tried to improve on BEA measures of
consumption by focusing on consumption of stock market participants in Mankiw and
Zeldes (1991), luxury goods consumption like in Aı̈t-Sahalia et al. (2004), consump-
tion of durable goods in Yogo (2006), or even garbage output as in Savov (2011).
An extremely important aspect of consumption measurement is limited stock market
participation. According to Jorgensen (2002), stock market participants are a small
sub-sample of the total population. Using aggregate consumption as a proxy for stock
market participants’ consumption may lead to inconsistent estimates for preference
parameters. The above strand of literature is complimentary to ours. Combining
more accurate measures of consumption with disappointment aversion preferences
will probably resolve a number of stylized facts in financial markets. Furthermore,
improving upon measures of consumption will also decrease the estimated magnitudes
for risk and disappointment aversion parameters.
It has been well documented that consumption models with time-additive CRRA
preferences require implausibly high values for the risk aversion parameter (Mehra
and Prescott 1985) in order to explain expected stock returns. However, Bansal
and Yaron (2004) show that with non-separable preferences and a persistent mean
in consumption growth, consumption risk can explain stock return moments with
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plausible parameter values. Furthermore, Bansal et al. (2005) use the concept of
long-run risk and are able to explain 60% of the cross-sectional variation in risk
premia for BM, size and momentum portfolios. However, the persistent shocks in
expected consumption growth implied by the long-run risk framework are difficult to
detect empirically. According to the results for the linear disappointment aversion
discount factor in which consumption changes are i.i.d. (Table 1.7.2 and Figure 1.8.1),
disappointment events can explain stock returns even if there are no risks for the long-
run, and changes in consumption are unpredictable. van Binsbergen et al. (2011)
also find that short-term risks may be more important than long-term ones for the
pricing of dividend strips.
Habit models, like the one proposed by Campbell and Cochrane (1999), are
a promising answer to asset pricing puzzles, mainly because they allow for time-
variation in expected returns. Nevertheless, according to Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2009),
these models imply a weird behavior from the social planner’s point of view: gov-
ernment interventions that destroy part of the endowment may lead to an increase
in welfare. Disappointment events should not be confused with Barro’s (2006) rare
disaster framework either. First, contrary to rare disasters, which are not present in
the post-war U.S. economy, disappointment events can be easily identified and hap-
pen relatively often. Second, disappointment events are endogenously characterized
by investor preferences, and are not exogenously specified as an additional source of
uncertainty.
Ju and Miao (2012) address the equity premium puzzle using the concept of
smooth ambiguity aversion introduced by Klibanoff et al. (2005). Ambiguity es-
sentially refers to uncertainty about the“true” probability distribution of stochastic
variables. Klibanoff et al. (2005) propose a smooth concave “utility” function over
the set of possible distributions for stochastic payoffs which implies that investors
overweigh unfavorable prior distributions. Epstein (2010) highlights some unappeal-
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ing characteristics of the smooth ambiguity aversion model, and proposes the multiple
priors approach by Gilboa and Scmeidler (1989) instead. Although, uncertainty about
“true” probability distributions for macroeconomic variables and asset returns is a
realistic assumption, I abstain from such considerations, and assume a rational ex-
pectations framework with no uncertainty about probability distributions in order to
focus on the performance of disappointment aversion preferences alone.
1.6 Conclusion
According to Kocherlacota (1996), in order to resolve the equity premium puzzle
(at least) one of the following three assumptions needs to be relaxed: i) CRRA pref-
erences, ii) market completeness, iii) transaction costs. Although, I maintain the last
two assumptions, this paper focuses on the first one, and introduces disappointment
aversion preferences in a general equilibrium framework. This paper is the first to
obtain closed-form solutions for the stochastic discount factor in terms of consump-
tion growth when investors are disappointment averse. Analytical solutions, in turn,
allow for a wide range of empirical tests, including comparisons with more traditional
asset pricing models. Unlike exogenous reference levels proposed by the majority of
first-order risk aversion models, my results highlight that endogenous, expectation-
based reference points for gains and losses, as suggested by disappointment aversion
preferences, are important in explaining the cross-section of equity returns.
At the annual frequency, the disappointment aversion discount factor can explain
expected returns for portfolios sorted on book-to-market, size, earnings-to-price, as
well as the aggregate market portfolio. Comparative results also suggest that at the
annual frequency disappointment aversion preferences outperform traditional asset
pricing models in terms of prediction errors, and that disappointment events tend to
predate NBER recessions. Nevertheless, at higher frequencies the performance of the
disappointment model deteriorates, and this is probably related to the myopic loss
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aversion effect of Bernatzi and Thaler (1995) or due to consumption measurement
issues. Directions for future research include the pricing of fixed income securities
subject to default risk, introducing disappointment aversion preferences in a pro-
duction economy in order to study investment, production and employment during
disappointment years, or even combining disappointment aversion preferences with
better measures for consumption. Finally, this study establishes that small and value
firms covary more with macroeconomic conditions, and consequently, that these firms
are riskier than big and growth firms respectively. However, a very important ques-
tion that remains unanswered by the literature is what are the fundamental firm-level
characteristics which expose small and value firms to aggregate risk.
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.7.1 Summary statistics
Consumption and the risk-free rate
annually quarterly
∆ct+1 ∆Ct+1 rf ,t+1 ∆ct+1 ∆Ct+1 rf ,t+1
Ê 1.922% $291.432 1.174% 0.484% $73.254 0.295%





1 0.841 0.087 1 0.876 0.057
ρ̂t,t−1 0.463 0.503 0.701 0.328 0.509 0.736
R2 AR(1) 21.968% 24.751% 49.261% 10.796% 25.909% 54.172%
Panel B: 25 Fama-French portfolios
Small/ Medium/ Medium/ Big/
Value Growth Medium Value Growth
25 BM-Size Ê[R̃i,t+1] 20.766% 8.419% 11.971% 15.770% 8.204%
annual Ĉov(∆ct+1, R̃i,t+1) 0.0017 0.0009 0.0011 0.0013 0.0010
25 BM-Size Ê[R̃i,t+1] 4.667% 2.120% 2.880% 3.678% 2.006%
quarterly Ĉov(∆ct+1, R̃i,t+1) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Panel C: stock market, HML, SMB, and MOM factors
market HML SMB MOM
annual
Ê[R̃i,t+1] 8.930% 5.126% 2.669% 9.374%
Ĉov(∆ct+1, R̃i,t+1) 0.0010 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0000
quarterly
Ê[R̃i,t+1] 1.778% 1.110% 0.504% 2.319%
Ĉov(∆ct+1, R̃i,t+1) 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000




in Panel A is real consumption growth, ∆Ct+1 = Ct+1 − Ct is real consumption in first differences,




is the real log risk-free rate. Ê is the sample mean, σ̂ is the sample




is the sample correlation coefficient with consumption growth.
ρ̂t,t−1 is the autocorrelation coefficient estimate, and R
2 AR(1) is the R-square for the AR(1) model.
Panel B shows summary statistics for real, cum-dividend, equity returns R̃i,t for the 25 Fama-French
portfolios. HML, SMB, MOM in Panel C are the value, size and momentum factors respectively.
Ĉov are covariance estimates. More details on consumption data and stock returns can be found in
subsection 1.4.1.
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Table 1.7.2 GMM results for the 25 Fama-French portfolios and the risk-
free rate (annual data)
market Fama-French CRRA Epstein-Zin linear DA log-linear DA
d̂1 -0.913 -0.780
Ê[1{disap.}] 11.111% 15.873%
β̂ 2.172 0.983 0.987 0.977
(3.334) (9.395) (340.966) (2.868)














J-test 43.005 35.780 47.881 45.464 37.029 20.087
d.o.f. 24 21 24 24 24 23
p-value 0.009 0.023 0.002 0.005 0.074 0.636
m.a.p.e. 2.38% 1.12% 1.51% 1.35% 0.99% 0.99%
Table 1.7.2 presents first-stage GMM results for the 25 Fama-French portfolios and the risk-free
rate. d̂1 are disappointment thresholds for consumption growth and consumption in first differences,




is the (unconditional) probability
for disappointment events. β̂ is the rate of time preference, α̂ is the second-order risk aversion
parameter, θ̂ is the disappointment aversion coefficient, and b̂i’s are factor coefficients. t-statistics
are in parenthesis. J-test is a χ2 random variable that tests for over-identifying restrictions. d.o.f.
(degrees of freedom) is the number of over-identifying restrictions. p-value is the probability of
obtaining a J-test statistic at least as large as the one estimated here, assuming the null hypothesis




E[Ri,t+1] − Ê[Ri,t+1]|) are
mean absolute prediction errors.
ˆ̂
E[Ri,t+1] are fitted expected returns according to (1.12), and
Ê[Ri,t+1] are sample expected returns from Table 1.7.1.
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Table 1.7.3 presents logistic regression results for NBER recession years and disappointment events.
The dependent variable is an indicator function depending on whether at least three months in
year t have been characterized as recession months by the NBER. The explanatory variable is an
indicator variable depending on whether year t − 1 (X(t−1)) or year t (X(t)) is a disappointment
year. Disappointment years are estimated from 25 Fama-French portfolios and the risk-free rate
in Table 1.7.2. const. is the constant term in the logistic regression, and b̂X is the regression
parameter for disappointment events. t-statistics are in parenthesis. LL is the log-likelihood value,
and LLnull is the log-likelihood value for the logistic regression which includes the constant term
only. LR = −2LLnull − (−2LL) is the likelihood-ratio statistic, a χ2 random variable. p-value is
the probability of obtaining a LR-test statistic at least as large as the one estimated here, assuming
the null hypothesis that the two models (with and without disappointment events as an explanatory
variable) have the same overall fit is true
.
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Table 1.7.4 Out-of-sample expected stock returns for 10 earnings-to-price
portfolios and the stock market (annual data)
Panel A: expected returns for earnings-to-price portfolios
sample market FF CRRA EZ linear DA log-linear DA
Low 9.010% 13.500% 10.394% 11.649% 11.637% 8.173% 9.987%
3 10.720% 11.514% 10.617% 11.393% 11.656% 11.072% 11.117%
Medium 12.925% 11.001% 11.650% 11.939% 12.052% 12.226% 12.225%
7 13.996% 11.072% 12.587% 12.652% 13.105% 13.835% 13.800%
High 18.974% 13.867% 16.406% 15.886% 15.806% 17.774% 16.068%
m.a.p.e. 2.595% 1.049% 1.343% 1.356% 0.398% 0.806%
Panel B: expected returns for the value-weighted market portfolio
sample CRRA EZ linear DA log-linear DA Choi et al. (2007)
8.93% 10.29% 9.43% 9.17% 8.43% 9.08%
m.a.p.e. 1.36% 0.50% 0.24% 0.50% 0.15%
Table 1.7.4 shows out-of-sample expected returns for the market, Fama-French (FF), CRRA,
Epstein-Zin (EZ), and disappointment aversion (DA) stochastic discount factors. Model parameters
were estimated using the 25 Fama-French portfolios and the risk-free rate. Parameter estimates can
be found in Table 1.7.2. Fitted expected returns are calculated according to the expression in (1.12).
Out-of-sample testing assets in Panel A are 10 equal-weighted earnings-to-price portfolios. In Panel
B, the market portfolio is included as an out-of-sample testing asset for consumption models only.
Choi et al. (2007) corresponds to the log-linear disappointment aversion discount factor in (1.8) with
parameter values from Choi et al. (2007): θ = 1.876 and α = 2.871. The rate of time preference
β for the Choi et al. (2007) model is set equal to 0.99, and the autocorrelation parameter φc for
consumption growth is equal to 0.968. m.a.p.e. are mean absolute prediction errors.
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Table 1.7.5 GMM results for the 25 Fama-French portfolios and the risk-
free rate during the 1949-1978 period (annual data)
market Fama-French CRRA Epstein-Zin linear DA log-linear DA
d1 -0.807 -0.788
Ê[1{disap.}] 13.334% 16.667%
β̂ 3.506 1.104 0.998 0.926
(1.678) (5.508) (338.014) (2.964)














J-test 28.769 28.808 28.737 29.281 25.822 4.494
d.o.f. 24 21 24 24 24 23
p-value 0.228 0.118 0.230 0.209 0.362 0.999
m.a.p.e. 2.06% 1.10% 2.44% 2.48% 1.83% 2.12%
m.a.p.e.
1979-2011 4.10% 13.59% 3.22% 1.99% 2.67% 2.17%
Table 1.7.5 presents first-stage GMM results for the risk-free rate and 25 equal-weighted portfolios





is the (unconditional) probability for disappointment events. β̂
is the rate of time preference, α̂ is the risk aversion parameter, θ̂ is the disappointment aversion co-
efficient, and b̂i’s are factor coefficients. t-statistics are in parenthesis. m.a.p.e. are in-sample mean
absolute prediction errors, and m.a.p.e. 1979-2011 are the out-of-sample mean absolute prediction
errors for the 1979 - 2011 period.
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Table 1.7.6 GMM results for 10 Book-to-Market portfolios and the risk-
free rate during the 1949-1978 period (annual data)
market Fama-French CRRA Epstein-Zin linear DA log-linear DA
d1 -0.833 -0.825
Ê[1{disap.}] 13.334% 13.334%
β̂ 3.758 1.121 0.998 1.021
(1.636) (5.203) (338.017) (2.521)














J-test 15.135 2.454 16.213 18.833 15.414 17.288
d.o.f. 9 7 9 9 9 8
p-value 0.087 0.873 0.062 0.026 0.080 0.027
m.a.p.e. 2.14% 0.21% 2.00% 2.33% 1.28% 1.98%
m.a.p.e.
1979-2011 5.04% 10.70% 3.91% 1.82% 2.45% 1.63%
Table 1.7.6 presents first-stage GMM results for the risk-free rate and 10 equal-weighted portfolios
sorted on BM. Portfolio returns are from 1949 to 1978 (30 years). t-statistics are in parenthesis.
m.a.p.e. are in-sample mean absolute prediction errors, and m.a.p.e. 1979-2011 are the out-of-
sample mean absolute prediction errors for the 1979 - 2011 period.
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Table 1.7.7 GMM results for first-order risk aversion preferences with
alternative reference points for gains and losses (annual data)
Mt,t+1 = exp
[
logβ −∆ct+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
time correction











1 + θ1{∆ct+1 < d̄}
1 + θEt
[










33.333% 53.968% 6.349% 11.111%
β̂ 0.917 1.215 0.919 0.903
(5.143) (6.590) (11.963) (4.444)
α̂ 46.784 54.277 19.2976 13.043
(3.015) (13.369) (0.793) (0.875)
θ̂ -0.827 -0.916 1.511 4.113
(-3.073) (-7.794) (0.428) (2.018)
J-test 33.061 6.058 21.017 7.191
d.o.f. 23 23 23 22
p-value 0.080 0.998 0.580 0.998
m.a.p.e. 2.02% 1.84% 1.54% 1.23%
Table 1.7.7 presents first-stage GMM for the 25 Fama-French portfolios and the risk-free rate.
Models in Table 1.7.7 are characterized by first-order risk aversion preferences with alternative
reference points for gains and losses. Reference points are: i) the log risk-free rate, d̄ = rf,t+1,
ii) current period’s consumption growth, d̄ = ∆ct, iii) zero consumption growth, d̄ = 0, and iv) d̄




is the (unconditional) probability for loss events
(1{∆ct+1 < d̄}). β̂ is the rate of time preference, α̂ is the second-order risk aversion coefficient,
and θ̂ is the first-order risk aversion parameter. t-statistics are in parenthesis. m.a.p.e. are mean
absolute pricing errors.
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Table 1.7.8 GMM results for the 25 Fama-French portfolios and the risk-
free rate (quarterly data)
market Fama-French CRRA Epstein-Zin linear DA log-linear DA
d1 -0.858 -0.774
Ê[1{disap.}] 15.294% 16.862%
β̂ 1.483 0.917 0.997 0.996
(13.030) (5.110) (2,486) (4.173)














J-test 78.741 43.351 71.640 70.984 35.234 8.921
d.o.f. 24 21 24 24 24 23
p-value 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.996
m.a.p.e. 0.60% 0.24% 0.40% 0.48% 0.43% 0.42%
Table 1.7.8 presents first-stage GMM results for the 25 Fama-French portfolios and the risk-free
rate at the quarterly frequency.
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1.8 Figures
Figure 1.8.1 Expected returns for the 25 Fama-French portfolios and the
risk-free rate (annual data)
























a) log−linear DA SDF − AR(1) ∆ ct+1
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Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 1.8.1 plots fitted (vertical axis) and sample (horizontal axis) expected equity returns for the
25 Fama-French portfolios and the risk-free rate. Estimation results can be found in Table 1.7.2.
Sample expected stock returns are from Table 1.7.1, while fitted expected returns are calculated
according to the expression in (1.12).
56
Figure 1.8.2 Annual consumption growth, disappointment events, and
NBER
























consumption growth AR(1) threshold i.i.d. threshold
Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 1.8.2 plots time-series for consumption growth and disappointment events. Shaded areas are
NBER recession dates. Disappointment events are estimated from the 25 Fama-French portfolios
plus the risk-free rate, and are highlighted by ellipses. The disappointment threshold for AR(1)
consumption growth is given by the expression µ̂c(1− φ̂c) + φ̂c∆ct−1 + d̂1,AR(1)
√
1− φ̂2c σ̂c (∆ct+1 <
1.031% + 0.463∆ct − 0.780 · 1.120%). Moment estimates (µ̂, σ̂, φ̂c) for consumption growth are from
Table 1.7.1 and d1,AR(1) is from Table 1.7.2. The flat line shows the disappointment threshold when
consumption growth is i.i.d.. In this case, the disappointment threshold is constant, and equal to
µ̂c + d̂1,i.i.d.σ̂c (∆ct+1 < 1.922%− 0.854 · 1.264%).
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Figure 1.8.3 Out-of-sample expected stock returns for 10 earnings-to-
price
portfolios (annual data)
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Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 1.8.3 plots predicted and sample equity returns for 10 equal-weighted earnings-to-price
portfolios. Model parameters have been estimated using the 25 Fama-French portfolios. Estimation
results are shown in Table 1.7.2. Predicted expected returns for the earnings-to-price portfolios were
calculated according to the expression in (1.12), and can be found in Table 1.7.4.
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Figure 1.8.4 In-sample expected returns for the 25 Fama-French port-
folios and the risk-free rate during the 1949-1978 period
(annual data)



















































































Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 1.8.4 plots fitted and sample expected equity returns for the 25 Fama-French portfolios
and the risk-free rate. I use the first thirty years of the sample to estimate model parameters, and
calculate in-sample fitted expected returns according to equation (1.12). Estimation results for each
model can be found in Table 1.7.5.
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Figure 1.8.5 Out-of-sample expected returns for the 25 Fama-French port-
folios during the 1979-2011 period (annual data)
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Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 1.8.5 plots predicted and sample expected equity returns for the 25 Fama-French portfolios.
I use the first thirty years of the sample to estimate model parameters, and the 1979-2011 period to
test out-of-sample predictions. Predicted expected returns are derived according to the expression
in (1.12), and can be found in Table 1.7.5.
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Figure 1.8.6 In-sample expected returns for 10 BM portfolios and the
risk-free rate during the 1949-1978 period (annual data)


















































































Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 1.8.6 plots fitted and sample expected equity returns for 10 book-to-market portfolios and
the risk-free rate. I use the first 30 years of the sample (1949-1978) to estimate model parameters,
and calculate in-sample fitted expected returns according to equation (1.12). Estimation results for
each model can be found in Table 1.7.6.
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Figure 1.8.7 Out-of-sample expected returns for 10 BM portfolios during
the 1979-2011 period (annual data)
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Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 1.8.7 plots predicted and sample expected equity returns for 10 book-to-market portfolios. I
use the first thirty years of the sample (1949-1978) to estimate model parameters, and the 1979-2011
period to test out-of-sample predictions. Predicted expected returns are derived according to the
expression in (1.12), and can be found in Table 1.7.6.
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Figure 1.8.8 Expected returns for first-order risk aversion preferences
with alternative reference points for gains and losses (annual
data)








































































Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 1.8.8 plots fitted and sample expected equity returns for the 25 Fama-French portfolios and
the risk-free rate. According to the expression in (1.19), discount factors are characterized by first-
order risk aversion preferences with alternative reference points for gains and losses. These reference
points are: i) the log risk-free rate, d̄ = rf,t+1, ii) previous period’s consumption growth, d̄ = ∆ct,
iii) zero consumption growth, d̄ = 0, and iv) d̄ is a free parameter to be estimated. Estimation
results for each model can be found in Table 1.7.7.
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Figure 1.8.9 Expected returns for the 25 Fama-French portfolios and the
risk-free rate (quarterly data)


















































































Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 1.8.9 plots fitted and sample expected equity returns for the 25 Fama-French portfolios
and the risk-free rate at the quarterly frequency. Estimation results for each model are shown in
Table 1.7.8. Fitted expected returns are derived according to equation (1.12), while sample expected
returns are from Table 1.7.1.
64
CHAPTER II
Disappointment Aversion Preferences, and the
Credit Spread Puzzle
oυκ αν λάβoις παρά τoυ µη έχoντoς
“You cannot receive anything by someone who has nothing”
“Dialogues of the Dead”, Lucian (125− 175 A.D.)
2.1 Abstract
Structural models of default are unable to generate measurable Baa-Aaa credit
spreads, when these models are calibrated to realistic values for default rates and
losses given default. Motivated by recent results in behavioral economics, this paper
is the first to propose a consumption-based asset pricing model with disappointment
aversion preferences in an attempt to resolve the credit spread puzzle. Simulation
results suggest that as long as losses given default and default boundaries are coun-
tercyclical, then the disappointment model can explain Baa-Aaa credit spreads using
preference parameters that are consistent with experimental findings. Further, the
disappointment aversion discount factor can match key moments for stock market
returns, the price-dividend ratio, and the risk-free rate.
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2.2 Introduction
When traditional structural models of default1 are calibrated to realistic values
for default rates and losses given default, then these models are unable to generate
measurable Baa-Aaa credit spreads, an empirical conundrum also known as the credit
spread puzzle. Moreover, recent results2 suggest that state-of-the-art consumption-
based asset pricing models cannot rationalize corporate bond spreads, even if they are
successful in explaining equity premia. Nevertheless, a universal stochastic discount
that can resolve the equity premium puzzle should also be able to fit credit spreads
in corporate bond markets.
Although behavioral theories have been extensively used to explain equity risk pre-
mia3, this is the first paper to address the credit spread puzzle from a behavioral per-
spective. Towards this objective, I use a general equilibrium model of an endowment
economy populated by disappointment averse investors in order to price zero-coupon
corporate bonds subject to default. Disappointment aversion preferences were first
introduced by Gul (1991), and are able to capture well documented patterns for risky
choices, such as asymmetric marginal utility over gains and losses or reference-based
evaluation of stochastic payoffs4, without violating first-order stochastic dominance,
transitivity of preferences or aggregation of investors. The disappointment aversion
framework can therefore help us shed additional light on the link between credit-
spreads and aggregate economic activity while maintaining investor rationality.
Disappointment averse investors are characterized by first-order risk aversion5
preferences with endogenous expectation-based reference points for gains and losses.
Due to the linear homogeneity of these preferences, I am able to obtain approximate
1e.g. Merton (1974)
2Chen et al. 2009.
3Epstein and Zin (1990), Bernatzi and Thaler (1995), Barberis et al. (2001), Andries (2011),
Piccioni (2011), Easley and Yang (2012), Delikouras (2013).
4Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Duncan (2010), Pope and Schweitzer (2011).
5Segal and Spivak (1990).
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analytical solutions for the price-payout ratios in the economy which are log-linear
functions of three state variables: consumption growth, consumption growth volatil-
ity, and consumption growth variance. Explicit solutions for price-payout ratios, in
turn, facilitate the simulation algorithm, and provide valuable intuition. The main
mechanism in place for disappointment aversion preferences is related to asymmetric
marginal utility, and the fact that disappointment averse investors penalize losses
below the endogenous reference level three times more than they do for losses above
the reference level.
The disappointment aversion model highlights the interaction between default
rates and periods of worse-than-expected aggregate macroeconomic conditions when
marginal utility is high. During these periods there is an upwards jump in marginal
utility. Almeida and Philipon (2007) also document that distress costs are most likely
to happen during times when marginal utility is high. Figure 2.9.1 shows Baa-Aaa
credit spreads, Baa default rates, and NBER recessions for the 1946-2011 period.
Two things become immediately clear from Figure 2.9.1. First, credit spreads are
strongly countercyclical. Second, Baa default rates are zero during most of the time,
and tend to spike up at or after a recession. Through first-order risk aversion, the
disappointment model amplifies very small risks, such as the almost zero default risk
for Baa firms, and is able to generate measurable Baa-Aaa credit spreads despite the
very low default rates.
Although several consumption-based asset pricing models have proposed frame-
works that generate credit spreads consistent with empirical observations, with the
exception of the habit model in Chen et al. (2009), either preference parameters (eg.
the risk aversion coefficient) in these models are much larger than those estimated
in clinical experiments6, or these models cannot perfectly match other asset pricing
6Chen (2010), p. 2190, assumes a risk aversion parameter equal to 6.5 and an EIS larger than
1. Bhamra et al. (2010) remain silent on preference parameters, and focus on risk-neutral pricing.
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moments such as equity risk premia7. On the other hand, preference parameters for
the disappointment model in this paper are calibrated to values which are consistent
with recent experimental results8: the risk aversion parameter is equal to 1.8, and the
disappointment aversion coefficient is equal to 2.03.
By providing evidence that the disappointment model can contribute to the reso-
lution of the credit spread puzzle, this paper compliments a growing literature which
argues that disappointment aversion preferences are able address a variety of stylized
facts in financial markets such as the equity premium puzzle (Routledge and Zin 2010,
Bonomo et al. 2011), the cross-section of expected returns (Ostrovnaya et al. 2006,
Delikouras 2013), or limited stock market participation (Ang et al. 2005, Khanapure
2012). Simulation results suggest that as long as losses given default and default
boundaries are countercyclical, then the disappointment model can explain the credit
spread puzzle, and generate expected Baa-Aaa credit spreads equal to 100 bps for
four-year maturities, contrary to 51 bps for the benchmark model which is based on
Merton’s framework (1974), and it is derived in discrete time. Nevertheless, the dis-
appointment model seems to overpredict expected credit spreads for long maturities
(15yr+).
Ever since Merton’s model (Merton 1974), most results on corporate bond pricing
(Leland 1994, Leland and Toff 1996, Goldstein et al. 2001, Bhamra et al. 2010)
rely directly on the risk-neutral probability measure for asset returns, while being
silent on investor preferences and the stochastic discount factor. In contrast, this
paper adds to recent works by Chen et al. (2009), and Chen (2010) who approach
the equity premium and credit spread puzzles in a unified manner, explicitly using a
universal consumption-based stochastic discount factor across all financial markets.
Taking a stance on the functional form of the stochastic discount factor is particu-
7The equity premium in Bhamra et al. (2010), p. 682, is 3.19%, whereas the sample equity
premium for the 1946-2011 period is around 5.7%.
8Choi et al. (2007), Gill and Prowse (2012).
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larly important for two reasons. First, we can identify whether a particular set of
preferences is able to generate plausible asset pricing moments across different mar-
kets. For instance, besides explaining the credit spread puzzle, the disappointment
aversion discount factor in this paper matches moments for aggregate state variables,
stock market returns, and the risk-free rate. Second, estimates for preference param-
eters can be compared to recent experimental findings for choices under uncertainty
in order to assess the empirical plausibility of the model.
There are many asset pricing models that can efficiently explain stylized facts in
financial markets, yet these models usually explain asset prices one market at a time.
The strategy of this paper is to impose more discipline on investor preferences, and
provide solid micro-foundations for a universal discount factor across different mar-
kets by taking into account recent experimental results for choices under uncertainty.
These results emphasize the importance of expectation-based reference-dependent
utility. The use of disappointment aversion preferences is therefore motivated by
strong experimental and field evidence from aspects of economic life that are not
directly related to financial markets9. This paper also adds to the relatively lim-
ited strand of literature that incorporates elements of behavioral economics into a
consumption-based asset pricing model without violating key assumptions of the tra-
ditional general equilibrium framework.
9Choi et al. (2007), Gill and Prowse (2012), Artstein-Avidan and Dillenberger (2011).
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2.3 The credit spread puzzle
2.3.1 Historical data
Average default rates for the 1970-2011 period10 and recovery rates are from the
Moody’s 2012 annual report. Data on recovery rates start in 1982. Corporate bond
yields are obtained from Datastream and the St. Louis Fed website for four different
sets of indices: two Moody’s indices11, four Barclays indices12, six BofA indices13, and
eighteen Thomson-Reuters corporate bond indices14.
In terms of aggregate variables, personal consumption expenditures (PCE), and
PCE index data are from the BEA. Per capita consumption expenditures are defined
as services plus non-durables. Each component of aggregate consumption expendi-
tures is deflated by its corresponding PCE price index (base year is 2004). Population
data are from the U.S. Census Bureau. Recession dates are from the NBER. Interest
rates are from Kenneth French’s (whom I kindly thank) website. Market returns, div-
idends, and price-dividend ratios are obtained through the CRSP-WRDS database
for the value weighted AMEX/NYSE/NASDAQ index.
Earnings are gross profits (item GP) from the merged CRSP-Compustat database.
I use gross profits as a measure of earnings because Compustat EBIT (or EBITDA)
growth rates are very volatile15. Earnings have been exponentially detrended due to
the increasing number of firms in the Compustat sample over time. Stock market
10Average default rates in the Moody’s report are calculated for three different periods: 1920-2011,
1970-2011, and 1983-2011. Average default rates for the 1983-2011 sample are almost identical to
the ones used in this study. However, average default rates for the 1920-2011 period are substantially
higher than for the 1970-2011 or the 1983-2011 samples due to the inclusion of the Great Depression.
11Moody’s Seasoned Aaa and Baa Corporate Bond Indices (1920-2011).
12US Agg. Corp. Intermediate Aaa and Baa Indices, US Agg. Corp. Long Aaa and Baa Indices
(1974-2011).
13US Corp. 1-5y Aaa and Baa, US Corp. 7-10y Aaa and Baa, and US Corp. 15y+ Aaa and Baa
Indices (2001-2011).
14US Corp. AAA and BBB Indices for maturities from 2yr up to 10yr (2003-2011). Even though
BofA indices use S&P ratings (AAA, BBB), for the practical purposes of this study, BBB (AAA)
and Baa (Aaa) ratings are considered equivalent. See also Cantor and Packer (1994).
15Compustat EBIT growth volatility is around 12%. Earnings growth volatility from Shiller’s
website is around 30%.
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returns, dividend growth, earnings growth, and interest rates have been adjusted
for inflation by subtracting the growth rate of the PCE price index16. Aggregate
variables and market data are sampled for the 1946-2011 period, with the exception
of earnings data that start in 1950 and end in 2010. Earnings growth for year t have
been aligned with consumption for year t − 1 because in the 1950-2010 sample, the
contemporaneous correlation coefficient between earnings growth and consumption
growth is low. All variables have been sampled or simulated at the annual frequency.
2.3.2 A benchmark model for credit spreads
Consider a discrete-time, single-good, closed, endowment economy in which the
aggregation problem has been solved. Implicit in the representative agent framework
lies the assumption of complete markets. There is no productive activity, yet at each
point in time the endowment of the economy is generated exogenously by n “tree-
”assets as in Lucas (1978). There are also markets where equity, debt, and claims
on the total output of these “tree-”assets can be traded. In addition to rational
expectations, I will also assume that there are no restrictions on individual asset
holdings or transaction costs, that preferences over risky payoffs can be described by
power utility, and that all agents have can borrow and lend at the same risk-free rate.
This paper focuses on zero-coupon bonds because, according to Chen et al. (2009, p.
3384), the inclusion of coupon payments does not really affect credit spreads.
Consider also a T -period, zero-coupon bond written on a firm’s assets. This bond
pays $1 if the firm remains solvent at time t + T , and $(1 − L) < $1 otherwise.
According to Appendix B.1, expected yields for zero-coupon, corporate bonds are
16Rreal,t+1 = exp(logRnom,t+1 − log PCEt+1PCEt ).
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given by17














yi,t,t+T and rf are the continuously compounded yield-to-maturity and risk-free rate
respectively, L are losses given default, N() is the standard normal c.d.f. and N−1()
is the inverse of the standard normal c.d.f., πPi,T is the physical probability of default,
while µ̃i and σi are the expected value and standard deviation for asset log-returns.




probabilities of default (πPi,T ), losses given default (L), and bond maturity (T ). In
calibrating the model, I set the Sharpe ratio equal to 0.22 which is the Sharpe ratio for
the median Baa firm in Chen et al. (2009)18. Losses given default L are set equal to
54.9% to match the average recovery rate of 45.1% for senior unsecured bonds in the
Moody’s report19. Finally, Panel A in Table 2.8.1 shows average default probabilities
for Aaa and Baa bonds during the 1970-2011 period.
Panel B in Table 2.8.1 shows average Baa-Aaa credit spreads estimated in previous
studies, as well as mean spreads for the four sets of bond indices (Moody’s, Barclays,
BofA, Thomson-Reuters)20. Following the credit spread puzzle literature, this paper
focuses on Baa-Aaa spreads because Aaa yields seem to encompass parts of credit
spreads such as liquidity, callability, or tax issues which are unrelated to default risk,
and are ignored by the model in (2.1)21. According to Panel B, the average Baa-Aaa
spread in the Huang and Huang sample (2012) is around 103 bps for short matu-
17This expression is identical to the continuous-time one in Chen et al. (2009) p. 3377. However,
Appendix B.1 derives the expression in (2.1) for a discrete-time economy with CRRA investors.
18The Sharpe ratio in (2.1) is the Sharpe ratio for the firm’s assets in place, not the equity Sharpe
ratio. However, because returns for assets in place are hard to measure, I follow Chen et al. (2009,
p. 3375) who proxy asset Sharpe ratios with equity Sharpe ratios.
19Chen et al. (2009) use an average recovery rate of 44.1%.
20See subsection 2.3.1.
21Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) find evidence in favor of a liquidity component in the spreads
of corporate bonds over treasuries, while Ericsson and Renault (2006) suggest part of the spread
over treasuries can also be attributed to taxes.
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rities, 131 bps for medium maturities, whereas expected credit spreads for the long
maturity Barclays indices is 112 bps. However, due to different sample periods, there
is significant variation in average credit spreads estimates across different studies. In
Duffee (1998), average credit spreads are low because the sample is short (1985-1995),
and is heavily influenced by the 1990-1995 period which, according to Figure 2.9.1,
is characterized by very low spreads (around 50 bps). In contrast, average credit
spreads for the BofA and Thomson-Reuters indices are high because average credit
spreads for the these indices are also calculated over a short sample (2001-2011), and
mean spreads are affected by high credit spreads during the 2009 recession (Figure
2.9.1).
For the rest of the paper, target expected credit spreads will be 103 bps for 4yr
maturities and 131 bps for 10yr maturities from Huang and Huang (2012), because
these spreads are frequently cited in the literature, and have been calculated over
a relatively long period (1973-1993). Note that 4yr expected credit spreads from
Huang and Huang are very similar to 4yr spreads in Chen et al. (2009) (107 bps for
the 1970-2001 period), while 10yr expected credit spreads from Huang and Huang are
very close to 10yr spreads in the Barclays sample (129 bps for the 1974-2011 period).
Finally, the target spread for long maturities (15yr) is 112 bps from the long-term
Barclays indices. Expected credit spreads for the long-term Barclays indices, in turn,
are similar to the Moody’s sample (118 bps for 1920-2011 data).
The second-to-last line in Panel B of Table 2.8.1 shows average Baa-Aaa credit
spreads generated by the benchmark model in (2.1). Expected Baa bond yields were
calculated using default probabilities for Baa firms from Panel A, a Sharpe ratio
of 0.22, and losses given default equal to 54.9%. Expected Aaa bond yields were
estimated with the same values for the Sharpe ratio and losses given default, but
Aaa default probabilities were used instead. Expected Baa-Aaa spreads generated by
the model in (2.1) are substantially smaller in magnitude than those observed in the
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data. For instance, model implied expected credit spreads for short maturites (4yr)
are almost half the average spreads observed in practice (51 bps vs. 103 bps in Huang
and Huang 2012)22.
The credit spread puzzle is clearly illustrated in Figure 2.9.2. The dotted line
shows expected credit spreads according to the expression in (2.1). The scattered dots
in Figure 2.9.2 are mean Baa-Aaa spreads from Huang and Huang (2012), and the
three sets of bond indices shown in Table 2.8.1 (Barclays, Thomson-Reuters, BofA).
If the expression in (2.1) were able to fit expected credits spread reasonably well,
then the credit spread curve should intersect with the scattered points. According, to
Figure 2.9.2, the credit spread puzzle is particularly pronounced for short maturities





becomes larger, and the benchmark model is able to fit credit spreads better.
Besides the implicit assumption of CRRA preferences, the model in (2.1) imposes
three very important limitations that can explain its problematic empirical perfor-
mance. First, even though time-variation in expected asset returns is considered a key
mechanism for resolving a number of stylized facts in financial markets, asset returns
in (2.1) are normally distributed with constant mean (µ̃i) and variance (σi). Fer-
son and Harvey (1991) emphasize the importance of time-varying expected returns,
while Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Bansal and Yaron (2004), and Ostrovnaya et
al. (2006) describe different mechanisms (habit, time-varying macroeconomic un-
certainty, generalized disappointment aversion) which can generate time-variation in
investors’ risk attitudes, and, consequently, time-varying expected returns23.
Second, recovery rates (1− L) in (2.1) are also constant. Table 2.8.2 shows OLS
regression results for recovery rates and aggregate consumption growth during the
22Nevertheless, the benchmark model is doing quite well in matching the Duffee (1998) sample
or longer maturities.
23Besides constant moments, the normal distribution also appears to be a restrictive assumption.
Nevertheless, Huang and Huang (2012) and Chet et al. (2009) show that introducing jumps and
relaxing the normality assumption cannot resolve the credit spread puzzle.
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1982-2011 period. The regression coefficient is positive (4.461), and statistically sig-
nificant (t-stat. 3.036, R2 24.767%), suggesting that recovery rates are most likely
procyclical. Figure 2.9.3 also indicates that recovery rates decrease substantially dur-
ing recessions24. Appendix B.2 shows that if recovery rates comove with aggregate
economic conditions (consumption growth) in a linear way25
1− Lt+T = arec,0 + arec,c∆ct+T−1,t+T ,
then the benchmark model becomes




























in (2.2) is the stock market Sharpe ratio (0.378 from Table 2.8.6), ρm,c is the
correlation coefficient between stock market returns and consumption growth (0.463
in Table 2.8.6), and σc is consumption growth volatility (1.914% in Table 2.8.4)
26.
According to the expression in (2.2), risk averse individuals adjust (decrease)
expected values for recovery rates 1 − E[Lt+T ] because these rates are procyclical
(arec,c > 0). This risk adjustment term depends on the risk aversion parameter of the
CRRA power utility. However, Appendix B.2 shows that we can use the consumption-
Euler equation for stock market returns (eqn. B.6 in Appendix B.6.1) in order to
substitute the risk aversion parameter with the stock market Sharpe ratio
µ̃m−rf
σm
adjusted for the correlation (ρm,c) between stock market returns and consumption
growth. Nevertheless, the last line in Panel B suggests that the addition of procyclical
24Evidence in favor of procyclical recovery rates can be found in Altman et al. (2005), and
Acharya et al. (2007) among others. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) also provide theoretical arguments
in favor of procyclical recovery rates.
25Throughout the paper, recovery rates do not change across all firms, even though they can vary
through time.




ρm,c, and σc are from the simulated economy.
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recovery rates leads to a small increase in credit spreads (10 bps across maturities)
relative to the benchmark model in (2.1), either because recovery rates do not covary
much with aggregate consumption (low arec,c in 2.2), or because the standard power
utility framework does not penalize enough recovery rate risk.
The third drawback of the benchmark model in (2.1) is related to the constant
and exogenous default boundary. In the original Merton model, default boundaries
are constant, and equal to the face value of debt. In (2.1), the default boundary is
also assumed constant but not necessarily equal to the face value of debt, because a
number of studies27 suggest that default happens below the debt level. For instance,
Chen et al. (2009) argue that since average recovery rates are around 45%, if default
happened at the face value of debt, then default costs would amount to 55% of face
value, an extremely large number. Contrary to the constant default case, Chen et
al. (2009) set an exogenous default boundary which comoves negatively with surplus
consumption28. Chen (2010) and Bhama et al. (2010), on the other hand, endoge-
nize default boundaries exploiting the smooth pasting conditions in a continous-time
framework. Although default boundaries are hard to measure, it seems that time-
variation in these boundaries is an important ingredient for resolving the credit spread
puzzle.
In a continuous-time setting, the derivation of the benchmark models in (2.1) and
(2.2) hinges on continuous trading so that, under the risk-neutral probability measure,
expected returns (µ̃i) are replaced by the risk-free rate
29. However, for discrete-time
models, in which continuous trading is not an option, replacing the mean with the
risk-free rate while preserving log-normality of asset returns necessarily requires that
investor preferences are characterized by power utility30. Hence, in a discrete-time
27Leland (2004), Davydenko (2012).
28The assumption of countercyclical default boundaries in Chen et al. (2009) is necessary for
positive comovement between default rates and credit spreads.
29Black and Scholes (1973).
30Brennan (1979) and Appendix B.6.1.
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world, the models in (2.1) and (2.2) are essentially a statement about investor pref-
erences, despite the absence of the risk aversion parameter. The aim of this paper is
to examine whether relaxing the CRRA assumption, and introducing disappointment
aversion preferences can help us resolve the credit-spread puzzle. Unfortunately, by
introducing more complicated preference structures, we are no longer able to derive
simple pricing formulas for corporate bond yields like the ones in (2.1) and (2.2).
2.4 Recursive utility with disappointment aversion prefer-
ences
2.4.1 Disappointment aversion stochastic discount factor
For the main model of this paper, I maintain the same assumptions as in sub-
section 2.3.2, with the crucial difference that now the model economy is populated
by disappointment averse, instead of CRRA, individuals. Disappointment aversion
preferences are homothetic. Therefore, if all individuals have identical preferences,
then a representative investor exists, and equilibrium prices are independent of the
wealth distribution31. The expression for the disappointment aversion intertemporal












second-order risk correction︸ ︷︷ ︸
Epstein-Zin terms
× (2.3)
[ 1 + θ1{Vt+1 < δµt}
1− θ(δ−α − 1)1{δ > 1}+ θδ−αEt[1{Vt+1 < δµt}]
]
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
disappointment (first-order risk) correction
31Chapter 1 in Duffie (2000), and Chapter 5 in Huang and Litzenberger (1989).
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The derivation of the disappointment aversion discount factor is shown in Appendix
B.3.
Vt is lifetime utility from time t onwards. µt in equation (2.4) is the disappointment
aversion certainty equivalent which generalizes the concept of expected value. Et is
the conditional expectation operator. The denominator in (2.4) is a normalization
constant such that µt(µt) = µt. 1{} is the disappointment indicator function that
overweighs bad states of the world (disappointment events). According to (2.4),
disappointment events happen whenever lifetime utility Vt+1 is less than some multiple
δ of its certainty equivalent µt. The parameter δ is associated with the threshold
below which disappointment events occur. In Gul (1991) δ is 1, whereas in Routlegde
and Zin (2010), disappointment events may happen below or above the certainty
equivalent, Vt+1 < δµt(Vt+1), depending on whether the GDA parameter δ is lower
or greater than one respectively. Here, I follow Gul (1991), and set δ equal to 1 for
analytical tractability.
α ≥ −1 is the Pratt (1964) coefficient of second-order risk aversion which affects
the smooth concavity of the objective function. θ ≥ 0 is the disappointment aversion
parameter which characterizes the degree of asymmetry in marginal utility above and
below the reference level. β ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of time preference. ρ ≤ 1 character-
izes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) for consumption between two
consecutive periods since EIS = 1
1−ρ . In order to facilitate the derivation of analytical
solutions, I set the EIS equal to unity (ρ = 0). For ρ = 0 and δ = 1 in (2.3), the
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1 + θ 1{Vt+1 < µt(Vt+1)}
Et[1 + θ 1{Vt+1 < µt(Vt+1)}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
disappointment correction
. (2.5)
Mt,t+1 in (2.3) and (2.5) essentially corrects expected values by taking into ac-
count investor preferences over the timing and riskiness of stochastic payoffs. The
first term in (2.3) and (2.5) corrects for the timing of uncertain payoffs (resolution of
uncertainty) which happen at a future date. The second term adjusts future payoffs
for investors’ dislike towards risk (second-order risk aversion). When investors’ pref-
erences are time-additive, adjustments for time and risk are identical (α = ρ), and
the second term vanishes. The third term in equations (2.3) and (2.5) corrects fu-
ture payoffs for investors’ aversion towards disappointment events, defined as periods
during which lifetime utility Vt+1 drops below its certainty equivalent µt.
2.4.2 Approximate analytical solutions for the disappointment aversion
discount factor
Since lifetime utility Vt in (2.5) is unobservable, it is hard to test the empirical
performance of the disappointment model. The analysis will become much easier if
we are able to express lifetime utility as a function of observable state variables.
Suppose that at each point in time, expected consumption growth is a function of a
state variable xt. For simplicity, I will assume that xt is equal to current consumption
growth ∆ct−1,t. Suppose also that there is a second state variable σt which drives
aggregate economic uncertainty. Based on those two assumptions, our model economy
33The reader is referred to Delikouras (2013) for a more thorough analysis of the disappointment
model.
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is described by the following system of equations
∆ct,t+1 = µc + φc∆ct−1,t + σtεc,t+1, (2.6)
σt+1 = µσ + φσσt + νσεσ,t+1, (2.7)
∆om,t,t+1 = µo + φo∆ct−1,t + σoσtεo,t+1. (2.8)
According to (2.6), consumption growth is an AR(1) process with time-varying
volatility. φc ∈ (−1, 1) is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient, µc is the constant
term, and εc,t+1 are i.i.d. N(0, 1) shocks. Although, the AR(1) model for consump-
tion growth is quite common in the asset pricing literature (Mehra and Prescott
1985, Routledge and Zin 2010
)
, a number of authors (Campbell and Cochrane 1999,
Cochrane 2001) suggest that consumption growth is i.i.d., and φc in (2.6) is zero.
Time-varying macroeconomic uncertainty34 is captured by consumption growth
volatility σt which is stochastic. Following Chen et al. (2009), σt is an AR(1) process
in which εσ,t+1 are i.i.d. N(0, 1) shocks, φσ ∈ (−1, 1) is the first-order autocorrela-
tion coefficient, µσ ∈ R>0 is the constant term, and νσ ∈ R>0 captures the condi-
tional volatility in macroeconomic uncertainty. Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal et
al. (2007), Lettau et al. (2007), and Bonomo et al. (2011) all use similar autore-
gressive models for macroeconomic uncertainty, although they consider consumption
growth variance instead of consumption growth volatility. Because shocks in (2.7)
are normally distributed, the probability of negative volatility is non-zero. However,
consumption growth variance σ2t is always positive
35.
The last equation describes the evolution of aggregate payout growth. Depend-
ing on the asset we want to price, om,t represents different kinds of cashflows. For
34In addition to the asset pricing implications of stochastic volatility, Bloom (2009) and Bloom
et al. (2012) propose a model in which stochastic second moments in TFP shocks are the single
cause for business cycle fluctuations.
35Hsu and Palomino (2011) resolve the issue of negative variance by assuming an autoregressive
gamma process as in Gourieroux and Gasiak (2006).
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aggregate equity claims, the relevant payout is dividends (o = d). For the valuation
of aggregate assets in place, the relevant payout is earnings (o = e). According to
(2.8), expected payout growth depends on aggregate consumption ∆ct−1,t through
φo ∈ R. For φo > 1 aggregate payout is a levered claim to consumption, whereas
for φo = 0, payout growth is i.i.d.. σo ∈ R>0 is the volatility parameter for payout
growth. This specification for aggregate payout growth is very similar to the one in
Bansal and Yaron (2004) where aggregate dividend growth depends on the long-run
risk variable. Finally, for algebraic convenience, I will assume that shocks to con-
sumption growth, consumption growth volatility, and payout growth (εc,t, εσ,t, εo,t),
are mutually uncorrelated.
Using the system of equations in (2.6) and (2.7), and the log-linear structure of
investor’s lifetime utility, I can derive an analytical expression for the log utility-
consumption ratio vt − ct in terms of consumption growth ∆ct−1,t and aggregate
uncertainty σt.
Proposition 1: For ρ = 0, δ = 1 in (2.3), and macroeconomic dynamics in (2.6) and
(2.7), the log utility-consumption ratio, vt − ct = log(Vt/Ct), is approximately affine
in consumption growth, consumption growth volatility, and consumption growth vari-
ance: vt − ct ≈ A0 + A1∆ct−1,t + A2σt + A3σ2t ∀t, where
• A1 = βφc1−βφc ,
• A2 =
disappointment aversion︷ ︸︸ ︷

















and n(.) is the standard normal p.d.f..
Proof. See Appendix B.6.4
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A1 is the consumption growth multiplier. The sign and magnitude of A1 depend
on consumption growth autocorrelation φc. If consumption growth is i.i.d. then A1
is zero. A3 is the multiplier for consumption growth variance σ
2
t . If the risk aversion
coefficient α is positive, then A3 is negative
36. For A3 to be real, we require that the
terms inside the square root are positive, and that α is different than zero37. A2 is the
multiplier for consumption growth volatility σt, and captures first-order risk aversion
through the θn(x̄) term. For A3 negative and positive θ, then A2 is also negative. A0
is the constant term in the log utility-consumption ratio. For A0 to be well defined,
we require 1 + 2αA3ν
2
σ to be positive, and that α is non-zero. Finally, if consumption
growth is positively autocorrelated (φc > 0), and preference parameters (α, θ > 0) are
also positive, then the log utility-consumption ratio is procyclical since A1 is positive,
and A2, A3 are negative.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 1 is that we can express the disappoint-
ment aversion stochastic discount factor in (2.5) as a function of consumption growth
∆ct−1,t, and consumption growth volatility σt
















1 + θ 1{A0 + (A1 + 1)∆ct,t+1 + A2σt+1 + A3σ2t+1 < 1β (A0 + A1∆ct−1,t + A2σt + A3σ
2
t )}
Et[1 + θ 1{A0 + (A1 + 1)∆ct,t+1 + A2σt+1 + A3σ2t+1 < 1β (A0 + A1∆ct−1,t + A2σt + A3σ
2
t )}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
disappointment correction
.
Mt,t+1 in (2.9) corrects expected future payoffs for timing, risk and disappointment,
much like the one in (2.5). The crucial difference between the two expressions is
that in equation (2.9) unobservable lifetime utility Vt+1 is expressed in terms of state
variables.
Armed with the expression for the stochastic discount factor, we can also solve
36Appendix B.6.4.
37A detailed discussion on parameter restrictions can be found in Appendix B.6.4. The require-
ment α 6= 0, implies that preferences need to be non-separable across time.
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for the one-period log risk-free rate (see Appendix B.6.5)
rf,t,t+1 ≈ −logβ + 1 · µc + 1 · φc∆ct−1,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
impatience and future prospects
−0.5[2α(A1 + 1) + 1]σ2t︸ ︷︷ ︸
second-order risk aversion
− θn(x̄)σt.︸ ︷︷ ︸







in (2.10) are multiplied by unity,
since the EIS is assumed equal to one, and thus consumption growth moves one-for-
one with interest rates. The last two terms in (2.10) reflect the precautionary motive
for investors to save. This motive depends on both risk and disappointment aversion.
Notice that second-order risk aversion terms depend on consumption growth variance
(σ2t ), while disappointment aversion terms depend on consumption growth volatility
(σt) due to the first-order risk aversion effect. For α, θ positive, higher uncertainty
(high values for σt and σ
2
t ) will force investors to save more in the risk-free technology,
and therefore decrease interest rates.
Turning now to risky financial assets, let Rm,t be the cum-payout, one-period,
gross return for a claim on a stream of aggregate payments (dividends or earnings).







Using the results in Appendix B.4, aggregate log-returns rm,t,t+1 can be written as a







where κm,0 and κm,1 are linearization constants, and zm,t = log
Pm,t
Om,t
is the log price-
payout ratio.
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In order to provide valuable intuition, we can further express the log price-payout
ratio zm,t as a linear function of the state variables ∆ct,t+1 and σt using Proposition
2.
Proposition 2: For ρ = 0, δ = 1 in (2.3), and the dynamics in (2.6) - (2.8), the log
price-payout ratio zm,t = log(Pm,t/Om,t) for a claim on a stream of aggregate payments
is approximately affine in consumption growth, consumption growth volatility, and
consumption growth variance: zm,t ≈ Am,0 +Am,1∆ct−1,t +Am,2σt +Am,3σ2t ∀t, where
• Am,1 = φo−φc1−κm,1φc ,
• Am,2 ≈
disappointment aversion︷ ︸︸ ︷
θn(x̄)(1− κm,1Am,1) +2κm,1Am,3µσφσ
1−κm,1φσ ,




• Am,0 ≈ 11−κm,1
[
logβ+κm,0 +µo + (κm,1Am,1− 1)µc +κm,1Am,2µσ +κm,1Am,3µ2σ
]
,
Proof. See Appendix B.6.6
Note that the values for Am,2, Am,3 and Am,0 above are approximations assuming
that the variance for consumption growth volatility (ν2σ) is a number close to zero.
Exact solutions can be found in Appendix B.6.6. The above approximations preserve
the intuition without the notational burden. However, for the simulation part of this
study, I use the exact solutions. Moreover, the multipliers Am,1, Am,2, Am,3 and Am,0
for the price-dividend ratio are different than the multipliers for the price-earnings ra-
tio because aggregate dividend growth dynamics are different than aggregate earnings
growth dynamics (φd 6= φe or µd 6= µe or σd 6= σe).
As long as φo 6= φc, the multiplier for consumption growth Am,1 will be non-zero,
and the price-payout ratio zm,t will depend on consumption growth, even if φc = 0
and consumption growth is i.i.d.. The sign of Am,1 essentially depends on φo − φc
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because 1−κm,1φc is positive38. Am,3 is the multiplier for σ2t , and depends on the risk
aversion coefficient α, as well as on the persistence of aggregate shocks through the
terms φ2σ and Am,1. Unlike A3 in Proposition 1, which is always negative for positive
values of the risk aversion parameter α, Am,3 can turn positive even if α is positive,
provided that σo is a large number. For Am,3 positive, an increase in consumption
growth variance will increase the price-payout ratio.
Am,2 is the stochastic volatility multiplier. If investors are not disappointment
averse (θ = 0) and Am,3 is positive, then Am,2 is also positive, and an increase in
aggregate uncertainty will lead to an increase in the price-payout ratio. However, for
positive θ, A2,m can be negative, even if Am,3 is positive. In this case, the effects
of aggregate uncertainty on the price-payout ratio operate in two different directions
thought the first and second-order risk aversion mechanisms. This is a subtle, but
important, difference between disappointment aversion and the traditional Epstein-
Zin (Epstein and Zin 1989) framework with no first-order risk aversion effects. Finally,
A0,m is the constant term in the price-divided ratio, and is essentially equal to the
sum of the constant terms (µm, µc) from (2.6) and (2.8) adjusted for disappointment
(Am,2µσ) and uncertainty (Am,3µ
2
σ).
The results in Proposition 2 are particularly important, since we can use the price-
payout approximation in Appendix B.4 to express asset log-returns as a function of
the state variables
rm,t,t+1 ≈ κm,0 + κm,1zm,t+1 − zm,t︸︷︷︸
Am,0+Am,1∆ct−1,t+Am,2σt+Am,3σ2t
+∆om,t,t+1, ∀t. (2.11)
Asset returns in (2.11) correspond to aggregate claims. In order to describe firm-level
38For consumption growth to be stationary φc ∈ (−1, 1). Additionally, κm,1 < 1 from (B.4), and
thus 1− κm,1φc > 0.
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asset returns, we need to introduce idiosyncratic shocks as follows
ri,t,t+1 ≈ κm,0 + κm,1zm,t+1 − zm,t + ∆om,t,t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
systematic component
+ σiεi,t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
idiosyncratic part
, (2.12)
for cum-payout returns, and
rxi,t,t+1 = zm,t+1 − zm,t + ∆om,t,t+1 + σiεi,t+1, (2.13)
for ex-payout returns. εi,t+1 are i.i.d. N(0,1) idiosyncratic shocks, orthogonal to the
rest of the aggregate shocks in (2.6)-(2.8). The above specification for firm-level
returns matches perfectly a long-standing concept in finance according to which asset
returns can be decomposed into a systematic part, and an idiosyncratic one. Note
that for equity returns the relevant payout in (2.11) - (2.13) is dividends (o = d),
whereas for assets in place returns the relevant payout is earnings (o = e).
2.5 Simulation results for the disappointment aversion dis-
count factor
2.5.1 Preference parameters, and state variable moments for the simu-
lated economy
The EIS and the GDA parameters for the disappointment aversion discount fac-
tor in (1.3) are assumed equal to one for analytical tractability. For the remaining
parameters, I set the risk aversion coefficient α equal to 1.8 and the disappointment
aversion parameter θ equal to 2.030. These values are within the range of clinical
estimates39, and are very similar to those used in Bonomo et al. (2011). The value
for θ implies that whenever lifetime utility is below its certainty equivalent (disap-
pointment events), investors penalize losses 3 times more than during normal times.
39Gill and Prowse (2012).
86
Finally, the rate of time preference β is equal to 0.9955. In the deterministic steady-
state of the economy, an additional $1 of consumption tomorrow is worth $0.9955
today.
In order to explain the market-wide equity premium, Routledge and Zin (2010)
employ a constant consumption growth variance framework, and set θ equal to 9 with
α equal to -1 (second-order risk neutrality). In Bonomo et al. (2011) consumption
growth variance is stochastic, θ is 2.33, and α is 1.5. Choi et al. (2007) conduct clinical
experiments on portfolio choice under uncertainty, and find disappointment aversion
coefficients that range from 0 to 1.876, with a mean of 0.39. They also estimate
second-order risk aversion parameters that range from -0.952 to 2.871, with a mean
of 1.448. Using experimental data on real effort provision, Gill and Prowse (2012)
estimate disappointment aversion coefficients ranging from 1.260 to 2.070. Ostrov-
naya et al. (2006) estimate disappointment aversion parameters from stock market
data using market wide stock market returns as the explanatory variable, instead
of consumption growth. Their estimates for θ range from 1.825 to 2.783. Finally,
Delikouras (2013) assumes constant consumption growth volatility, and provides θ
estimates around 4.6, and risk aversion estimates that range from 10 up to 16.
Table 2.8.3 summarizes parameter values for state variable dynamics in (2.6)-(2.8).
These values are carefully chosen so that simulated moments match those observed
in real data. Many of these parameters have been used in previous studies. For
instance, the consumption growth multipliers φd and φe in (2.8) are equal to 3 as
in Bansal and Yaron (2004). Earnings are considered a levered claim to consump-
tion (φe > 1) because the endowment model ignores other claims to earnings such
as salaries, depreciation, and taxes that need to be paid out before interest and div-
idends40. Volatility parameters for dividends and earnings growth (σd = 7.1664 and
40Also, for uncorrelated macroeconomic shocks in (2.6)-(2.8), letting φe (φd) be larger than one is
the only way to obtain plausible correlations between earnings (dividend) growth and consumption
growth. Chen et al. (2009), p. 3404, set φd equal to 3.5 and φe equal to 2.7.
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σe = 2.2011) are larger than one, because dividend and earnings growth are much
more volatile than consumption growth. The autocorrelation parameter for aggre-
gate consumption growth volatility is 0.971 because, according to previous results41,
aggregate uncertainty is a very persistent process. Finally, idiosyncratic volatility σi
is set equal to 0.210 so as to match the Sharpe ratio for the median Baa firm which
is 0.220 (Chen et al. 2009, p. 3377).
Despite the similarities with previous studies, there are a few notable exceptions.
First, in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal et al. (2007), expected consumption
growth is a very persistent process, whereas in Chen et al. (2009) and Bonomo et al.
(2011) consumption growth is i.i.d. (φc=0). Here, I set the autocorelation parameter
φc equal to 0.5 to match the persistence in BEA consumption data. Second, the
volatility parameter µσ in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bonomo et al. (2011) is
quite high. Their values for µσ imply that annual consumption growth volatility is
approximately 3%, which is more than two times the volatility observed in the BEA
sample (1.3% from Table 2.8.4). In this study, µσ is equal to a very small value
(0.0004) so that consumption growth volatility remains low. Finally, the linearization
constant z̄m for log price-payout ratios in (B.4) is equal to 3, which is very close to
the unconditional mean for the stock market log price-dividend ratio (Table 2.8.6).
Table 2.8.4 shows simulated and sample moments for all macroeconomic variables.
Simulated values for the state variables are according to the system in (2.6)-(2.8),
using parameter values from Table 2.8.342. Simulated moments for aggregate con-
sumption growth are very close to actual ones (mean 1.834% vs. 1.838% in the data,
autocorrelation 0.504 vs. 0.502), with the exception of consumption growth volatil-
ity which is higher for the simulated economy (1.914% vs. 1.346% in the data)43.
41Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal et al. (2007), Lettau et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2009), and
Bonomo et al. (2011).
42Because (2.7) admits negative volatility, if at some point volatility becomes negative, then the
negative observation is replaced with the previous observation.
43In Chen et al. (2009) consumption growth volatility is around 1.5%. In Bansal and Yaron
(2004) and Bonomo et al. (2011) consumption growth volatility is 3%, whereas consumption growth
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Simulated moments for aggregate dividend growth are very realistic as well (mean
1.796% vs. 2.107%, volatility 13.232% vs. 13.079% in the data). However, the au-
tocorrelation for the simulated aggregate dividend growth process is positive (0.093),
whereas dividend growth in the data is a mean reverting process (-0.278). Finally,
the simulated dividend growth and consumption growth processes are positively au-
tocorrelated much like in the 1946-2011 sample (0.218 vs. 0.286 in real data44).
Expected earnings growth for the simulated economy is positive (1.819%), and
similar to the to expected value for consumption and dividend growth. Even though,
in the long-run, expected growth rates should be almost identical because dividends
and earnings are cointegrated, Belo et al. (2012) explain how endogenous capital de-
cisions can make dividends riskier than earnings in the short-run. Expected earnings
growth in the sample is negative (-3.831%), and approximately equal to expected infla-
tion, because CRSP-Compustat nominal earnings have been exponentially detrended
due to the increasing number of firms in the Compustat sample over time. Earnings
growth volatility is lower than in the 1946-2011 sample (6.784% vs. 7.057%). Simi-
larly, the simulated correlation coefficient between earnings growth and consumption
growth is lower than the sample one (0.425 vs. 0.487)45. Macroeconomic uncer-
tainty is hard to measure, and, therefore, there aren’t any readily available data to
benchmark simulation results for σt. Nevertheless, parameter values for uncertainty
dynamics in (2.8) are based on previous results commonly used in the asset pricing
literature46.
volatility in Shiller’s data is 1.8%.
44For their habit model, Chen et al. (2009), p. 3377, assume that the correlation coefficient
between aggregate dividends and aggregate consumption growth is equal to 0.60, more than twice
the estimated value 0.286 in Table 2.8.4.
45The correlation coefficient between consumption growth and earnings growth in Chen et al.
(2009) is 0.48 (p. 3377).
46Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal et al. (2007), Chen et al. (2009), and Bonomo et al. (2011).
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2.5.2 Simulation results for Baa-Aaa credit spreads
The main pricing equation used in this study is the consumption-Euler equation
for zero-coupon, corporate bonds that are subject to default at the expiration date









1− Lt+T1{rxi,t,t+T < Di,t+T}
)]]
, (2.14)
in which Mt,t+j is the disappointment aversion stochastic discount factor from (2.9),
Lt+T are losses given default, r
x
i,t,t+T are ex-payout, log-returns for assets in place (not
equity returns) according to (2.13), and Di,t+T is the default boundary. Although
bond yields in Table 2.8.1 are measured in nominal terms, the model economy has
been simulated in real terms, and thus, model implied spreads are inflation-free. To
the extend that inflation risk premia are approximately equal for Baa and Aaa bonds,
then nominal Baa-Aaa credit spreads should be very similar to real Baa-Aaa credit
spreads. Unlike the model in (2.1), losses given default Lt+T and default boundaries
Di,t+T are allowed to vary over time, and also be functions of the state variables
1− Lt+T = arec,0 + arec,c∆ct+T−1,t+T , (2.15)













Table 2.8.5 shows the main empirical results in this study which have been ob-
tained through the simulation process discussed in Appendix B.5. Panel A in Table
2.8.5 specifies values for the Baa and Aaa default boundaries which are expressed in
terms of asset log-returns. For example, the 4yr constant Baa default boundary is
equal to -0.998 which means that the value of assets in place needs to decrease to
e−0.998 = 36.861% of initial value before a Baa firm defaults47.
Simulated default probabilities in Panel B are practically indistinguishable from
47Chen et al. 2009 also assume a similar constant default boundary for 4 year Baa bonds (p.
3384).
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default rates in the Moody’s report due to appropriately selecting default boundaries.
The default rates in Panel B guarantee that the stochastic discount factor in (2.9)
generates plausible credit spreads because investors severely penalize default states
through the disappointment aversion mechanism, and not because default probabili-
ties are abnormally high. Finally, Panel C in Table 2.8.5 shows average credit spreads
implied by the disappointment aversion discount factor in (2.9) with preference pa-
rameters from Table 2.8.3, and aggregate state variable dynamics according to the
system in (2.6)-(2.8). In order to address the shortcomings of the benchmark model in
(2.1), I consider four different cases: I) constant recovery rates and default boundaries,
II) procyclical recovery rates according to (2.15) and constant default boundaries, III)
constant recovery rates and countercyclical default boundaries according to (2.16),
and IV) procyclical recovery rates and countercyclical default boundaries.
Expected credit spreads for the disappointment aversion discount factor in case I
are larger than those for the benchmark model (average increase across maturities 15
bps) because disappointment averse investors heavily penalize periods during which
lifetime utility is less than its certainty equivalent (disappointment events). During
these periods, Baa defaults happen more often than defaults for Aaa firms, which are
fairly acyclical. In other words, Baa corporate bonds expose the aggregate investor
to more disappointment risk than Aaa bonds. Therefore, in order for Baa bonds to
be part of the aggregate portfolio, these claims should be discounted at higher rates
than Aaa bonds.
Relative to the benchmark model in (2.1), case I in Panel C is different in two very
important ways. First, as explained by Lemma 1 in Appendix B.6.1, the benchmark
model implicitly assumes CRRA preferences. Although concave CRRA utility func-
tions overweigh unfavorable outcomes, they do not capture asymmetries in marginal
utility, because CRRA preferences are isoelasic. On the other hand, the disappoint-
ment model relies heavily on investors penalizing losses that happen during periods
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when lifetime utility is below the certainty equivalent 1+θ times more than loses dur-
ing normal times. Second, disappointment aversion preference induce time-variation
in risk attitudes. This time-variation is further amplified by stochastic consump-
tion growth volatility in (2.7) to generate substantially time-variation in expected
returns and Sharpe ratios. Recent results in asset pricing suggest that time-variation
in Sharpe ratios is almost a necessary condition for resolving a number of prominent
asset pricing puzzles48, including the credit spread puzzle.
Nevertheless, disappointment aversion alone cannot fully rationalize expected Baa-
Aaa credit spreads, especially for very short maturities, since, according to Table
2.8.5, 41 bps in expected credit spreads for 4yr bonds remain unexplained by the
disappointment model. These results should not cast any doubt on the explanatory
power of disappointment aversion. According to Chen et al. (2009), neither the
habit, nor the long-run risk models can explain credit spreads49, unless we assume
time-varying recovery rates or stochastic default boundaries.
Table 2.8.2 provides evidence that recovery rates are procyclical. The assumption
of constant recovery rates therefore ignores an important risk source for credit spreads.
Case II in Table 2.8.5 relaxes this assumption, and, based on the results of Table 2.8.2,
assumes that losses given default Lt+T are a linear function of aggregate consumption
growth as in (2.15) in which arec,c is set equal to 4.464 from Table 2.8.2. The addition
of procyclical recovery rates increases Baa-Aaa spreads implied by the disappointment
model by 34 bps on average across maturities relatively to the benchmark model in
(2.1), and by 23 bps relatively to the benchmark model with procyclical recovery
rates in (2.2).
In the case of countercyclical losses given default, corporate bonds need to com-
pensate the disappointment averse investor for two sources of systematic risk. The
48Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Verdelhan (2010), Routledge and
Zin (2010), Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013).
49Chen et al. (2009) p. 3384 and p. 3405.
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first one is related to the fact that during economic downturns default frequencies for
Baa firms increase more than default frequencies for Aaa bonds. The second source of
systematic risk captures the fact that during disappointment periods recovery rates
decrease. Moreover, disappointment aversion preferences punish the procyclicality
of recovery rates more severely than power utility which is implicitly assumed by
the model in (2.2). The first-order risk aversion mechanism amplifies recovery rate
risk, despite the relatively low covariance between recovery rates and consumption
growth. However, despite the improvement relatively to the benchmark case in (2.2),
even with countercyclical recovery rates, 26 bps in 4yr expected credit spreads (17
bps for 10yr maturities) cannot be explained by case II of the disappointment model.
Cases III and IV in Table 2.8.5 assume stochastic default boundaries. Since these
boundaries are hard to measure, parameters for the stochastic default boundary have
been calibrated so that default rates for the simulated economy match actual ones.
Unlike Chen (2010) or Bhamra et al. (2010), but similar to Chen et al. (2009),
default boundaries in this study are exogenous, even though they are functions of state
variables. The calibrated values for the default boundary functions in (2.16) imply
that these boundaries are strongly countercyclical, since they co-move negatively with
consumption growth, and positively with macroeconomic uncertainty. In bad times,
when consumption growth (volatility) is lower (higher) than its unconditional mean,
default boundaries are low in absolute value, and thus managers find it easier to
declare bankruptcy. In good times, when consumption growth (volatility) is higher
(lower) than its mean, default boundaries are high in absolute value, and firms do
not default as easily as in bad times.
Countercyclical default boundaries lead to a larger number of defaults during
economic downturns, and fewer number of defaults during good times, yet, uncondi-
tionally, average default rates are equal to the ones observed in actual data. Coun-
tercyclical default boundaries essentially imply that default events covary more with
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aggregate macroeconomic conditions relative to cases I and II. The combination of dis-
appointment aversion preferences with countercyclical default boundaries (case III)
improves the fit of the baseline disappointment model (case I), and also increases
model implied expected credit spreads by 25 bps across maturities relative to the
benchmark model in (2.1). Nevertheless, the increase in credit spreads induced by
stochastic default boundaries in case III is less than the increase due to procyclical
recovery rates in case II, and leaves 29 bps in 4yr expected credit spreads (25 bps in
10yr bonds) unexplained.
Finally, the disappointment model with procyclical recovery rates and counter-
cyclical boundaries (case IV) can fit average credit spreads for short (100 bps vs. 103
bps for 4yr spreads) and medium maturities (129 bps vs. 131 bps for 10yr spreads),
but severely overestimates credit spreads at the long end of the term structure (148
bps vs. 112 bps for 15yr bonds). Countercyclical default boundaries increase the fre-
quency of defaults during bad times, while procyclical recovery rates increase losses
given default during periods of low economic growth. Because periods of high Baa
default rates and high losses given default are also associated with disappointment
events (lifetime utility below its certainty equivalent), disappointment averse investors
require larger compensation for holding Baa bonds than Aaa bonds.
Overall, results in Table 2.8.5 suggest that as long as we allow for procyclical
recovery rates and countercyclical default boundaries, disappointment aversion pref-
erences are able to resolve the credit spread puzzle using risk and disappointment
aversion parameters that are consistent with recent experimental results. However,
as shown in Figure 2.9.4, by fitting mean credit spreads for short and medium ma-
turities, the disappointment model overestimates mean credit spreads for maturities
longer than 15 years. The credit spread literature mostly considers 4yr or 10yr bonds,
and does not provide any results on long maturities. Therefore, we cannot assess the
relative performance of the disappointment aversion model for long maturities. More-
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over, matching average credit spreads for very short maturities (1-3yr) still remains
an open question50.
Although, the goal of this paper is not a horse race between prominent asset
pricing models, we need to highlight that the disappointment aversion mechanism
is unique. First, disappointment aversion preferences fully encompass recent clinical
and field evidence for behavior under uncertainty which emphasize the importance of
expectation-based reference-dependent utility51. The key mechanism in disappoint-
ment aversion is asymmetric marginal utility over gains and losses. Gains and losses
are, in turn, endogenously characterized by the forward-looking certainty equivalent
for lifetime utility.
Asymmetric marginal utility is not present in the habit model, which assumes
a backwards-looking unobservable habit process, and, according to Ljungqvist and
Uhlig (2009), leads to policy inconsistencies for the central planner. Furthermore, in
the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) consumption never drops below its
habit, otherwise marginal utility becomes infinity. On the other hand, for disappoint-
ment aversion preferences it is precisely periods during which consumption growth
falls below its certainty equivalent that are important for credit spreads. Asymmetric
marginal utility is not captured by the long-run risk model either which assumes a
highly persistent mean in expected consumption growth52.
2.5.3 Equity premium, and the risk-free rate
By assuming extremely high risk premia, one could possibly improve the perfor-
mance of consumption-based models in fitting credit spreads. However, high risk
premia would also imply abnormally high expected returns for the stock market.
50According to Table 2.8.1, default rates for for 1 up to 3 years are almost zero. Because no asset
pricing model can map zero default rates for short term bonds into measurable yields, the credit
spread literature focuses on medium to long term maturities (4-10yr).
51Choi et al. (2007), Post et al. (2008), Doran (2010), Crawford and Meng (2011), Abeler et al.
(2011), Gill and Prowse (2012).
52Beeler and Campbell (2012), Bonomo et al. (2011).
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In this section, I show that the disappointment aversion model in (2.9) can match
moments for the equity premium, the price-dividend ratio, and the risk-free rate rea-
sonably well, with the same preference parameters and state variable dynamics from
Table 2.8.3. Equity returns, the risk-free rate, and the price-dividend ratio, have been
simulated according to the expressions in (2.11), (2.10), and Proposition 2 respec-
tively, while sample moments are calculated using the data described in subsection
2.3.1.
According to Table 2.8.6, simulated stock market returns for the disappoint-
ment aversion model have a high mean (6.653% vs. 6.581% in the data), are quite
volatile (15.049% vs. 17.216% in the data) and i.i.d.
(
ρ(rm,t,t+1, rm,t−1,t) = 0.035
vs. -0.030 in the data
)
, and are positively correlated with consumption growth(
ρ(rm,t,t+1,∆ct−1,t) = 0.463 vs. 0.503 in the data
)
. The disappointment model also
predicts a highly autocorrelated (0.650 vs. 0.696 in the data) and low mean (0.962%
vs. 0.928% in the data) risk-free rate, yet the variance for the simulated risk-free rate
is substantially smaller than the sample estimate (1.163% vs. 2.727%). Finally, even
though results for the price-dividend ratio are fairly accurate, especially in terms of
persistence (0.891 vs. 0.950 in the data), the simulated price-dividend in the dis-
appointment averse economy has lower mean (3.000 vs. 3.433), and is less volatile
(0.227 vs. 0.467) than the one obtained from the CRSP database.
Traditional consumption-based asset pricing models with time-separable power
utility need exorbitant values for the risk aversion coefficient, around 50 for annual
data53, and around 150 for quarterly data54, in order to match expected stock market
returns. Further, extremely large risk aversion parameters lead to very volatile risk-
free rates55. Non-separable Epstein-Zin preferences without first-order risk aversion
53Mehra and Prescott (1985), Cochrane (2001), Yogo (2004), Liu et al. (2009), Routldege and
Zin (2010), Delikouras (2013).
54Aı̈t-Sahalia et al. (2004), Yogo (2004), Delikouras (2013).
55Weil (1989), Delikouras (2013).
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effects, also require large coefficients of risk aversion, around 3056 to match expected
stock market returns, unless we assume a very persistent process for expected con-
sumption growth57. These empirical discrepancies are ingeniously concealed by the
benchmark models in (2.1) and (2.2) or any other model that directly uses risk-
neutral pricing because these models do not explicitly model investor preferences. In
contrast, the disappointment aversion discount factor in (2.9) can generate realistic
asset pricing moments using parameter values that are consistent with clinical results
for behavior under uncertainty.
2.5.4 Comparative results for alternative preference parameters
The main goal of the paper is to examine whether disappointment aversion pref-
erences can explain asset prices across different financial markets with risk and dis-
appointment aversion parameters calibrated to experimental findings. This section
performs a sensitivity analysis on preference parameters for the disappointment aver-
sion discount factor in (2.9). Comparative results focus on the two parameters that
affect risky choices, the risk and disappointment aversion parameters α and θ, while
the rest of the parameters in Table 2.8.3 as well as model dynamics from (2.6)-(2.8)
are kept constant.
The choice of alternative parameter values for the disappointment aversion model
serves three purposes. First, alternative parameters need to be close to clinical esti-
mates. Second, alternative parameter values should be able to identify the marginal
importance of the first and second-order risk aversion channels. Finally, the choice
of these alternative values ought to guarantee that the multipliers A0 − A3, and
Am,0−Am,3 are well defined and real. The systems of equations in Proposition 1 and
Proposition 2 impose constraints on the magnitude of the risk aversion parameter.
For instance, if α is greater than 8.7, then the solutions to the quadratic equations for
56Routldege and Zin (2010), Delikouras (2013).
57Bonomo et al. (2011), Beeler and Campbell (2012), Delikouras (2013)
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A3 and Am,3 are imaginary numbers, unless we specify different parameters for the
state variable dynamics in (2.6)-(2.8). In contrast, there are no constraints imposed
on θ, because A2 and Am,2 are solutions to linear equations.
For the first alternative scenario, the risk aversion parameter is set equal to -1
(second-order risk neutrality), and the disappointment aversion parameter is equal
to 3. By setting α equal to -1, we are essentially downgrading the importance of
consumption growth variance σ2t as a state variable. This is done through the param-
eters A3 and Am,3 which significantly decrease in magnitude, and even turn positive
due to second order risk neutrality. For the baseline disappointment model in Table
2.8.5 and Table 2.8.6 where α is positive, A3 and Am,3 are large in absolute value and
negative.
According to Table 2.8.7, if we turn off the risk aversion channel, and increase the
magnitude for the disappointment aversion parameter, then the expected risk-free
rate decreases relative to the baseline scenario (0.519% vs. 0.962%) because the first-
order precautionary savings motive intensifies. In contrast, expected equity premia
remain essentially the same relative to the baseline disappointment model (5.676% vs.
5.691% for the baseline model). Even though the reduction in expected excess stock
returns is almost zero, the decrease in expected credit spreads relative to the baseline
scenario in Table 2.8.7 is quite impressive, approximately -29 bps for 4yr maturities
across all four cases. Results in Table 2.8.7 suggest that although equity premia
are insensitive to the second-order risk aversion channel, credit-spreads are hugely
affected by setting α equal to -1. Because Baa defaults are very rare events, even the
slightest change in systematic risk can lead to substantial changes in credit spreads.
On the other hand, equity premia are not sensitive to second-order risk-neutrality
because stock market returns are not related to rare events.
For the second alternative scenario, the disappointment aversion channel is turned
off (θ = 0), and the risk aversion parameter is set equal to 5. Although 5 is a reason-
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able value in the asset pricing literature, experimental results imply that α cannot be
greater than 2.858. In the absence of the first-order risk aversion mechanism, there
is an important decrease in average credit spreads relative to the baseline calibration
for the disappointment model, approximately -38 bps for 4yr maturities across all
four cases. Furthermore, expected excess stock returns are almost zero, while the
expected risk-free rate doubles in magnitude (2.000%), because, without disappoint-
ment aversion, the precautionary savings motive attenuates. Table 2.8.7 highlights
the importance of both first- and second-order risk aversion terms in generating mea-
surable credit spreads. Asset pricing models that do not include disappointment
aversion preferences, usually substitute first-order risk aversion effects with highly
persistent shocks to the stochastic discount factor through the habit or the long-run
risk mechanisms59.
2.6 Related literature
Before concluding the discussion on the credit spread puzzle, I will briefly relate
the disappointment framework to some key results in the corporate bond literature.
Merton (1974) was one of the first authors to propose a unified framework for the
valuation of corporate securities, bonds and equities, which are priced as contingent
claims written on a firm’s assets in place. Previous results on the inability of the
Merton model to match credit spreads date back to Jones et al. (1984), while Huang
and Huang (2012) show that the credit puzzle is robust to a variety of specifications
for the risk-neutral dynamics of asset returns.
In Merton’s early framework, there were no taxes, no bankruptcy costs, and capital
structure choices were irrelevant. Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996), extend
Merton’s framework to account for tax benefits of debt, bankruptcy costs, and optimal
58Choi et al. (2007).
59Campbell and Conchrane (1999), Bansal and Yaron (2004).
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leverage decisions. Goldstein et al. (2001) also propose an asset pricing model for
corporate bonds in which the government, bondholders, and equityholders all have
stakes in the firm’s EBIT-generating process. In the Goldstein et al. model, bond
coupons, default, and leverage are all endogenous decisions. However, all these papers
rely directly on risk-neutral dynamics, remain silent on investor preferences, and do
not really focus on the empirical performance of these models across financial markets.
Bhamra et al. (2010) also propose a unified framework to explain the equity
premium and the credit-spread puzzle. Even though they use risk-neutral dynamics,
and do not focus on investor preferences either60, they provide a comprehensive model
with endogenous capital structure and default decisions in order to resolve the equity
premium and credit spread puzzles. Nevertheless, their model generates a credit
spread of only 45 bps for 5yr maturities (75 bps for 10yr maturities, p. 670), and an
equity risk premium of 3.19%.
Chen et al. (2009) compare the habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999),
and the long-run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004) for their ability to explain
the credit spread puzzle while generating possible moments for the stock market.
Although, both models can resolve the equity premium puzzle, the long-run risk model
has difficulties in generating measurable credit-spreads, while the habit-model needs
to be combined with countercyclical default boundaries or procyclical recovery rates
in order to fit Baa-Aaa credit spreads. Finally, Chen (2010) provides a parsimonious
general equilibrium model in order to resolve the credit spread and underleverage
puzzles, while matching moments for equity risk premia. However, he focuses only
on 10yr maturities, while he sets the risk aversion coefficient equal to 6.5, and the
EIS equal to 1.5., even though a number of empirical results suggest that61 the EIS
cannot be larger than one.
Table 2.8.8 shows model implied credit spreads and expected equity premia calcu-
60Although they assume Epstein-Zin utility for the aggregate investor.
61Hall (1988), Bonomo et al. (2011), and Beeler and Campbell (2012).
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lated in previous works. Notice that almost all results focus on 4yr or 10yr maturities
and remain silent on longer maturities. Furthermore, this paper is the first to im-
pose a stochastic discount factor which is microfounded on experimental evidence for
behavior under risk.
2.7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to examine whether disappointment aversion preferences
can help us resolve the credit spread puzzle within a consumption-based asset pric-
ing framework of an endowment economy. Given the relative success of first-order
risk aversion preferences in explaining other stylized facts in financial markets, the
disappointment aversion discount factor seems a natural candidate for correctly pric-
ing corporate bonds. However, the first-order risk aversion mechanism implied by
disappointment aversion is not powerful enough to map low probabilities of default
into measurable Baa-Aaa credit spreads. Only when the disappointment model is
combined with countercyclical losses given default and default boundaries, can dis-
appointment aversion preferences resolve the credit spread puzzle. This is in line
with the conclusions in Chen et al. (2009), according to which neither the habit nor
the long-run risk models can price Baa corporate bonds, unless we assume additional
sources of risk such as procyclical recovery rates, countercyclical default boundaries
or stochastic idiosyncratic volatility.
Furthermore, by fitting credit spreads for the short and medium term, the disap-
pointment model tends to overestimate credit spreads for long maturities (15yr+).
Traditional consumption-based asset pricing models (habit, long-run risk) have only
been tested against 4yr or 10yr bond maturities. It would be interesting to examine
the predictions of these models for longer maturities, as well as for the ultra short run.
Another direction for future research is to introduce disappointment aversion prefer-
ences in a world where capital structure choices matter so as to endogenize default
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decisions. In spite of all these issues, the disappointment model is quite successful
in explaining not just corporate bond prices, but also key moments for stock market
returns, the risk-free rate, and the price-dividend ratio using preference parameters
that are consistent with experimental data for choices under uncertainty.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.8.1 Average default rates, and expected credit spreads for Baa
and Aaa bonds
Panel A: average default rates for Aaa and
Baa bonds (1970-2011)
1 year 4 year 10 year 15 year 20 year
Aaa 0.000% 0.035% 0.476% 0.884% 1.045%
Baa 0.181% 1.379% 4.649% 8.632% 12.315%
Panel B: average Baa-Aaa credit spreads (bps)
sample maturity
period short medium long
Moody’s Baa-Aaa Corp. Bond Yield 1920-2011 118
Barclays US Agg. Corp. Baa-Aaa 1974-2011 128 112
BofA US Corp. BBB-AAA 2001-2011 155 128 102
Thomson-Reuters US Corp. Baa-Aaa 2003-2011 157 180
Duffee (1998) 1985-1995 75 70 105
Chen et al. (2009) 1970-2001 109
Huang and Huang (2012) 1973-1993 103 131
benchmark model in (2.1) 51 77 97
stochastic recovery rates in (2.2) 58 87 112
Table 2.8.1 Average default rates for Baa and Aaa-rated bonds in Panel A are from the Moody’s
2012 annual report. Panel B summarizes sample average credit spreads used in previous studies, as
well as expected credit spreads implied by the models in (2.1) and (2.2). In Duffee (1998), short
maturity is 2yr-7yr, medium is 7yr-15yr, and long maturity is 15yr-30yr. Chen et al. (2009) consider
4yr maturities, while Huang and Huang (2012) consider 4yr and 10yr maturities. For the Moody’s
indices, long maturity is between 20yr and 30yr. For the Barclays indices, medium maturity is
1yr-10yr, and long maturity is 10yr+. For the BofA indices, short maturity is 1yr-5yr, medium is
7yr-10yr, and long maturity is 15yr+. For the Thomson-Reuters indices, short maturity is 4yr and
medium maturity is 10yr. Finally, for the benchmark and stochastic recovery rates models in (2.1)
and (2.2), short maturity is 4yr, medium maturity is 10yr, and long maturity is 15yr.
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Table 2.8.2 shows results for the OLS regression of recovery rates on contemporaneous consumption
growth. Recovery rates for senior subordinate debt are from the Moody’s 2012 report. ârec,c is the
OLS estimate with the t-statistic in parenthesis.
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Table 2.8.3 Preference parameters, and state variable dynamics for the
baseline disappointment model
variable variable description variable value
EIS elasticity of intetemporal substitution 1
δ generalized disappointment aversion 1
β rate of time preference 0.9955
α risk aversion 1.8000
θ disappointment aversion 2.0303
µc consumption growth constant 0.0091
φc consumption growth autocorrelation 0.5026
µσ volatility constant 0.0004
φσ volatility autocorrelation 0.9715
νσ volatility of volatility 0.0017
µd dividend growth constant -0.0367
φd leverage parameter for dividend growth 3
σd volatility parameter for dividend growth 7.1664
µe earnings growth constant -0.0367
φe leverage parameter for earnings growth 3
σe volatility parameter for earnings growth 2.2011
σi idiosyncratic return volatility 0.2100
z̄m linearization constant for the price-payout ratio in (B.4) 3
x̄ linearization constant for the normal c.d.f. in (B.9) 0
Table 2.8.3 summarizes preference parameters for the disappointment aversion stochastic discount
factor in (2.9), as well as model parameters for aggregate state dynamics in equations (2.6)-(2.8).
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Table 2.8.4 shows sample and simulated moments for aggregate state variables. E is expected
value, Vol is volatility, and ρ is the correlation coefficient. ∆ct−1,t, ∆dm,t−1,t, and ∆em,t−1,t are
real consumption, real dividend, and real earnings growth respectively. σt is consumption growth
volatility. Variables have been simulated for 100,000 years.
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Table 2.8.5 Default boundaries, average default rates, and expected Baa-
Aaa credit spreads for the disappointment model
Panel A: default boundaries for the simulated economy
cases I & II: constant default boundary
4 yr 10 yr 15 yr
Baa Aaa Baa Aaa Baa Aaa
adef,0 -0.998 -1.600 -1.108 -1.832 -1.007 -1.970
cases III & IV: time-varying default boundary
4 yr 10 yr 15 yr
Baa Aaa Baa Aaa Baa Aaa
ai,def,0 -1.085 -1.790 -1.150 -1.920 -1.032 -2.040
adef,c -4 -4 -4 -4 -4 -4
adef,σ 4 4 4 4 4 4
Panel B: average default rates for the simulated data
4 year 10 year 15 year
Aaa Baa Aaa Baa Aaa
case I 1.379% 0.036% 4.655% 0.469% 8.626% 0.888%
case II 1.378% 0.035% 4.665% 0.471% 8.627% 0.891%
case III 1.374% 0.035% 4.666% 0.469% 8.640% 0.881%
case IV 1.385% 0.036% 4.651% 0.472% 8.663% 0.869%
1970-2011 sample 1.375% 0.035% 4.649% 0.476% 8.632% 0.884%
Panel C: expected Baa-Aaa credit spreads according to the disappointment model
4 year 10 year 15 year
Baa-rf Aaa-rf Baa-Aaa Baa-rf Aaa-rf Baa-Aaa Baa-rf Aaa-rf Baa-Aaa
case I 65 3 62 122 27 95 153 40 113
case II 81 4 77 151 37 114 191 55 136
case III 78 4 74 139 33 106 167 47 120
case IV 106 6 100 176 47 129 215 67 148
eq. (2.1) 51 77 97
eq. (2.2) 58 87 112
sample 103 131 112
Table 2.8.5 Default boundaries for the simulated economy (Panel A) are expressed in terms of
asset log-returns. I consider four different cases for the disappointment aversion discount factor:
i) constant recovery rates and default boundaries, ii) procyclical recovery rates according to (2.15)
and constant default boundaries, iii) constant recovery rates and countercyclical default boundaries
according to (2.16), and iv) procyclical recovery rates and countercyclical default boundaries. ai,def,0
is a constant, and adef,c, adef,σ are the multipliers for consumption growth and consumption growth
volatility respectively in the expression for default boundaries (2.16). Panel B shows average default
rates for the simulated data as well as for the Moody’s sample. Finally, Panel C shows expected
Baa-Aaa credit spreads for the simulated disappointment model. Benchmark expected credit spreads
are from the models in (2.1) and (2.2). Sample average credit spreads are from Huang and Huang
(2012) for 4yr and 10yr bonds, and from the Barclays corporate indices for long maturity bonds.
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Table 2.8.6 Simulation results for the stock market and the risk-free rate




ρ(rm,t−1,t, rm,t,t+1) -0.030 0.035




ρ(rf,t−1,t, rf,t,t+1) 0.696 0.650
E[zm,t] 3.433 3.000
Vol(zm,t) 0.427 0.227
ρ(zm,t, zm,t−1) 0.950 0.891
Baa Sharpe ratio 0.220 0.218
Table 2.8.6 shows sample and simulated moments for the stock market, and the risk-free rate.
rm,t,t+1 are real stock market returns, rf,t,t+1 is the one-year real risk-free rate, zm,t is the aggregate
price-dividend ratio, and Baa Sharpe ratio is the equity Sharpe ratio for the median Baa firm
according to Chen et al. (2009).
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Table 2.8.7 Simulation results for alternative preference parameters in
the disappointment model
baseline scenario I scenario II
θ = 2.03, α = 1.8 θ = 3, α = −1 θ = 0, α = 5
case I Baa-Aaa 4yr 62 43 33
case II Baa-Aaa 4yr 77 48 39
case III Baa-Aaa 4yr 74 43 38
case IV Baa-Aaa 4yr 100 61 51
E[rm,t,t+1 − rf,t,t+1] 5.691% 5.676% 0.000%
Vol(rm,t,t+1) 15.049% 16.275% 14.367%
E[rf,t,t+1] 0.962% 0.519% 2.000%
Vol(rf,t,t+1) 1.163% 1.247% 0.987%
Table 2.8.7 shows simulation results for expected Baa-Aaa credits spreads and the stock market
when the disappointment aversion discount factor is calibrated to alternative preference parameters.
In the baseline case, θ = 2.03 and α = 1.8. For the first alternative scenario, θ is 3 and α is
-1 (second-order risk neutrality). In the second alternative scenario, θ is zero (no disappointment
aversion effect) and α is 5.
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Table 2.8.8 Model implied expected credit spreads and expected equity
risk premia in the literature
model maturity
characteristics 4yr 10yr 15yr E[rm,t,t+1 − rf,t,t+1]
Chen et al. (2009) habit, α = 2.45 107 123 7.30%
countercyclical boundaries
Chen et al. (2009) long-run risk, 52 7.40%
EIS=2, α = 7.5
Chen (2010) endogenous default, 105 6.71%
EIS=1.5, α = 6.5
Bhamra et al. (2010) endogenous default, 45(5yr) 75 3.19%
no preferences
Huang & Huang (2012) Goldstein et al. (2001) 31 40
model
case IV in Table 1.7.2 EIS=1, α = 1.8, θ = 2.03, 100 129 148 6.65%
countercyclical boundaries &
losses given default
Table 2.8.8 shows model implied expected credit spreads (bps) and equity risk premia calculated
in prior works. “no preferences” implies that expected credit spreads have been calculated using
risk-neutral measures, without modeling investor preferences. α is the risk aversion parameter,
EIS is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and θ is the disappointment aversion parameter.
E[rm,t,t+1 − rf,t,t+1] is the expected equity risk premium.
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2.9 Figures











Moody’s Baa−Aaa credit spreads    Baa default probabilities
Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 2.9.1 The solid line in Figure 1.8.2 shows Baa-Aaa credit credit spreads for the Moody’s
Seasoned Aaa and Baa Corporate Bond Indices. The dashed line shows annual Baa default rates
from the Moody’s 2012 report. Shaded areas are NBER recessions.
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Figure 2.9.2 Sample and fitted expected Baa-Aaa credit spreads accord-
ing to the benchmark model in (2.1)






























average Baa−Aaa credit spreads
according to the benchmark model in (1)
average Baa−Aaa credit spreads
accross different samples
Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 2.9.2 The dotted line in Figure 2.9.2 shows expected credit spreads (bps) according to the
benchmark model in (2.1) for maturities from 1 up to 20 years. The scattered points are mean Baa-
Aaa credit spreads for three sets of corporate bond indices (Barclays, BofA, and Thomson-Reuters)
and the Huang and Huang (2012) sample.
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Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 2.9.3 shows recovery rates for senior subordinate bonds from the Moody’s 2012 report.
Shaded areas are NBER recessions.
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Figure 2.9.4 Sample and fitted expected Baa-Aaa credit spreads accord-
ing to the disappointment model in (2.14)





























benchmark model in (1) sample Baa−Aaa credit spreads case IV disap. aversion
Student Version of MATLAB
Figure 2.9.4 shows model implied expected Baa-Aaa credit spreads according to the benchmark
model in (2.1) and case IV of the disappointment model in (2.14). Sample expected credit spreads
are from Huang and Huang (2012) for 4yr and 10yr maturities. Sample credit spreads for 15yr





Disappointment Events in Consumption Growth,
and the Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns
Appendix A.1 Preferences over stochastic payoffs
Assume that conditions for expected utility hold1. Suppose also that an investor
is endowed with $1, and is presented with the following dilemma: consume $1 for
sure or spend $1 to buy a ticket to a lottery that pays either $1 + σ or $1 − σ
(σ > 0) with equal probability. Consider first a risk-neutral agent whose preferences





= 1, the risk neutral agent is indifferent between taking the
actuarial fair bet or not.
Now suppose that preferences over risky payoffs x can be represented by a strictly
increasing, strictly concave, twice differentiable utility function U2(x) such that U2(1) =






around the point σ0 = 0 is given by
1
2
U2(1 + σ) +
1
2
U2(1− σ) = U2(1) + 0.5U ′′2 (1)σ2 +O(σ3). (A.1)
1See von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). For disappointment averse agents, the independence
axiom can be relaxed with a betweenness axiom (Gul 1991).
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Notice that when preferences are represented by smooth utility functions there are
no linear σ-terms in equation (A.1) because U2(x) is twice differentiable, and the
probability mass function for the random payoff is symmetric. Ignoring O(σ3) terms,
as long as U2(x) is strictly concave everywhere, then U
′′
2 (x) < 0 ∀x, and 12U2(1 +σ) +
1
2
U2(1 − σ) < U2(1) = 1. The risk averse individual would reject the lottery, unless
the lottery ticket were cheaper than $1 (risk premium2).











= U2(1) = 1
When the dispersion of possible outcomes is very small, risk averse investors become
indifferent between participating in an actuarial fair lottery or not, much like a risk
neutral agent3.
The utility function for a loss averse individual is given by
U3(x) =
 x+ θ̃(x− 1), x < 1, θ̃ > 0,x, x ≥ 1,
in which θ̃ is the coefficient of loss aversion. Since loss aversion theory does not
provide any guidelines on the selection of the reference point, we set it equal to one,
the value of investor’s current wealth. Expected utility over lottery payoffs for the





For θ̃ > 0, loss averse individuals would reject the fair bet, unless the ticket to enter
2The risk premium depends on the magnitude of U ′′2 (1) which is associated with the Arrow-Pratt
coefficient of second-order risk aversion (Pratt 1964).
3See also the discussion in Backus et al. (2005) p. 334.
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the lottery were cheaper than $1 (loss premium).
Consider finally an individual whose preferences over payoffs are described by a
utility function of the form
U4(x;µ) =






θ(x− µ)1{x < µ}
]
,
x, x ≥ µ,
in which θ > 0 is the coefficient of disappointment aversion, and µ is the certainty
equivalent of the random payoff4. Notice that µ is also the threshold for disappoint-








σ < 1. (A.2)
The disappointment averse agent would also reject the actuarially fair bet, unless the
price to enter the lottery were cheaper than $1 (disappointment premium).
Let ε be an extremely small positive number close to zero, and consider the limit



























4According the the generalized disappointment aversion model of Routledge and Zin (2010), the
reference level for gains and losses is a multiple δ of the certainty equivalent µ
U4(x;µ) =
{






θ(x− δµ)1{x < δµ}
]
,
x, x ≥ δµ.
For the case δ > 1, the reader is referred to Routledge and Zin (2010).
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U ′′2 (1)ε ≈ 1.
As σ2 approaches zero, σ also approaches zero but at a far slower rate than σ2 5.
First-order risk aversion effects in disappointment or loss aversion preferences do
not vanish immediately as σ2 ↓ 0. In contrast, as σ2 ↓ 0, a second-order risk averse
individual would be indifferent between accepting actuarial fair lotteries or not. When
the dispersion of lottery payoffs is small, first-order risk aversion induces a more
conservative risk taking behavior than second-order risk aversion.
In the context of consumption-based asset pricing, smooth utility functions need
to be extremely concave in order to generate realistic equity risk premia because
aggregate consumption growth exhibits very low variability (σ2c ↓ 0). On the other
hand, even if consumption growth variance is almost zero, there might still be mea-
surable consumption growth volatility terms (σc > 0). These volatility terms can
be combined with disappointment aversion preferences to generate measurable equity
risk premia.
The figure below shows utility plots for all four types of preferences considered
here. When uncertainty is low, linear utility becomes tangential to the CRRA utility
function, and CRRA investors behave as if they were risk-neutral.
Appendix A.2 Linear disappointment aversion preferences
One of the key insights of non-separable utility functions is that preferences over
the timing and uncertainty of payoffs need not be characterized by the same param-
eter. The disappointment aversion framework can separate preferences over risk and
time, while preserving the additive form for lifetime utility Vt. Suppose that in equa-
5σ approaches zero at a square root rate, yet as σ2 eventually becomes zero, σ will also become
zero.
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Student Version of MATLAB
Figure A.1 The utility functions shown in are: i) linear utility (risk neutrality), ii) power utility
(second-order risk aversion), iii) piece-wise utility over gains and losses (loss aversion, LA), iv) piece-
wise utility with endogenous reference for gains and losses (disappointment aversion, DA). W0 and
W1 are wealth before and after the gamble respectively. Rw = W1/W0 are returns on wealth after
the gamble, and µ() is the disappointment aversion certainty equivalent.
tions (1.1), (1.2), and (1.3) −α = δ = ρ = 1. The restriction −α = ρ implies that
preferences are essentially time-additive. However, the expected value operator Et
in the recursive equation (1.1) is replaced by the disappointment aversion certainty
equivalent µt, and the discount factor in (1.3) becomes
Mt,t+1 = β
1 + θ 1{Vt+1 < µt(Vt+1)}
1 + θ Et[1{Vt+1 < µt(Vt+1)}]
. (A.3)
Suppose now that consumption in first differences follows an AR(1) process
∆Ct+1 = µC(1− ΦC) + ΦC∆Ct +
√
(1− Φ2C)ΣCεt+1. (A.4)
µC = E[∆Ct+1] ∈ R, Σ2C = Var(∆Ct+1) ∈ R>0, ΦC = ρ(∆Ct+1,∆Ct) ∈ (−1, 1) are
the unconditional mean, variance, and first-order autocorrelation for consumption in
first differences respectively. εt+1 are i.i.d. N(0, 1) variables. The R
2 for the above
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AR(1) model is 24.571% at the annual frequency, and 25.909% for quarterly data.
Since Vt+1 is unobservable, the use of the disappointment aversion discount factor in
(A.3) for empirical purposes becomes problematic. However, we can express lifetime
utility Vt in terms of consumption changes ∆Ct,
Proposition 2: Given the consumption dynamics in (A.4), then for −α = ρ = δ = 1
in equations (1.1), (1.2) and (1.3), investors’ lifetime utility Vt can be expressed as
Vt = Ct + µV + ΦV ∆Ct ∀t, where
• ΦV = βΦC1−βΦC , ΦV ∈ R,
• µV = β1−β
[




, µV ∈ R,





and N(.) and n(.) are the standard normal cdf and pdf respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.2.
Proposition 2 tells us that lifetime utility minus current consumption (Vt − Ct)
is an affine function of consumption in first differences (∆Ct). µV is the constant
term, and ΦV is the slope coefficient for consumption changes. Notice the linear
(d1
√
1− Φ2CΣC), instead of quadratic, structure of the disappointment aversion cor-
rection in µv. Comparative statics for µV imply that high uncertainty about the
economy (large ΣC) or a large disappointment aversion coefficient θ would lead to
large (in absolute magnitude) corrections to µV
6.




< 0 since the inequality 1 > x1+x holds trivially ∀ x ∈ R>0.
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From Proposition 2 disappointment events happen whenever




1− Φ2CΣC .︸ ︷︷ ︸
disappointment aversion adjustment︸ ︷︷ ︸
certainty equivalent
(A.6)
For θ = 12 in (A.5), then d1 ≈ −1, and disappointment events happen whenever
shocks to consumption in first differences ε are less than -1, or consumption changes
drop one standard deviation below the expected value. If shocks to consumption
changes were normally distributed, then for θ = 12 disappointment events would
happen around 16% of the time.
Using Proposition 2, the discount factor in (A.3) now becomes
Mt,t+1 = β
1 + θ 1{∆Ct+1 < µC(1− ΦC) + ΦC∆Ct + d1
√
1− Φ2CΣC}




and its conditional expectation is equal to
Et[Mt,t+1] = β.
The risk-free rate for the linear disappointment model is a constant, and the real
yield-curve is always flat.
Finally, expected asset returns for the linear disappointment model are equal to




θCov[Ri,t+1,1{∆Ct+1 < µC(1− ΦC) + ΦC∆Ct + d1
√
1− Φ2CΣC}]
1 + E[1{∆Ct+1 < µC(1− ΦC) + ΦC∆Ct + d1
√
1− Φ2CΣC}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk premium: a function of θ alone
,
The risk-free rate depends only on the rate of time preference β. On the other
hand, the disappointment aversion coefficient θ affects risk premia, but not the risk-
free rate. An individual characterized by linear disappointment aversion preferences
is only worried about consumption in first differences dropping below the certainty
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equivalent. On the other hand, an investor with log-linear disappointment aversion
preferences (section 1.3.2) cares about consumption growth falling below the certainty
equivalent, as well as about the actual level of consumption growth.
Appendix A.3 Consistency and asymptotic normality of GMM estima-
tors when the GMM objective function is not continuous
In order to prove consistency and asymptotic normality for GMM estimators, stan-
dard applications require differentiability of the GMM objective function. However,
continuity and differentiability are violated when moment restrictions are associated
with indicator functions.



























For the disappointment aversion model x = {β, α, θ}, zt =
{













































We can assume that x = {β, α, θ} takes values in a compact space X ∈ R3.
Economic theory suggests that for disappointment averse investors β ∈ (0, 1), α ∈
(−1, Bα), and θ ∈ (0, Bθ). Bα < +∞ and Bθ < +∞ are upper bounds for the coef-
ficients of risk and disappointment aversion respectively. In general, risk preference
parameters α and θ cannot assume infinite values, and are bounded from above by
some positive real numbers (Bα and Bθ) which may be arbitrarily large but finite. We
will also assume that zt =
{
∆ct+1, {ri,t+1}n−1i=1 , rf,t+1
}
is characterized by a continu-
ous probability distribution function, and a well-defined moment generating function
∀x ∈ X7. Finally, let x0 be the minimizer in (A.7), and x̂T the minimizer in (A.8).
Identification. We will assume that the GMM objective function in (A.7) satis-
fies the conditions in Lemma 2.3, p. 2126 in Newey and McFadden (1994), so that x0
is globally identified. Because it is quite hard to verify identification, for the practical
purposes of our estimation we will simply assume it8.
Consistency. For consistency of GMM estimators when the GMM objective
function is not continuous, we refer to Theorem 2.6, p. 2132 in Newey and McFadden
(1994). We essentially require that:
1. zt is stationary and ergodic
7For β ∈ (0, 1) and ∆ct+1 stationary, it also follows that 1− φcβ 6= 0.




p→W , W is positive definite, and WE[g(z, x0)] = 0 only if x = x0
3. X is compact






Stationarity and ergodicity are reasonable properties for the random variables{
∆ct+1, {ri,t+1}n−1i=1 , rf,t+1
}
at the quarterly and annual frequencies. The second con-
dition is satisfied because the GMM weighting matrix is constant, and equal to the
identity matrix. Moreover, according to the identification assumption above, the
GMM objective function has a unique minimizer x0 which can be identified. Eco-
nomic theory suggests that the parameter space X is compact. The fourth condition
is also satisfied since the only point of discontinuity in expression (A.9) is
∆ct+1 = φc∆ct + µc(1− φc) + d1
√
1− φ2cσc,
which is a zero-probability event as long as consumption growth is a continuous
random variable. Finally, condition five is satisfied because X is compact, and the
distribution of zt has a well-defined moment generating function ∀x ∈ X.
Asymptotic normality. Theorems 7.2, p. 2186, and 7.3, p. 2188 in Newey and
McFadden (1994) provide conditions for asymptotic normality of GMM estimates


































4. x0 is in the interior of X








7. E[g(z, x)] is differentiable at x0 with derivative G, and G′WG is non-singular










The first condition is related to identification. The second condition is satisfied since
Ŵ = I. The third condition is satisfied by the consistency theorem above. Condi-
tions 4, 5, and 6 are standard GMM assumptions. The seventh condition is satisfied
provided that the joint probability density function of asset returns and consumption
growth is continuous, and that the moment generating function is well-defined. The
critical condition for asymptotic normality is condition 8, the stochastic equicontinu-
ity condition.
Andrews (1994) provides primitive conditions in order to verify stochastic equicon-
tinuity. These conditions are related to Pollard’s entropy condition (Pollard 1984).
Fortunately, the GMM objective function in (A.9) is a mixture of functions that sat-
isfy the entropy condition. According to Theorem 2, p. 2272 in Andrews (1994),
indicator functions (which are “type I” functions, p. 2270 in Andrews 1994) sat-
isfy Pollard’s conditions. A second class of functions (“type II” functions, p. 2271
in Andrews 1994) that satisfy Pollard’s conditions are functions which depend on
a finite number of parameters, and are Lipschitz-continuous9 with respect to these
parameters.
9Lipschitz continuity is also exploited in Theorem 7.3, p. 2188, in Newey and McFadden (1994)
as a primitive condition to show stochastic equicontinuity.
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The GMM q(zt, x) vector-valued function in equation (A.9) consists of exponen-
tial terms which, in turn, are functions of a finite number of preference parameters.
Exponentially functions are only locally Lipschitz-continuous. However, the exponen-
tial terms in the GMM objective function are Lipschitz-continuous on the compact
parameter space X, since the rate of change of the exponential functions remains
bounded as long as variables take values in compact spaces. Therefore, exponential
functions defined on the compact set X belong to the “type II” class of functions.
We conclude that the disappointment aversion GMM objective function in equation
(A.9) contains terms which individually satisfy Pollard’s entropy condition.
According to Theorem 3, p. 2273 in Andrews (1994), elementary operations among
“type I” and “type II” functions result in functions which also satisfy Pollard’s en-
tropy condition. Consequently, the disappointment aversion GMM objective function
in (A.9), which is a product of “type I” and “type II” functions, satisfies the stochas-
tic equicontinuity condition, and GMM estimates for the disappointment model are
therefore asymptotically normally distributed.
The above discussion confirms that even though q(zt, x) in (A.9) is not continuous
with respect to x = {β, α, θ}, standard results from GMM asymptotic theory can still
be applied provided that certain regularity conditions are satisfied. These conditions





rather than the function q(zt, x) itself.
Finally, even if q(zt, x) is not continuous or continuously differentiable, we can still
proceed with hypothesis testing as usual by replacing derivatives with finite differ-
ences approximations. Theorem 7.4, p. 2190 in Newey and McFadden (1994) suggests
that numerical derivatives for 1
T
∑T
t=1 q(zt, x) will asymptotically converge in proba-
bility to the derivative of E[q(zt, x)]. We can, therefore, obtain consistent asymptotic
variance estimators using finite differences. However, a practical problem with nu-
merical derivatives is the choice of perturbation parameters used in the denominator.
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Unfortunately, econometric theory does not provide a clear answer to this problem.
Appendix A.4 Proofs
Appendix A.4.1 Proof of Proposition 1

















Taking logs in both sides of the equation, and using the definition of the disappoint-
ment aversion certainty equivalent µt in (1.2), we obtain
1
β







− α(vt+1 − ct)
] 1 + θ1{vt+1 − ct < 1β (vt − ct)}
1 + θEt[1{vt+1 − ct < 1β (vt − ct)}]
}
.
Letting vt − ct = µv + φv∆ct ∀t, then
1
β








] 1 + θ1{µv + (φv + 1)∆ct+1 < 1β (µv + φv∆ct)}
1 + θEt[1{µv + (φv + 1)∆ct+1 < 1β (µv + φv∆ct)}]
}
.
We can use (1.5) to express ∆ct+1 in terms of ∆ct
1
β






µv + (φv + 1)
(













Partial moments for log-normal random variables imply that
1
β
(µv + φv∆ct) = µv + (φv + 1)
(
































10Lower case letters denote logs of variables.
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1−βφc , the two log-terms in (A.11) do not depend on ∆ct. Hence, the


























































Plugging back the above expression for µv into the definition of d1 in (A.12), d1 is the

















11If δ 6= 1 in (1.2), then d1 would be a function of ∆ct, and the linearity of the log-value function












Appendix A.4.2 Proof of Proposition 2























µV + (ΦV + 1)∆Ct+1; µV + (ΦV + 1)∆Ct+1 <
1
β
[µV + ΦV ∆Ct]
)
.








µV + (ΦV + 1)µ̃C + (ΦV + 1)ΦC∆Ct + (ΦV + 1)Σ̃Cεt+1
)
(
1 + θ1{µV + (ΦV + 1)µ̃C + (ΦV + 1)ΦC∆Ct + (ΦV + 1)Σ̃Cεt+1 <
1
β





1{µV + (ΦV + 1)µ̃C + (ΦV + 1)ΦC∆Ct + (ΦV + 1)Σ̃Cεt+1 <
1
β
(µV + ΦV ∆Ct)}
]}−1
,
where µ̃C = µc(1 − ΦC) and Σ̃C = Σc
√
1− Φ2C . Since error terms εt+1 are normally








1 + θ N(d1)
×
{
µV + (ΦV + 1)µ̃C (A.13)
+(ΦV + 1)ΦC∆Ct + θ
[(











12Winkler et al. (1972) derive simple expressions for partial moments of normally and log-
normally distributed random variables.
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is the disappointment threshold.
















1 + θ N(d1)
. (A.15)



















Thus, for ΦV =
βΦC
1−βΦC
, there are no ∆Ct terms in the expression for the disappoint-









1− Φ2C(ΦV + 1)ΣC
]
.
Plugging the equation for µV back into the equation for d1 in (A.16), d1 now becomes





13The scalar 1− βΦC is non-zero since ΦC lies within the (−1, 1) interval, and β ∈ (0, 1).
14Given the continuity and monotonicity of the function h(x) = x+ θn(x)1+θN(x) for θ > 0, the fixed
point problem is well defined and has a negative solution.
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APPENDIX B
Disappointment Aversion Preferences, and the
Credit Spread Puzzle
Appendix B.1 Bond yields according to the benchmark model in (2.1)
Suppose that single-period, cum-payout, asset log-returns for firm i ri,t,t+1 are
i.i.d. normal random variables with constant mean µ̃i − 12σ
2
i ∈ R, and volatility
σi ∈ R>0. Let ∆i be the constant log-payout yield
(






payout, log-returns rxi,t,t+1 are equal to cum-payout log-returns minus the log-payout
yield (rxi,t,t+1 = ri,t,t+1−∆i). Hence, rxi,t,t+1 are also normal random variables, and, in
a discrete-time setting, can be expressed as




with εi,t+1 i.i.d. N(0, 1) shocks. Moreover, T -period, ex-payout returns are also i.i.d.
normal random variables with mean (µ̃i −∆i − 12σ
2
i )T and volatility σi
√
T .
Suppose that the single-period, log risk-free rate is constant and equal to rf .
Assume also that there are no taxes, and that default boundaries Di,T as well as
1Oi,t+1 is the payout, and Pi,t+1 is the price of assets in place.
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losses given default L are constant. Let πPi,t,t+T be the physical probability of default






Pi,t is the value of assets in place for firm i. Similarly to the original Merton model,
default can only happen at the expiration date t + T , but unlike the Merton model,
the default boundary is not necessarily equal to the face value of debt. Normalizing
current period firm value Pi,t to one, the physical probability of default π
P
i,t,t+T can
be expressed in terms of asset log-returns rxi,t,t+1
πPi,t,t+T = N






in which N() is the standard normal c.d.f.. Because asset log-returns are i.i.d. with
constant mean and standard deviation, πPi,t,t+T depends only on maturity T , hence
πPi,t,t+T = π
P
i,T . Finally, using the inverse of the normal c.d.f. N
−1(), we can express
the log-default boundary logDi,T in terms of the physical probability of default π
P
i,T ,
expected returns for assets in place µ̃i, and asset return volatility σi




−1(πPi,T )σi√T . (B.1)
The continuous-time framework in Black and Scholes (1973) allows for frictionless
trading and hedging between underlying and derivative securities. An immediate
consequence of continuous trading is that if asset returns under the physical measure
are normally distributed with constant mean and volatility, then asset returns under
the risk-neutral measure are also normally distributed with the same variance, and
mean equal to the risk-free rate.
In a discrete-time setting, continuous trading is not possible. However, according
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to Lemma 1 in Appendix B.6.1, the risk-neutral density for asset returns is normal,
provided that aggregate preferences over consumption are described by a CRRA util-
ity function, and that aggregate consumption growth is a log-normal random vari-
able. Hence, assuming that all conditions for Lemma 1 hold, T -period, ex-payout
asset log-returns under the risk-neutral measure are normally distributed with mean
(rf −∆i − 12σ
2
i )T , and volatility σi
√
T .
Let yi,t,t+T be the continuously compounded yield to maturity for a T -period,










Taking logs in (B.2), and substituting logDi,T with the expression from (B.1), we get
that


















Since the right-hand side above and the risk-free rate are constants, we conclude that


















Appendix B.2 Bond yields according to the model in (2.2) with time-
varying recovery rates
Suppose that recovery rates are the same across all bonds, and depend only on
consumption growth
1− Lt+T = arec,0 + arec,c∆ct+T−1,t+T .
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Suppose also that all the assumptions in Appendix B.1 hold. Then, the yield-to-
















1− (1− arec,0 − arec,c∆ct+T−1,t+T )N





According to Appendix B.6.3, under the risk neutral measure, log-consumption
growth is a normal random variable with volatility σc, and mean µ̃c− µ̃m−rfρm,cσmσc.
µ̃m−rf
σm
is the stock market Sharpe ratio, and ρm,c is the correlation between stock market
returns and consumption growth. Using the expression for the default boundary
logDi,T from (B.1), we obtain
























Since the right-hand side and the risk-free rate are constants, we conclude that

























2Under the risk neutral measure Q, asset returns ri,t,t+1 and consumption growth are indepen-
dent.
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Appendix B.3 Intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for disappoint-
ment aversion preferences
Along an optimal consumption path, the Bellman equation for the representative
investor’s consumption-investment problem implies that
Vt =
[





where µt is the disappointment aversion certainty equivalent from (2.4). The expres-























[ V −αt+1 (1 + θ1{Vt+1 < δµt})






1 + θ1{Vt+1 < δµt})
1− θ(δ−α − 1)1{δ > 1}+ θδ−αEt[1{Vt+1 < δµt}]
1
ρ











)]−α−ρ[ 1 + θ1{Vt+1 < δµt}




Appendix B.4 Asset returns and the price-payout ratio
Let Pm,t, Om,t, Zm,t = (P/O)m,t be the price, payout, and price-payout ratio of
a generic financial claim m written on a stream of aggregate payments. Depending
on the asset we want to price, payouts can be aggregate dividends (equity), aggre-
gate earnings (assets in place), or even aggregate consumption (claim on aggregate





Dividing and multiplying the numerator with Om,t+1, the denominator with Om,t,
and taking logs, we can express log-returns rm,t,t+1 in terms of log price-payout ratios
zm,t
rm,t,t+1 = log[e
zm,t+1 + 1]− zm,t + ∆om,t,t+1.
Using a first-order Taylor series approximation for log[ezm,t+1 + 1] around the point
zm,t+1 = z̄m, asset returns can be expressed as





∈ (0, 1), (B.4)
and
κm,0 = log[e





Following a similar line of arguments3, ex-payout, asset log-returns are given by
rxm,t,t+1 = zm,t+1 − zm,t + ∆om,t,t+1.
Appendix B.5 Simulation
Appendix B.5.1 Simulation methodology
The consumption-Euler equation for a T -period, zero-coupon bond written on






1{rxi,t,t+T ≥ Di,t+T}+ (1− Lt+T )1{rxi,t,t+T < Di,t+T}
)]
.
Unlike the model in (2.1), the default barrier Di,t+T , which is expressed in terms of
ex-payout asset returns, and losses given default Lt+T are allowed to vary over time,
and be functions of the state variables














1− Lt+T = arec,0 + arec,c∆ct+T−1,t+T .
The first step in the simulation exercise is to discretize the consumption growth
and consumption growth volatility space into N∆c = 20 and Nσ = 20 equidistant
points with a pace of d∆c and dσ respectively. The consumption growth space is
truncated from above and below by Ê[∆ct−1,t]± 3V̂ol(∆ct−1,t), whereas the volatility
space is truncated from above and below by Ê[σt]± 1.9V̂ol(σt). The lower bound for
the volatility space guarantees that initial values for volatility are always positive. Ê[]







and V̂ol() are the simulated unconditional mean and standard deviation from Table
1.7.3.
The second step is to choose starting values for consumption growth and con-
sumption growth volatility. To do so, I iterate though all possible pairs of {∆cl, σk},
l = 1, 2, ..., N∆c, k = 1, 2, ..., Nσ. For each pair of starting values, I simulate N =
10, 000 4 paths for consumption growth, consumption growth volatility, and aggre-
gate payout growth according to the system in (2.6)-(2.8), as well as idiosyncratic
volatility shocks. Each path contains T nodes, as many nodes as the life of of the





from the initial grid.
At each node of the simulated paths for ∆ct−1,t and σt, I can obtain values for
the stochastic discount factor Mt+j−1,t+j from (2.9), price-payout ratios according
to Proposition 2, one-period, ex-payout asset log-returns for the median firm from
(2.13), as well as losses given default and default boundaries according to (2.15) and
(2.16). T -period, ex-payout, asset log-returns are simply given by the sum of single-




i,t,t+j. Finally, for each simulated path, the discounted





(1−Lt+T )1{rxi,t,t+T < Di,t+T}
)
. Averaging across all N simulated paths, we obtain a
value for the yield to maturity given the initial values for ∆ct,t−1 and σt


























The objective is to match unconditional first moments for credit spreads. We
therefore need to calculate unconditional expected values over the grid of starting
values for consumption growth and consumption growth volatility using the p.d.f’s.
4Simulation results are not affected by the number of simulation paths N or the number of grid
points (Nδc, Nσ), provided of course that these numbers are relatively large.
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for ∆ct−1,t, σt, and σt−1



















σ are constants such that
∑N∆c







σ = 1. The p.d.f.’s for ∆ct−1,t, σt, and σt−1 are derived in Appendix
B.5.2.
Appendix B.5.2 Unconditional p.d.f. for consumption growth, and con-
sumption growth volatility
According to (2.7), consumption growth volatility σt−1 is unconditionally normally
distributed with mean µσ/(1 − φσ) and variance ν2σ/(1 − φ2σ). According to (2.6),










Using the above results and equations (2.6)-(2.7), we conclude that the long-run


































The joint p.d.f. for ∆ct−1,t, σt and σt−1 is therefore equal to
f(∆ct−1,t, σt, σt−1) = f(∆ct−1,t|σt, σt−1)f(σt|σt−1)f(σt−1)⇔


























Appendix B.6.1 Lemma 1
Lemma 1: Suppose that one-period, cum-dividend, asset log-returns ri,t,t+1 are i.i.d.
normal random variables with constant mean µ̃i − 12σ
2
i and volatility σi. Suppose
also that financial markets are complete, that there exists a representative investor
with CRRA (power utility) defined over consumption5, that log-consumption growth
∆ct,t+1 is a normal random variable with constant mean µ̃c and constant volatility σc,
and that the correlation coefficient between ri,t,t+1 and ∆ct,t+1 is ρi,c. Then, the log
risk-free rate rf is constant, and also cum-payout, asset log-returns under the risk-




5More on the aggregation properties of the CRRA utility function can be found in Chapter 1 of
Duffie (2000), and Chapter 5 in Huang and Litzenberger (1989).
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Proof:





= 1⇔ µ̃i + logβ − αµ̃c +
1
2
α2σ2c − αρi,cσcσi = 0. (B.6)
in which β ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of time-preference, and α ≥ −1 is the risk aversion
parameter in the CRRA power utility function. Similarly, for the log risk-free rate
rf + logβ − αµ̃c +
1
2
α2σ2c = 0. (B.7)
which is constant since µc and σc are also constant.
























































































σi dri,t,t+1 = 1.
Appendix B.6.2 Lemma 2
Lemma 2: Let x be a normal random variable with mean µ ∈ R and standard






















































After a change of variables x̃ =
√












Appendix B.6.3 Risk-neutral density for consumption growth under CRRA
preferences
Following Lemma 1 in Appendix B.6.1, assume that consumption growth is log-
normally distributed with constant mean µ̃c and volatility σc, and that aggregate in-
vestor preferences can be described by a CRRA power utility function. Let ft(∆ct,t+1)
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Exploiting the consumption-Euler equations for stock market returns and the risk-
free rate in (B.6) and (B.7), we can substitute out the term ασ2c with the stock market



















Appendix B.6.4 Proof of Proposition 1









µt is the disappointment aversion certainty equivalent from (2.4) with δ = 1. Suppose
that log Vt
Ct















− α[A0 + (A1 + 1)∆ct,t+1 + A2σt+1 + A3σ2t+1]
]
×
1 + θ1{A0 + (A1 + 1)∆ct,t+1 + A2σt+1 + A3σ2t+1 < 1β (A0 + A1∆ct−1,t + A2σt + A3σ
2
t )}





























1 + θ1{A0 + (A1 + 1)∆ct,t+1 + A2σt+1 + A3σ2t+1 < 1β (A0 + A1∆ct−1,t + A2σt + A3σ
2
t )}






Recall that εc,t+1 and εσ,t+1 from (2.6) and (2.7) are independent. We can use the law

























1 + θ1{A0 + (A1 + 1)∆ct,t+1 + A2σt+1 + A3σ2t+1 < 1β (A0 + A1∆ct−1,t + A2σt + A3σ
2
t )}






Using the dynamics of consumption growth ∆ct,t+1 in (2.6), and partial moments for









































For θ = 2 and N() a small number6, we can use the following approximation 1 +






















































Further, we can use a first-order linear approximation for the difference of the two
standard normal c.d.f.’s in the above equation, provided that this difference is small7,





























− αA2σt+1 − αA3σ2t+1
]}
= 1,
in which n() is the standard normal p.d.f..
Combining the dynamics for aggregate uncertainty σt+1 in (2.7) with Lemma 2































6In simulations, the probability of disappointment events is less than 0.5
7Essentially we require that α1−βφcσt to be small.
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We can now solve for A0, A1, A2, and A3 using the method of undetermined





Note that for β ∈ (0, 1) and φc ∈ (−1, 1), then A1 + 1 is positive. Also, for β ∈ (0, 1),
the sign of A1 depends only on the sign of φc.
Similarly, collecting σ2t terms yields
2αν2σA
2




2 = 0. (B.12)
For α 6= 0, the solution for to the quadratic equation is
A3 =
−[1− βφ2σ + βα2(A1 + 1)2ν2σ]±
√
[1− βφ2σ + βα2(A1 + 1)2ν2σ]2 − 4βα2(A1 + 1)2ν2σ
4αν2σ
. (B.13)
The ratio of the constant term over the quadratic coefficient in the above quadratic





. Hence, the roots of the quadratic
equation will be of the same sign. Furthermore, since β ∈ (0, 1) and φσ ∈ (−1, 1),
then 1−βφ2σ is positive, −[1−βφ2σ +βα2(A1 +1)2ν2σ] is negative, and the solutions to
the quadratic equation are therefore negative. We will pick the largest negative root
so that the quadratic solution in (B.13) is very close to the linear approximation in
(B.14) below.
For A3 to be a real number, we require that
[1− βφ2σ + βα2(A1 + 1)2ν2σ]2 − 4βα2(A1 + 1)2ν2σ > 0.
We cannot really examine whether the above inequality holds without having cali-
brated model parameters. However, ν2σ is a very small number close to zero (0.00177
2),
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and for ν2σ ≈ 0 the determinant in (B.13) is approximately equal to
lim
ν2σ↓0
[1− βφ2σ + βα2(A1 + 1)2ν2σ]2 − 4βα2(A1 + 1)2ν2σ ≈ [1− βφ2σ]2 > 0.
The restriction that νσ is a very small number is associated with higher consumption
growth moments being well defined. Parameter values for the simulated economy
ensure that the determinant in (B.13) is well defined, and that 1 + 2αA3ν
2
σ > 0
as required by Lemma 2 in Appendix B.6.2. Finally, for ν2σ ≈ 0, equation (B.12)








Collecting σt terms in (B.10), we obtain the solution for A2
A2 =
−θβn(x̄)(A1 + 1)(1 + 2αA3ν2σ) + 2βA3µσφσ
1 + 2αA3ν2σ − βφσ
. (B.15)
It is easy to verify that for negative A3, then A2 is also negative. As ν
2
σ ↓ 0, an
approximate solution for A2 reads
A2 ≈
−θβn(x̄)(A1 + 1) + 2βA3µσφσ
1− βφσ
. (B.16)























Appendix B.6.5 The log risk-free rate










))−α 1 + θ 1{Vt+1 < µt(Vt+1)}
Et[1 + θ 1{Vt+1 < µt(Vt+1)}]
]
.
Repeating all the steps that lead to equation (B.9) in Appendix B.6.4, we obtain
e−rf,t,t+1 = exp
[













[α(A1 + 1) + 1]














− αA2σt+1 − αA3σ2t+1
]}
.




























− αA2σt+1 − αA3σ2t+1
]}
= 1.
Therefore, the log risk-free rate must be approximately equal to
rf,t,t+1 ≈ −logβ + µc + φc∆ct−1,t −
1
2
[2α(A1 + 1) + 1]σ
2
t − θn(x̄)σt
Appendix B.6.6 Proof of Proposition 2
We conjecture that the log price-payout ratio zm,t for a financial claim on a stream
of aggregate payments (dividends or earnings) is an affine function of the state vari-
ables ∆ct−1,t, σt, σ
2
t












Substituting the result for the disappointment aversion discount factor Mt,t+1 from
















1 + θ 1{A0 + (A1 + 1)∆ct,t+1 + A2σt+1 + A3σ2t+1 < 1β (A0 + A1∆ct−1,t + A2σt + A3σ
2
t )}












































[0.5(αA2 − κm,1Am,2)ν2σ − (αA2 − κm,1Am,2)µσ − (αA2 − κm,1Am,2)φσσt




[−(αA3 − κm,1Am,3)µ2σ − (αA3 − κm,1Am,3)φ2σσ2t − 2(αA3 − κm,1Am,3)µσφσσt




1 + 2(αA3 − κm,1Am,3)ν2σ
= e0.
We are now able to solve for Am,0, Am,1, Am,2, and Am,3 using the method of
undetermined coefficients. Specifically, for Am,1 we get
−φc − α(A1 + 1)φc +
1
β
αA1 + κm,1Am,1φc − Am,1 + φm = 0.
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[α(A1 + 1) + 1− κm,1Am,1]2 + σ2m
]
[1 + 2(αA3 − κm,1Am,3)ν2σ] + αA3(1 + 2αA3ν2σ − βφ2σ)
−2αA3κm,1Am,3ν2σ − βAm,3 − 2αA3ν2σβAm,3 + 2βκm,1ν2σA2m,3 + βκm,1φ2σAm,3 = 0.





















σ) + αA3(1 + 2αA3ν
2
σ − βφ2σ).
We will pick the largest negative root so that the quadratic solution in (B.22) is very
close to the linear approximation in (B.23) below. As in Appendix B.6.4, we need
to make sure that 1 + 2(αA3 − κm,1Am,3)ν2σ is positive, and that the determinant in
(B.22) is well defined. Both conditions are satisfied for very small ν2σ, and reasonable
values for the risk aversion coefficient α. Finally, since ν2σ is a small number close to








Collecting σt terms from (B.19), the solution for A2,m is given by
Am,2 =
θβn(x̄)[α(A1 + 1) + 1− κm,1Am,1][1 + 2(αA3 − κm,1Am,3)ν2σ]
β + 2β(αA3 − κm,1Am,3)ν2σ − βκm,1φσ
(B.24)
+αA2[1 + 2(αA3 − κm,1Am,3)ν2σ − βφσ]− 2β(αA3 − κm,1Am,3)µσφσ
β + 2β(αA3 − κm,1Am,3)ν2σ − βκm,1φσ
.
For ν2σ ≈ 0, and the approximate expressions for A3 and A2 in (B.14) and (B.16)
respectively, we conclude that
Am,2 ≈
θn(x̄)(1− κm,1Am,1) + 2κm,1Am,3µσφσ
1− κm,1φσ
. (B.25)





logβ + κm,0 + µm − αA0
β − 1
β
− [α(A1 + 1) + 1− κm,1Am,1]µc (B.26)
−(αA2 − κm,1Am,2)µσ + (αA3 − κm,1Am,3)µ
2
σ − 0.5(αA2 − κm,1Am,2)2ν2σ
1 + 2(αA3 − κm,1Am,3)ν2σ
−0.5log
(
1 + 2(αA3 − κm,1Am,3)ν2σ
)]
.
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